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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
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Doctor of Philosophy  
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March 2015 
 
Title: Internet Service Provider Liability for Defamation: United States and United 
Kingdom Compared  
 
 
Since the mid-1990s, American Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have enjoyed 
immunity from liability for defamation under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act. As Congress originally intended in 1996, Section 230 has strongly 
protected freedom of online speech and allowed ISPs to thrive with little fear of being 
sued for online users’ comments. Such extraordinary statutory immunity for ISPs reflects 
American free-speech tradition that freedom of speech is preferred to reputation. 
Although the Internet landscape has changed over the past 20 years, American 
courts have applied Section 230 to shield ISPs almost invariably. ISPs won in 83 of 85 
cases in 1997 to 2014. Nearly all types of ISPs have been held to be eligible for immunity 
unless they are original online speakers. Even when ISPs have operated websites that 
have left digital “scarlet letters” on individuals, they have not been liable if the ISPs did  
not “create or develop” the defamatory contents. Bloggers, as website operators, could be 
immunized even when they exercised the “traditional editorial functions” unlike the 
traditional journalists. 
By contrast, ISPs in the United Kingdom could not enjoy such absolute immunity. 
	  	   v 
Following the U.K. tradition of plaintiff-friendly libel law, the Defamation Act 1996 did 
not adopt any separate provision for ISP liability. Under Section 1, ISPs in England are 
subject to liability for defamation by third parties if they are notified of harmful online 
contents but fail to remove the postings promptly. Meanwhile, the new Defamation Act 
2013 includes a separate provision for ISP liability. Section 5 is novel because ISP 
liability hinges on whether the original speaker is identifiable.  
I suggest that CDA Section 230 of the United States should be revised. One 
possible way of revising Section 230 is borrowing from the U.K. Defamation Act 2013.  
But such adoption is not compellingly urgent. It needs time to see what impact the new 
U.K. defamation law will have on freedom of speech. Regardless, the U.K. experience 
with ISP liability will provide a useful comparative framework to rebalance free speech 
with reputation on the Internet. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has brought about a communication revolution. It allows people 
numerous opportunities to communicate with each other without geographical barriers. 
As print media in the fifteenth century enlightened the Dark Ages and marked a turning 
point in communication history, the Internet has been touted as a “unique and wholly new 
medium of worldwide human communication.”1  
As the number of its users has increased exponentially, the Internet has transformed 
the whole picture of the communicational, cultural, political, and legal spectrum. For 
instance, social networking websites such as Myspace, Facebook, and Twitter provide 
global users with a variety of ways for online communication via instant message, e-mail, 
and status updates. A 2014 survey reports that 74% of online adults used online social 
networking sites to share their interests with others.2  
The Internet has changed the way people obtain information. It makes an enormous 
amount of data available that the pre-Internet generation could not imagine. Web portals 
such as Yahoo!, MSN, and AOL typically provide news, shopping opportunities, email, 
and countless other sources of information. Google Book supplies a colossal collection of 
digitized books from library collections all over the world, although Google still struggles 
with publishers and authors over its ambitious e-book projects.3 The New York Times 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997). 
  
2 Pew Research Center, Social Networking Factsheet, Jan. 2014, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2014). 
 
3 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (accepting 
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offers over 13 million articles that have been published since 1851 through its online 
“Article Archive.”4 In addition, the Internet has already surpassed all other media except 
television as a favorite source for news. The Pew Research Center reported in 2008 that, 
for the first time in its almost 20-year history, American adults get news information 
from the Internet (40%) more than from newspapers (35%), although television (70%) 
was still cited most frequently as a main source for national and international news.5 
However, 59 percent of young (aged 18-29) people answered that they got most of their 
news from the Internet.6   
While some legal scholars have been sanguine about the Internet’s possible role in 
democratizing politics with great numbers of speakers,7 others are increasingly skeptical 
because of the “digital divide.”8 Another pessimistic view on the Internet as a democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Google’s argument that its scanning books and making snippets of text available for online 
searches constituted fair use). The Authors Guild appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit, which 
heard oral arguments in December 2014. See Max Stendahl, Google Tells 2nd Circ. Fair Use 
Shields Book-Scanning Project, LAW360, http://www.law360.com/articles/599419/google-tells-
2nd-circ-fair-use-shields-book-scanning-project (last visited Jan. 26, 2015).  
 
4 “Article Archive,” N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2014).  
 
5 Pew Research Center, Survey Reports, Internet Overtakes Newspapers as News Outlet, Dec. 23 
2008, http://people-press.org/report/479/internet-overtakes-newspapers-as-news-source (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2014).  
 
6 Id.  
 
7 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006) (discussing that “networked 
public sphere” will contribute to democracy). See also BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI 
GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY 
STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL (2009) (suggesting that “collaborative governance” 
enables people to participate in government decision-making on the Internet). 
 
8 “Digital divide” refers to the asymmetries in news and information flow caused by wealth, age, 
race, and education. See George A. Barnett & Devan Rosen, The Global Implications of the 
	  	   3 
agent is related to fragmentation. The unlimited filtering system of online communication 
produces little shared information as the social glue for citizens, which may preclude 
citizens from being exposed to a diverse set of opinions for social discussion.9 Political 
scientist Matthew Hindman worries about an online “missing middle”10 on the ground 
that it might fail the true deliberation that is necessary for democracy.11 
For nearly 30 years, the Internet has been viewed as a way to expand freedom of 
speech globally. Yet, as other mass media did, the Internet has generated its own set of 
legal issues for free speech in cyberspace. One of the most serious issues is online hate 
speech since individuals and groups are easily able to spread their hate messages and 
recruit new individuals through the Internet. A document called “Hate Directory” shows 
an explosive increase in the number of hate websites in the United States in recent 
years.12 Further, neo-Nazi propagandas that have originated from California have been 
transmitted through the Internet to Canada or Germany.13 The reason for more hate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Internet: Challenges and Prospects, in GLOBAL COMMUNICATION 157, 174-75 (Yahya R. 
Kamalipour ed., 2nd ed. 2007). For more discussion of the digital divide, see KAREN 
MOSSBERGER ET AL., VIRTUAL INEQUALITY: BEYOND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (2003). 
  
9 CASS R.  SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC. COM 2. 0: REVENGE OF THE BLOGS 220-21 (2007). 
 
10 The online “missing middle” means that while the news market concentrates on the top 10 
outlets, the tiniest outlets also have earned a substantial portion of attention. The middle class 
outlets have declined in the online world. See MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF DIGITAL 
DEMOCRACY 138 (2009). 
  
11 Id. at 138-39.  
 
12 The “Hate Directory” contains a 170-page list of over 2,500 directories of “blogs, web rings 
and racist games available on the Internet, as well as racist friendly web hosting services” such as 
“Celtic Blood White Pride World Wide” and “Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.” See Raymond A, 
Franklin, The Hate Directory, http://www.hatedirectory.com (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).  
13 Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1530 (2003).  
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speech websites in the United States is that the First Amendment allows more speech, not 
less, as a right for the maintenance of democracy.14 On the other hand, in Europe hate 
speech is prohibited, but controversies surrounding the Danish cartoons15 and the Dutch 
film “Fitna”16 have highlighted hate speech as a raging global issue.   
Another online speech issue relates to pornography and obscenity. Considering that 
obscene images are more easily and instantly available on the Internet, it is almost 
impossible to protect young people from online obscenity.17 Further, drawing a line 
globally between legal pornography and illegal obscene or child pornography is difficult 
when it involves different cultural viewpoints. In Japan, for example, owning 
pornographic images of children has been legal if the images are not intended for selling 
or posting on the Internet, but the Diet in June 2014 passed a bill to ban the possession of 
child pornography.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123, 132 (Ivan Hare & 
James Weinstein eds., 2009).   
 
15 The Danish cartoons that depicted Mohammed wearing a bomb-shaping turban were rapidly 
spread through the Internet. For more discussions of the Danish cartoon, see generally HENRY J.  
STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 659 
(3d ed. 2008); Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose, the Danish Cartoon Controversy, and the New 
European Freedom of Speech, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 253 (2010). 
 
16 The Dutch film “Fitna,” which was made by a Dutch lawmaker Geert Wilders to ridicule the 
Koran as a “fascist” book, was spread out to international viewers through YouTube.com. 
Wilders was acquitted of charges of hate speech by the Amsterdam regional court in June 2011; 
see Geert Wilders Acquitted on Hate Speech Charges, TELEGRAPH, June 23, 2011, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/8593559/Geert-Wilders-
acquitted-on-hate-speech-charges.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2014). 
 
17 See generally JEREMEY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, BROADCAST AND INTERNET INDECENCY: 
DEFINING FREE SPEECH 119-20 (2008). 
18 Melissa Hellmann, Japan Finally Bans Child Pornography, TIME, June 18, 2014,	  
http://time.com/2892728/japan-finally-bans-child-pornography/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).  
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In addition, the Internet is challenging the traditional concept of “press” and 
“journalist” as many bloggers are engaged in news reporting online. U.S. lawyer Scott 
Gant, in his book titled “We’re All Journalists Now,” argues that the conception of 
journalism should be adjusted to “reflect that there may be journalists who make it their 
profession, but one need not be a professional journalist to practice journalism.”19 In the 
mid-2000s, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit could have had an 
opportunity to address the definitional question of “journalist” in the Internet era. But the 
federal appellate court ducked the opportunity when it simply accepted U.S. District 
Judge William Alsup’s determination that freelance videographer and blogger Joshua 
Wolf was a journalist under California shield law.20 The Ninth Circuit rejected Wolf’s 
claim for the journalist’s privilege because “there is no showing of bad faith [on the part 
of the grand jury] and the journalist refuses to produce non-confidential material 
depicting public events.”21  
Privacy also attracts a lot more attention as a cyberlaw issue because it is particularly 
vulnerable to its invasion in the online situation.22 George Washington law professor 
Daniel Solove, author of a highly acclaimed book on the subject, suggests that Internet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRESS AND 
RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 201 (2007). 
 
20 Id. at 43. 
 
21 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Joshua Wolf, 201 Fed. App’x 430, 432-33 (9th Cir. 2006).  
22 A good example of online privacy issue is the Korean “Dog Poop Girl” case. In 2005, a Korean 
train rider took pictures of a girl who did not clean up her dog’s poop on the subway and then 
posted the photos on a popular website. As the Internet mob identified her, the girl was 
nicknamed as a “dog poop girl” by online users. See Jonathan Krim, Subway Fracas Escalates 
into Test of the Internet’s Power to Shame, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/06/AR2005070601953.html 
(last visited Dec. 22, 2014). 
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law should recognize privacy in public places and give more protection to 
confidentiality.23 One notable online privacy violation in the United States related to a 
website known as the “Nuremburg Files,” which disclosed the names and personal 
information of abortion doctors and their families.24 After several abortion doctors in the 
“Nuremburg Files” were killed and seriously wounded, the Ninth Circuit held in 2002 
that the Internet website constituted an illegal “true threat ” rather than protected political 
speech.25 
Defamation is an equally challenging issue for freedom of speech online, whether 
globally or domestically. For example, four executives of Google were tried in Italy on 
criminal charges of defamation and privacy offences over a video uploaded to the site, in 
which a boy with Down syndrome was teased by other youths.26 In addition, Google lost 
a lawsuit in Italy over defamatory autocomplete suggestions.27 The Google cases will 
likely bring on a chilling effect on ISPs around the world.28 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE 
INTERNET 187 (2007).  
 
24 Christiangallery, The Nuremburg Files, http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2014).  
 
25 Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).   
26 David Meyer, Italy Convicts Google Execs Over Bullying Video, ZDNET, Feb. 24, 2010, 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/italy-convicts-google-execs-over-bullying-video/ (last visited Dec. 
22, 2014).  
 
27 Id. 
 
28 Id. 
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Further, online defamation might be one of the most perplexing issues even in the 
United States, where free speech is uniquely more protected than reputation.29 This is all 
the more true, given that “[t]he threat of libel litigation is now exacerbated by the reach 
of the Internet.”30 Cross-border litigation is resorted to by some international public 
figures to bypass media-friendly American libel law. For example, American boxing 
promoter Don King sued British boxer Lennox Lewis, a U.S. promotion company, and a 
New York attorney in London, even though the defamatory statements about him were 
posted on California-based websites.31 King chose the United Kingdom to file suit 
because English defamation law was more plaintiff-friendly.32 As one noted media 
attorney observed, defamation law is increasingly internationalized through foreign 
lawsuits relating to online publications.33  
                                             A. Research Statements 
Defamation law is one of the few legal areas that continue to challenge the 
application of free speech principles online and offline. It has to balance the two well-
established rights -- freedom of speech and the right to reputation.34 Because defamation 
law ought to reflect the underlying values that a given society attaches to the importance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See generally Fredrick Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).   
 
30 Preface: Understanding Media Law in the Global Context, in INTERNATIONAL LIBEL & 
PRIVACY HANDBOOK, at xi (Charles J. Glasser Jr., ed., 3d ed. 2013).  
 
31 King v. Lenox [2004] EWCA Civ 1329.  
 
32 Id.  
 
33 Richard N. Winfield, Globalization Comes to Media Law, 1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 109, 116 
(2006). 
 
34 ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 198 (2d ed. 2005). 
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of reputation and free speech,35 the line drawn between reputation and speech varies from 
country to country.36  
While U.S. law gives the strongest protection to freedom of speech by protecting 
demonstrably false speech, it represents a minority approach when compared with other 
countries.37 In Germany and Japan, for instance, more value is given to reputation than to 
free speech even on a matter of public interest.38 Thus, if American publishers consider 
their stories from solely a U.S. legal perspective, they might better hope that “either their 
publisher has no assets to attach in a foreign country or that an adverse judgment will not 
be enforced on the United States.”39 
The considerable difference between U.S. and foreign libel law has resulted in a 
global forum-shopping phenomenon dubbed “libel tourism.”40 In an effort to alleviate the 
negative impact of libel tourism on American media, the U.S. Congress in 2010 enacted 
the SPEECH (Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative Analysis, 1 J. 
MEDIA L. & PRAC. 3 (1980), reprinted in MEDIA LAW 263 (Eric Barendt ed., 1993).   
 
36 For libel law in various countries, see CARTER-RUCK ON DEFAMATION AND PRIVACY (Alastair 
Mullis & Cameron Doley eds., 6th ed. 2010). 
 
37 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Defamation in the Digital Age: Some Comparative Law Observations 
on the Difficulty of Reconciling Free Speech and Reputation in the Emerging Global Village, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 350 (2005). 
 
38 Id. at 348-50. 
39 Glasser, supra note 30, at xvi. 
 
40 In “libel tourism,” some libel plaintiffs, especially those celebrity plaintiffs, travel to London to 
take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly U.K. defamation law and to preclude media defendants 
from being protected under the media-friendly U.S. law. Robert Balin et al., Libel Tourism and 
the Duke’s Manservant, in INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW DEVELOPMENTS 97, 100 (2009).   
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Heritage) Act.41 The SPEECH Act aims to prevent U.S. courts from enforcing foreign 
defamation judgments that are incompatible with the First Amendment.42  
Cyber-communication has made the law of defamation more complicated. At least in 
the past, gossip might have tarnished good reputation in one community but faded from 
the other’s memories over time. But currently the Internet makes gossip a permanent 
reputational stain as a “digital scarlet letter,” which is forever engraved into Google’s 
memory.43 Online communication may inflict more serious injury on individual and 
corporate reputations with instant, quick access to the Internet. Given that the Internet has 
amplified the speech versus reputation conflicts, the focus is now whether the offline 
balancing between speech and reputation rights should be located “in the same place with 
respect to the Internet as with other media.”44 
Cross-border litigation has also been exacerbated by Internet publications. When 
online users download a defamatory article from the Internet, downloading in England 
and Australia may constitute a separate publication. As a result, any person in England 
and Australia can sue American publishers with the sale of a single book or with a 
handful of online access to the publications, which causes serious chilling effects on 
speech in the United States.45 Confronted with severe criticisms from American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 SPEECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010).  
 
42 See id. § 4102(a). 
 
43 Solove, supra note 23, at 94. 
44 Diane Rowland, Free Expression and Defamation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 55 
(Mathias Klang & Andrew Murray eds., 2005). 
 
45 See, e.g., Dow Jones v. Gutnick [2002] HCA 56 (High Court of Australia held that publication 
on the Internet took place whenever the information was downloaded).  
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publishers, the new Defamation Act 2013 requires that the court be satisfied that 
“England and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place” for an action to have 
jurisdiction against a non-domiciled defendant.46 
Although anonymity is not necessarily a unique phenomenon of cyber speech, online 
libel suits against anonymous “John Doe” defendants have increased significantly during 
the past years.47 Furthermore, the absence of the “take down” remedy in “John Doe” 
lawsuits is troublesome especially for online defamation in which the plaintiffs want their 
names not to be discovered from Google search.48 
Liability for online publication is another tricky issue presented by online defamation.  
Liability for online defamation may fall not only on an original speaker but also on an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP)49 as part of the online publication chain. Moreover, ISPs 
are more attractive than individual online users as defendants in defamation lawsuits 
because (1) they are easier to identify as defendants than anonymous users who have 
originated defamatory information and (2) they have “deep pockets” when compared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Defamation Act 2013, § 9.  
 
47 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn From John Doe, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1373 (2009).  
 
48 Id. at 1389-90.  
 
49 Various acronyms and terms are used to refer to Internet Service Providers and other online 
industries. Among the more widely used acronyms are ISP (Internet Service Provider), OSP 
(Online Service Provider), ICS (Interactive Computer Service), ICH (Internet Content Host), and 
Internet Intermediary. Because of the confusion surrounding the acronyms, this dissertation will 
use “ISP” as a term in common parlance, which is an online service provider that allows users 
access to the Internet and information generated by other users. For the definitions of ISP, see 
MATTHEW COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 17 (3d ed. 2010). 
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with the single users.50 But it is not easy to decide on ISP liability under the current 
defamation law because many ISPs share some features of publisher, distributor, and 
common carrier.51   
To solve the conundrum of ISP liability, the United States has adopted broad 
immunization of ISPs under the Communications Decency Act (CDA).52 This statutory 
rejection of liability for ISPs for publishing libel by third parties is rooted in the First 
Amendment to give more protection to online freedom of speech.53 Yet, few countries 
have adopted the American-style rule of immunity for cyber libel. In Germany, for 
example, ISPs that provide their own content or adopt third-party content are fully liable 
for their postings, while ISPs that simply host or provide access are only required to 
remove access to content.54 ISPs in France have liability for defamation when they were 
aware of the defamatory content and when they did not restrain the access to the content 
as soon as they were notified of the content.55  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Traditionally, newspaper and broadcasters have been attractive defendants as “deep pockets” in 
libel lawsuits. The vast majority of controversial libel litigation has involved media defendants 
because the media would likely pay more “significant award of damages” to plaintiffs than an 
individual author. See ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT 1-2  
(1997). 
 
51 See generally MADELEINE SCHACHTER & JOEL KURTZBERG, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH 339-
40 (3d ed. 2008). 
 
52 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000). 
 
53 See, e.g., Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
 
54 Jan Hegemann & Slade R. Metcalf, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL LIBEL & PRIVACY 
HANDBOOK, supra note 30.  
 
55 Dominique Mondoloni, France, in INTERNATIONAL LIBEL & PRIVACY HANDBOOK, supra note 
30. 
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Given that the United States is unique in its free speech jurisprudence, it is hardly 
surprising that it accords ISPs more protection than other countries. To more closely 
examine U.S. law on ISP liability, this research uses comparative research as a method 
because a comparison of different legal systems can lead to a better understanding of 
issues involved and suggest possible directions for future policy.56  
In conducting comparative research, “functional equivalence” will guide my analysis 
on cyber libel.  The principle of functional equivalence in comparative law states: “[T]he 
legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these 
problems by quite different means though very often with similar results.”57 Thus, 
examining functional equivalence will help to understand and figure out similar problems 
that the United States and other countries have faced for online libel despite different 
laws of those countries. 
U.S. law on ISP liability would serve as a frame of comparison with other systems 
because of its extensive experiences with online issues. For American online libel 
judgments “commanded considerable attention worldwide” to illustrate how one 
jurisprudence could approach the problem of determining ISP liability.58 
 In this context, this dissertation compares U.S. and U.K. law on libel in general and 
on ISP liability in particular. Because American and English defamation laws have the 
same root, ISP liability for defamation in England would deserve attention from U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Stefaan G. Verhulst & Monroe E. Price, Comparative Media Law Research and its Impact on 
Policy, 2 INT’L J. COMM. 406 (2008). 
 
57 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 34 (3d ed. 1998). 
 
58 GRAHAM J. H. SMITH, INTERNET LAW AND REGULATION 342-43 (4th ed. 2007).  
	  	   13 
lawyers and scholars. In addition, English libel law has more reason for comparative 
online research in that the CDA of the United States and the Defamation Act of the 
United Kingdom were the “first attempts anywhere in the world to legislate” ISP liability 
in the same year--1996.59 Thus, this comparative study will be helpful to online speakers 
and ISPs who have similar common law background but fall under different online 
defamation laws.  
In my study, I examine how freedom of speech and the right to reputation have been 
balanced with each other in the United States and the United Kingdom and how similar 
and different the United States has been from the United Kingdom in addressing ISP 
liability. 
                                           B. Research Questions  
• How has the Internet affected communication in cyberspace in connection with 
freedom of speech and the press? 
• How has reputation been balanced with freedom of speech in the United States 
and the United Kingdom?  
• Why and how has U.S. statutory and case law immunized ISPs from defamation 
liability? 
• Why and how has U.K. statutory and case law made ISPs liable for online 
defamation?          
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Id. at 314.  
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                                           C. Review of Literature   
The review of the relevant literature aims to contextualize this project by examining 
what has been published about libel law in general and about online defamation in 
particular. It will illustrate a comparative framework for defamation law and find what 
issues have yet to be addressed in communication law. It focuses on significant books 
and journal articles that discuss defamation law of the United States and the United 
Kingdom while placing emphasis on comparative law research.   
1.  Law of Defamation 
American defamation law reflects the First Amendment requirement that “speech be 
overprotected in order to assure that it is not underprotected.”60 The revolutionary change 
in American libel law since New York Times v. Sullivan61 has neutralized libel litigation 
as a significant threat to American media freedom.62 According to a 2001 study of U.S. 
libel litigation, American libel law since Sullivan has presented little threat to the First 
Amendment rights of the media and created an environment in which “public ‘debate on 
public issues [is] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’” while few libel claims against 
media defendants have been successful.63  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 213.  
 
61 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (ruling that public officials must prove “actual malice” – knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for whether material is true or false – to prevail in libel action). 
 
62 David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Litigation, 
87 VA. L. REV. 503, 508 (2001). 
 
63 Id. at 529 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270). 
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American defamation law, especially the “actual malice” rule, is often viewed to be 
too reputation-unfriendly in favor of freedom of speech.64 Former New York Times 
columnist Anthony Lewis is critical of the expansion of “actual malice” to “public 
figures,”65 especially to celebrities, who have nothing to do with the governing process.66  
Likewise, U.K. lawyers Geoffrey Robertson and Andrew Nicol are not convinced of the 
public figure doctrine because it “denies virtually any protection” to public figures who 
happened to be involved in pubic affairs and have greater access to the media than 
ordinary people.67  
Nonetheless, U.S. defamation law has affected foreign laws in varying degrees even 
when foreign courts have explicitly rejected the Sullivan “actual malice” principle.68 A 
leading U.K. media law scholar, Eric Barendt, observes that the House of Lords in 
England and other Commonwealth courts attempt to accept the Sullivan principle, which 
permits protection for false allegations about public figures.69 An overview of the 
Sullivan impact on foreign law has found that almost all the foreign courts that have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991) 
(arguing that most defamation victims cannot meet the “actual malice” standard). 
 
65 The “actual malice” standard was expanded to include public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 288 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 
66 ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 57 (2007). 
 
67 GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW NICOL, MEDIA LAW 189 (5th ed. 2008). 
 
68 For example, the Korean Supreme Court rejected “actual malice” in 1998. See Judgment of 8 
May 1998, 97 Da 34563 (Supreme Court). But in 2002 the Court gave more protection to the 
press when it reported on a matter of public concern. See Judgment of 22 January 2002, 2000 Da 
37524, 37531 (Supreme Court).  
 
69 Barendt, supra note 34, at 204.  
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examined Sullivan have recognized the “overarching theoretical basis” of its media-
friendly holding.70 
The plaintiff-oriented English libel law has been “notorious” in requiring that the 
media prove truth as a libel defense.71 According to a thoughtful empirical study of 
English libel law, U.K. media consider the law a major impediment to their freedom, 
which forces them to practice self-censorship.72 As British law professor Marlene 
Nicholson notes, English defamation law might export the chill on speech to other 
countries.73 European defamation law might have especially been “indirectly 
‘Anglicized,’ since European publications may be compelled to satisfy a ‘lower common 
denominator’” of English law.74 
English libel law, however, has accepted the concept of press freedom that is 
“increasingly similar” to Sullivan and its progeny.75 The two landmark cases of the U.K. 
House of Lords, Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd 76 and Jameel v. Wall Street Journal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Kyu Ho Youm, Impact on Freedom of the Press Abroad, 22(3) COMM. LAW. 16 (2004). 
 
71 Robertson & Nicol, supra note 67, at 126. 
 
72 Barendt, supra note 50, at 87. 
 
73 Marlene Arnold Nicholson, McLibel: A Case Study on English Defamation Law, 18 WIS. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 133 (2000).  	  
74 Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the European Union, 
26 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 936 (1996). 
 
75 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:9.50 (2d ed. 2014). 
 
76 [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (holding that freedom of speech on political matters is “essential to 
the proper functioning of the system of parliamentary democracy.”). 
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Europe 77 are cases in point. British media lawyers Robertson and Nicol state that 
freedom of speech in their country has become closer to the American protection of free 
speech.78 First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla concurred by noting that British libel 
law has liberalized in a “dramatic” way with Jameel.79 
Regardless of the growing acceptance or recognition of Sullivan and its principle 
abroad, foreign libel law has rarely attracted attention from American jurists and scholars.  
Major defamation treatises such as Defamation: A Lawyer’s Guide80 and Sack on 
Defamation81 offer virtually no discussion of defamation law in other countries. Smolla’s 
Law of Defamation and Bruce Sanford’s Libel and Privacy are better in their treatment of 
foreign law. Smolla devotes two sections to U.K. defamation law82 and includes a section 
on Canadian defamation law.83 Sanford is more expansive in his discussion of foreign 
libel law. The “Defamation from the Dark Ages to the Information Age: A Global 
Overview” chapter of his book is a rare exception in its concise and insightful discussion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 [2006] UKHL 44 (emphasizing the importance of investigative journalism, the House of Lords 
held that responsible news reporting in public interest should preclude liability for defamation). 
 
78 Robertson & Nicol, supra note 67, at 99. 
 
79 Smolla, supra note 75, §1:9.50. 
 
80 DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE (2009).  
 
81 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS (4th ed. 
2014).   
 
82 Smolla, supra note 75, § 1:9.50. 
 
83 Id. § 1:9.75. 
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of non-American libel law.84 Also, the chapter includes sections on international libel law 
and British press law.85  
Most leading American media law textbooks concentrate on American libel law 
without discussing U.K. or other foreign libel cases.86 One possible exception is 
Communication and the Law, which discusses Jameel to demonstrate the impact of 
American libel law abroad.87 Few scholars have undertaken extensive comparative 
research on defamation law.  One of the seminal studies was First Amendment scholar 
Frederick Schauer’s 1980 article published in an English media law journal. In this 
article, Professor Schauer observed that while U.S. defamation law reflected a society 
where the press occupied a preferred position, U.K. law demonstrated Britons’ more 
respect for reputation than freedom of speech.88   
Likewise, several law review authors have addressed the comparative libel law issue, 
but they have primarily focused on libel tourism and forum shopping.89 For instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY Ch. 2 (2d ed. 2014).  
 
85 Id.  
 
86 See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL (7th ed. 2014); 
KENT T. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS (9th ed. 2013); 
ROY L. MOORE & MICHAEL D. MURRAY, MEDIA LAW AND ETHICS (4th ed. 2011); WAYNE 
OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW (2015 ed. 2015); DON R. PEMBER & CLAY 
CALVERT, MASS MEDIA LAW (19th ed. 2014); ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION (4th ed. 2013).  
 
87 See Kyu Ho Youm, Defamation, in COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 126 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 
2015 ed. 2015). 
 
88 Schauer, supra note 25, at 278-89. 
 
89  See, e.g., Heather Maley, Note, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All; Forum 
Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment Un-guaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 
883 (2006) (discussing the chilling effect of the forum shopping trend on American media); 
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media law professor Kyu Ho Youm notes Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications90 as the 
“most important cross-border libel case.”91 However, he argues that although Bachchan 
gives a clear warning to libel plaintiffs against U.S. media about the requirement of the 
First Amendment, the impact of Bachchan might be limited to American media sued in 
foreign countries.92 
Defamation: Comparative Law and Practice93 by University of Melbourne law 
professor Andrew Kenyon and The Right to Speak Ill94 by University of Louisville law 
professor Russell Weaver and others are useful comparative books on libel laws in the 
United States, England, and Australia. Since these studies focus on various defenses for 
the traditional press and litigation practice, they address few Internet law issues. 
Meanwhile, International Libel & Privacy Handbook,95 edited by U.S. media lawyer 
Charles Glasser Jr., is the most recent book as a nation-by-nation summary of libel and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel 
Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978 (1994) (arguing that U.S. courts should 
enforce foreign libel judgments only when defamatory statements did not relate to public concern 
in the United States); Eric J. McCarthy, Comment, Networking in Cyberspace: Electronic 
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privacy law. While this book is useful to journalists, publishers, and lawyers as a 
practical guide on how to avoid lawsuits in 22 jurisdictions and the Middle East, it is not 
a comprehensive comparative analysis of libel law. Likewise, an edited volume by 
Suffolk University law professor Christian Campbell examines libel laws in 11 
countries,96 while The International Libel Handbook, edited by U.K. attorney Nick 
Braithwaite, analyzes defamation laws in 8 countries. Although these two books were 
published in England in the mid-1990s and need considerable updating, they indicate a 
serious interest in comparative and foreign libel law.97  
2.  Defamation in Cyberspace 
In the mid-1980s, online defamation was already a substantial legal issue, although its 
discussions centered on the liability of computer bulletin boards.98 Since then, the most 
important concern relating to online defamation has become “how to apply existing libel 
law in the context of a new method of publication.”99 
Of the major elements of actionable defamation,100 deciding what constitutes 
“publication” in an online context is the most problematic while other elements such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LIABILITY: CIVIL LIABILITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Christian 
Campbell ed., 1997). 
 
97 THE INTERNATIONAL LIBEL HANDBOOK (Nick Braithwaite ed., 1995). 
 
98 See, e.g., Lynn Becker, Electronic Publishing: First Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First 
Century, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801 (1985); Robert Charles, Computer Bulletin Boards and 
Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under What Standard?, 2 J.L. & TECH. 121 (1987); Joseph 
P. Thornton et al., Symposium: Legal Issues in Electronic Publishing – Libel, 36 FED. COMM. L.J. 
178 (1984). 
 
99 BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 8.4 (2d ed. 2014).  
 
100 § 558 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977) states: “To create liability for defamation 
there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged 
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“defamatory meaning,” “identification” or “injury” make little difference in an offline 
and online situation. As one of the publication-related issues, the “single publication” 
rule101 was adopted in the United Kingdom to shield a publisher from perpetual liability 
caused by online archives.102  
 Another issue relating to online publications is whether “linking” can be considered a 
publication. A person who has deliberately embedded a hyperlink can be recognized as a 
publisher of material and so liable when he has “a degree of awareness” of general 
responsibility for the material.103 But the liability for the linking might be challenged 
because it would be eventually a third person who decided whether to click and read the 
linked material or not. Thus, it is open to question why the person who provided access to 
the linked material should be liable for the third party’s action. Regardless, the linking 
issue in cyber libel needs to be more in depth examined by scholars in the United States 
and abroad. 
More often than not, online libel litigation involves tracing a source of anonymous 
defamation. University of Florida law professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky argues that an 
anonymous speaker “John Doe” should be protected when powerful corporate plaintiffs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; 
and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special 
harm caused by the publication.” 
 
101 In his extrajudicial writing, Judge Robert Sack defines the “single publication” rule: “[I]f only 
one work is involved, its distribution constitutes but a single publication on the date of first 
publication of the work.” Sack, supra note 81, § 7.2. 
 
102 See Defamation Act 2013, § 8. For more information about the “single publication” rule, see 
infra Chapter IV, “Defamation Law in the United Kingdom.” 
 
103 Collins, supra note 49, at 86-87. 
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abuse defamation lawsuits to suppress legitimate criticisms.104 Lidsky proposes that the 
opinion privilege should be used to counter the chill on online speakers whose opinion is 
“less factual, less accurate, and less reliable” than professional analysts.105 But since her 
argument focuses on only corporate libel cases, she does not address whether “John Doe” 
needs to be protected against individual non-corporate plaintiffs. Online anonymity also 
concerns whether ISPs should be subject to subpoenas to identify anonymous publishers 
as third parties to defamation litigation.106   
In U.S. law, deciding the standards of fault for public figures is more critical online.  
Several lawyers state that online libel plaintiffs should be treated as public figures mainly 
for two reasons: (1) online users have easy access to the Internet to counter false 
statements;107 and (2) they have an opportunity for quick response similar to the “right of 
reply.”108 But lawyer Michael Hadley disagrees. He counters that the public figure 
doctrine of American libel law should not be expanded online beyond its boundaries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Disclosure in Cyberspace, 49 
DUKE L. REV. 855, 945 (2000). 
 
105 Id. at 939. 
 
106 For proposed standards for quashing subpoenas to online users, see Megan Sunkel, Comment, 
And the I(SP)s Have It…But How Does One Get It?: Examining the Lack of Standards for Ruling 
on Subpoenas Seeing to Reveal the Identity of Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online 
Defamation, 81 N.C.L. REV. 1189, 1213-18 (2003). See also Jason C. Miller, Who’s Exposing 
John Doe?: Distinguishing Between Public And Private Figure Plaintiffs in Subpoenas to ISPs in 
Anonymous online Defamation Suits, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 254-60 (2008). 
 
107 Thomas D. Brooks, Catching Jellyfish in the Internet: The Public Figure Doctrine and 
Defamation on Computer Bulletin Boards, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 461, 473-90 
(1993); Mike Godwin, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 
7-9 (1994). 
 
108 Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First 
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1671-72 (1995); David R. Johnson & David 
Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1381-82 (1996). 
	  	   23 
offline. Hadley explains: “The ability to reply in cyberspace, just like in the real world, 
depends not just on one’s access to the Internet, but also on the ability and willingness of 
others to access one’s reply.”109 
Since online libel law poses a raft of vexing issues in the United States and abroad, as 
discussed above, comparative research will provide a valuable guideline. Thus far, 
comparative research on cyber defamation has been limited, although some 
communication and legal scholars have paid attention to the subject in recent years. For 
example, Law of Internet Speech110 by media attorneys Madeleine Schachter and Joel 
Kurtzberg is a comprehensive textbook on American online law, but it discusses only one 
U.K. case Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd111 and rarely compares the United States with 
other countries. Similarly, an American looseleaf, Internet and Online Law, by media 
lawyer Kent Stuckey does not review any English cases for defamation.112 Another 
looseleaf Law of the Internet by two American lawyers cite only Godfrey for discussion 
on U.K. Internet defamation.113 Even an otherwise excellent U.K. book, Internet Law and 
Regulations, cites only three American cases for comparison.114  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Michael Hadley, The Gertz Doctrine and the Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477, 492 
(1998). 
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114 Smith, supra note 58, at 342-45 (citing Cubby v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y, 
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1995) and Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997)).  
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The Law of Defamation and the Internet by Australian libel law expert Matthew 
Collins is an outstanding book on online libel.115 Although his discussion focuses on 
English libel law, Collins provides a comparative perspective on case and statutory laws 
relating to Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
 
3.  ISP Liability for Defamation 
The early scholarly discussions of ISP liability for defamation in the United States 
tended to focus on bulletin board system (BBS). A lawyer argued in 1987 that an operator 
of a computer bulletin board should be liable as a distributor because it looks like a 
common carrier but actually has control over the online board.116  
Since the CDA adopted blanket immunity for ISP liability in 1996, American lawyers 
and scholars have examined the scope of the immunity for ISPs. Some of them argued 
that the CDA immunity clause should be revised or repealed.117 Criticizing the CDA as 
an extreme libertarian approach, professor Daniel Solove at George Washington 
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116 Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox: Computer Bulletin Boards and the First Amendment, 
39 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 219 (1987). 
 
117 See, e.g., Robert T. Langdon, The Communications Decency Act § 230: Makes Sense? Or 
Nonsense? – A Private Persons’ Inability to Recover if Defamed in Cyberspace, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 829 (1999); Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory Email and Employer Liability: Why Razing 
Zeran v. America Online is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2000). 
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University Law School suggests a “middle-ground” solution, which does not grant 
immunity to ISPs that become aware of the harmful material but do not remove it.118 
Other legal scholars prefer a common law framework to revise the CDA immunity 
because they want to place an ISP into a traditional category of publisher, distributor, and 
common carrier.119 Yet it is not entirely clear how plausible the common law approach to 
ISP liability could be, for ISPs do not always fit into one of the publisher, distributor, and 
common carrier categories.120   
Moreover, a more fundamental problem with the CDA arises from the lack of a clear 
definition of ISP.121 A law review author maintains that the current definition of an ISP is 
so broad that courts have permitted immunity to almost all the service providers, such as 
Amazon.com or even individuals who created a chat room.122 The definitional problem 
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122 Miree Kim, Narrowing the Definition of an Interactive Service Provider under § 230 of the 
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with ISP is not limited to U.S law. As Professor Gavin Sutter of the University of London 
noted, the concept of ISP does not provide “all-embracing definition, and already looks 
somewhat dated.”123 
While the CDA has been increasingly criticized, it is still supported by the advocates 
of Section 230.124 The proponents argue that a “notice-based” liability proposed by the 
CDA opponents would chill freedom of speech when ISPs simply choose to delete 
defamatory information after receiving a notice from an allegedly defamed person.125 
Amidst the ongoing debates about the CDA on ISP liability in the United States, more 
people question the “notice-based” ISP liability adopted by the Defamation Act 1996 of 
the United Kingdom. Several British lawyers suggest that the current “notice-based” 
liability in English law would chill free speech, especially freedom of debates on the 	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123 Gavin Sutter, Online Intermediaries, in COMPUTER LAW: THE LAW AND REGULATION OF 
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124 See Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of 
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discussion boards.126 As American supporters of the CDA do, they point out that ISPs are 
likely to err on the side of deleting allegedly defamatory information regardless of the 
truth of the statement.127 
As already noted, comparative research on ISP liability is exceedingly limited in the 
United States.128 By contrast, English scholars and lawyers have paid more attention to 
ISP from a comparative perspective. They have examined American ISP case law 
because it has developed relatively earlier and more extensively than that of England.129 
But University of Wales law professor Diane Rowland, after analyzing American ISP 
cases, rejects the American-style immunity for ISPs on the ground that it gives too much 
protection to speech.130 Her alternative suggestion is to extend the ISP defense under the 
Defamation Act 1996, giving a clearer guidance to ISPs on notice procedure through a 
Code of Practice.131 English communication law scholar Gavin Sutter, opposing the 
broad immunity for ISP, also criticizes American cases such as Zeran for “patently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Nick Armstrong, Blog and Be Damned?, 158 NEW L.J. 387 (2008) (suggesting that English 
defamation law fails to reflect online realities); Tim Ludbrook, Defamation and the Internet: 
Where Are We Now and Were Are We Going?, 15 ENT. L.R. 173 (2005) (worrying about possible 
removals of online contents by ISPs); Niri Shanmuganathan, Libel Online: An Update, 152 NEW 
L. J. 1040 (2002) (arguing that most ISPs will immediately take down defamatory materials for 
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127 See, e.g., Rowland, supra note 44, at 67; Gavin Sutter, Internet Service Providers and 
Liability, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 71, 76 (Mathias Klang & Andrew Murray eds., 
2005). 
128 For the dearth of comparative research on U.S. cyber-libel law, see Schachter & Kurtzberg, 
supra note 51, at 121-23. 
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fail[ing] in its original intent”132 and merely having “encouraged a very laissez-faire 
approach.”133 
While there are other English comparative studies of ISP liability, they merely 
summarize U.S. cases and thus lack in-depth analyses.134 Australian lawyer author 
Matthew Collins’s book on Internet defamation is exceptional in that it is refreshingly 
extensive in discussing American case and statutory law on ISP liability.135 Collins, 
however, provides little comprehensive criticism of American law in a comparative 
context. 
                                                 D. Methodology    
This dissertation will use comparative law as a research method—the “systematic 
study of particular legal traditions and legal rules on a comparative basis” rather than a 
distinctive branch of substantive law.136 The comparison of the United States and the 
Untied Kingdom on Internet libel law will focus on a documentary analysis of statutory 
and case law.   
In locating all the reported and unreported cases on ISP liability for defamation in the 
United States, I have conducted a Westlaw search on January 5, 2015, using the “Terms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Gavin Sutter, Defamation, in MEDIA LAW AND PRACTICE 373, 421 (David Goldberg et al. 
eds., 2009). 
  
133 Id. at 421 n.185.   
 
134 See e.g., Michael Deturbide, Liability of Internet Service Providers for Defamation in the US 
and Britain: Some Competing Interests, Different Responses, 2000 (3) J. INFO. L. TECH. (2000) 
(summarizing 6 U.S. cases and U.K. Godfrey case); Smith, supra note 58, at 342-45 
(summarizing Prodigy, Stratton Oakmont, and Zeran). 
  
135 Collins, supra note 49, at Ch. VII, “Aspects of United States Law.”  
 
136 PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 3 (3d ed. 2007). 
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and Connectors” function.137 The Westlaw “Terms and Connectors” search yielded 210 
cases. Because 23 cases were the lower court decisions that were ultimately affirmed or 
reversed or let stand by higher courts, the lower court decisions were not counted. In 
addition, 33 cases involved decisions in which plaintiff sought to compel an ISP to 
identify the “John Doe” defendants. Although whether to protect the anonymity of “John 
Doe” as a libel defendant is an important issue for online speech, “John Doe” cases are 
not counted for this project on ISP liability.138 After checking the contents of court 
decisions, non-defamation or non-ISP cases have been deleted from the case list. 
I have also searched LexisNexis and Media Law Reporter,139 using the same search 
terms that I had formulated for my Westlaw search. LexisNexis and Media Law Reporter 
have located 177 and 82 cases respectively.140 One case from Media Law Reporter did 
not overlap with the Westlaw cases.141  
In addition, I ran the “KeyCite” search using the leading online libel case, Zeran v. 
America Online, and the CDA Section 230. The KeyCite search of the CDA Section 230 
has found 471 cases, which included various cases on intentional infliction of emotional 	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term search because the average length of a sentence is 25 words. 
 
138 For the issue of anonymous expression, see infra Chapter II, “Freedom of Speech in 
Cyberspace,” and accompanying notes.  
 
139 Media Law Reporter is the most comprehensive loose-leaf service on U.S. court opinions 
relating to the media. 
 
140 Media Law Reporter has yielded far fewer cases than Westlaw and LexisNexis. Since Media 
Law Reporter narrowly focuses on media-related cases, it seems to be selective in including cases 
on major online services such as American Online, Yahoo!, and MySpace.  
 
141 See D'Alonzo v. Truscello, 34 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2084 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 31, 2006). 
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distress, spam filtering, breach of contract, negligence, unfair competition, and invasion 
of privacy as well as defamation. The KeyCite search of Zeran has identified 207 cases.   
I have also checked several secondary source materials such as Internet Law: A Field 
Guide,142 Communications Law in the Digital Age,143 and Santa Clara law professor Eric 
Goldman’s blog144 to supplement the cases. As of January 5, 2015, a total of 85 cases on 
ISP liability in the United States were identified for my analysis. 
For the ISP cases in the United Kingdom, my search of the database of British and 
Irish Legal Information Institute (BAILII)145 located 25 cases for ISP-related defamation. 
Out of 25 cases, 8 cases were related to ISP liability for defamation. After crosschecking 
Westlaw and secondary sources,146 9 cases were eventually selected for my analysis of 
ISP liability in England.147    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 JONATHAN D. HART, INTERNET LAW: A FIELD GUIDE (5th ed. 2007) (summarizing cases on 
ISP liability). 
 
143 BRUCE P. KELLER, LEE LEVINE & JAMES C. GOODALE, COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 2009 (2009) (providing a summary of recent online defamation cases). 
 
144 Eric Goldman, Technology & Marketing Law Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2015). 
 
145 BAILII provides U.K. primary legal materials for free online. See BAILII, “About BAILII,” 
http://www.bailii.org/bailii/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). 
 
146 The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog (Inforrm’s Blog) is the most useful 
website that provides recent U.K. court decisions and law journal articles. See Inforrm’s Blog, 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2014). See also David Hooper et al., Survey 
of English Libel Law, in MEDIA LIBEL LAW: MLRC 50-STATE SURVEY 1269 (Media Law 
Resource Center ed., 2008). 
 
147 For a discussion of U.K. ISP cases, see infra Chapter VI, “ISP Liability for Defamation in the 
United Kingdom.” 
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The statutory laws on ISP liability in the United States and the United Kingdom were 
collected from official codes available at Westlaw, LexisNexis, and BAILII.148 All the 
primary source materials relating to the legislative history and interpretations of the CDA 
of the United States and the Defamation Act of the United Kingdom were located from 
Westlaw and the UK Parliament website.149 I have also examined the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, which incorporates the E-commerce 
Directive of the European Union into British law on ISP liability.150  
                                         E. Significance and Scope  
Given that now the Internet is one of the most powerful communication 
technologies,151 various free expression issues relating to ISPs need to be discussed from 
a journalism and communication perspective. In addition, an in-depth look at the 
communication perspective on cyberlaw is necessary because law is often devoted to 
settling disputes with a view to providing monetary remedies for libel plaintiffs while 
ignoring the important communication component of the issue involved. That is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 For the statutory laws in U.S. and U.K., see infra “Appendices.”  
 
149 UK Parliament, Bills & legislations, http://www.parliament.uk/business/bills-and-legislation/ 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2014). Especially, Hansard of the Parliament website provides the edited 
verbatim report of proceedings of both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. See 
Hansard, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 	  
150 Electronic Commerce Regulations No. 2013 of 31 July 2002, art. 17-19. 
 
151 LORENZO CANTONI & STEFANO TARDINI, INTERNET 2 (2006). 
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reason why the ISP liability issue has been discussed from the legal perspective of who 
has “deeper pocket” to compensate for the plaintiff’s damages.152   
Yet conducting interdisciplinary research on communication and law is quite 
challenging because law and communication have different academic disciplines 
respectively. While law centers on a “system of regulation” to “set, interpret, and enforce 
rules of conduct,” communication revolves around a “search for understanding of 
individuals, events, institutions, and other phenomenon.”153 Hence, researchers have 
frequently paid attention to one viewpoint while they “specialize in communication or in 
law.”154 Suggesting freedom of expression as an “area of research especially appropriate 
to the discipline of communication studies,”155 media law professors Jeremy Cohen and 
Timothy Gleason have encouraged more interactions of communication and law. 
Interdisciplinary approach in communication law, however, is still not a mainstream of 
research trend in communication and journalism.156 In this connection, this dissertation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 See, e.g., Brian C. McManus, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service Providers, 
35 SUFFOLK. U.L. REV. 647, 648 (2001) (commenting on “[d]eeper pocketed” ISP as “the most 
logical source of relief when the authors are judgment proof”). 
 
153 Jeremy Cohen & Timothy Gleason, Charting the Future of Interdisciplinary Scholarship in 
Communication and Law, in COMMUNICATION AND LAW: MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO 
RESEARCH 3, 5 (Amy Reynolds & Brooke Barnett eds., 2006).  
 
154 JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN COMMUNICATION AND LAW 11 
(1990). 
 
155 Id. at 8. 
 
156 Amy Reynolds & Brooke Barnett, Introduction: The Benefits of a Multidisciplinary Approach 
in Communication Law, in supra note 153, at xv-xvi (2006) (noting Rash Kamhawi and David 
Weaver’ 2003 research on communication research in 1980-1999. Kamhawi and Weaver showed 
that only 60 (about 6%) out of 889 communication researches between 1980 and 1999 involved 
communication law topic. They found that 57 of those 60 communication law articles adopted 
traditional legal research or historical legal methodologies). 
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examines ISP liability from a communication and law perspective, by focusing on how 
free communication in cyberspace would be harmonious with legal liability for 
defamation. 
In addition, a mass communication perspective on the Internet would help to analyze 
the conflict between defamation law and free expression in cyberspace. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court said that “[d]ifferent communications media are treated differently for 
First Amendment purposes,”157 communication technology has been critical to American 
courts in balancing freedom of speech and the press with reputation and other conflicting 
interest. Thus, this study examines how the courts have factored the Internet into their 
ruling on freedom of expression in cyberspace.158 Research on the legislative history of 
the CDA and the U.K. Defamation Act is also relevant to the current study of ISP and 
defamation law in understanding the statutory foundation of ISP liability almost twenty 
years ago.159 Furthermore, few have conducted extensive comparative research about ISP 
liability thus far even though online defamation has emerged as a global issue.160 This 
should be baffling, given that the advent of the Internet as a new medium has highlighted 
a growing need for comparative research.161 This dissertation project contributes to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986). 
 
158 This topic will be addressed in infra Chapter II, “Freedom of Expression and the Internet.” 
 
159 For a discussion of the legislative history, see infra Chapters V, “ISP Liability in the United 
States,” and VI, “ISP Liability in the United Kingdom.” 
 
160 For a review of literature for comparative research, see supra Section C, Subsection 3, “ISP 
Liability for Defamation.”  
 
161 Stefaan G. Verhulst & Monroe E. Price, Comparative Media Law Research and Its Impact on 
Policy, 2 INT’L. J. COMM. 406, 409 (2008). 
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still evolving comparative law literature on freedom of speech as a whole and on online 
defamation in particular. The value of this study is to serve as an in-depth case and 
statutory analysis of how the two liberal democracies with similar political, cultural, and 
legal traditions balance free speech with reputation in cyberspace. 
                                                F. Outline of the Study    
Chapter I includes the introduction, research statement and questions, review of 
literature, methodology, and significance of the study. 
Chapter II reviews the Internet as a medium. In addition, it examines the Internet 
from a communication/journalism and law perspective. Further, freedom of speech in 
cyberspace is analyzed in this chapter. After providing a general theoretical framework of 
free speech offline, it focuses on various online speech issues including anonymous 
speech, hate speech, copyright, obscenity, privacy, and journalism in cyberspace.  
Chapter III centers on American defamation law by examining how free speech has 
been balanced with reputation in the United States. This chapter covers significant libel 
cases, including Sullivan.  
Chapter IV analyzes defamation law in the United Kingdom. It discusses the English 
common law tradition in balancing libel law with freedom of speech and examines 
important U.K. cases such as Reynolds and Jameel. 
Chapter V concentrates on ISP liability for defamation in the United States. To 
understand why ISPs have been immunized from liability in American law, this chapter 
pays attention to the legislative history of the CDA and to judicial interpretations of the 
CDA since 1996. 
	  	   35 
Chapter VI focuses on ISP liability in the Untied Kingdom. Revolving around the 
Defamation Act 1996, the Defamation 2013, and U.K. court decisions, this chapter 
explains why and how ISPs in the United Kingdom have liability for defamation.   
Chapter VII summarizes and concludes my research on U.S. and U.K. statutes and 
case law on ISP liability. This chapter provides comparative perspectives on ISP liability 
while highlighting the similarities and differences between the two countries.  
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CHAPTER II 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET 
The Internet, as a network of computer networks, has showed the most explosive 
growth in a short span of time when compared with other communication medium.162 The 
Internet’s rapid growth is startling: “It took radio broadcasters 38 years to reach an 
audience of 50 million, television 13 years, and the Internet just four.”163 Enabling more 
two-way communications, the Internet breaks down a high barrier between the traditional 
media and the passive audience with relatively easy and low-costly accessibility.164  
 The Internet originated from ARPANET, a computer network of the U.S. 
Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1969.165 A 
working group that consisted of the ARPA, Stanford University, and the University of 
California at Los Angeles (UCLA) developed the Transfer Control Protocol (TCP)/ 
Internet Protocol (IP) in the 1970s, which has been universal languages for compute 
networks that remain the foundation of the current Internet.166 Since computer scientist 
and MIT Professor Tim Bernes-Lee developed the World Wide Web (WWW) in 1990, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Lyombe Eko, Internet Law and Regulation, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMMUNICATION (Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2008), 
http://www.communicationencyclopedia.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/subscriber/uid=1138/?authsta
tuscode=202 (last visited Dec. 15, 2014).  	  
163 United Nations, Briefing Papers for Students: Information and Communications Technology, 
http://davidpapp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/tech.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
 
164 VINCENZO ZENO-ZENCOVICH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 101 (2008). 
 
165 LORENZO CANTONI & STEFANO TARDINI, INTERNET 26 (2006). 
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the WWW browser system has replaced file transfer protocol as the common application 
on the net.167  
As a new communication tool, the Internet has attracted attention from 
communication scholars since the early 1990s. But most communication studies of the 
Internet have focused on online newspaper, journalistic blogs, and computer games.168  
Communication scholars Merrill Morris and Christine Ogan in 2002 criticized 
communication studies for overlooking the importance of research on the Internet.169 
Noticing that the Internet did not “fit researcher’s idea about mass media, locked, as 
they have been, into models of print and broadcast media,”170 they have urged 
communication scholars to reconceptualize and categorize the Internet in a flexible way 
to reflect “the slippery nature of ideas such as mass media, audiences, and 
communication itself.”171 
Yet the Internet-related communication research has not so much changed over the 
years. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly (JMCQ), a leading scholarly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Daniel G. McDonald, Internet, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION 
(Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2008), 
http://www.communicationencyclopedia.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/subscriber/uid=1138/?authsta
tuscode=202 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).  	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169 Merrill Morris & Christine Ogan, The Internet as Mass Medium, in MCQUAIL’S READER IN 
MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 134 (Denis McQuail ed., 2002). 
 
170 Id. at 135. 
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journal in the communication area, has published 105 articles relating to the Internet 
since 1990.172  
But many of the JMCQ articles on the Internet revolve around online journalism,173 
media effects of the Internet,174 and online political communication.175 Hence, while 
journalism and mass communication research has concentrated on the Internet usage or 
effects, few communication scholars have paid attention to the Internet’s overall impact 
on communication in society.176  
To examine the impact of the Internet on general communication, this research offers 
a contextual overview of freedom of expression and the Internet in Chapter II. Focusing 
on the U.S. and the U.K. legal perspectives, this chapter places freedom of expression in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Using search terms like “internet” or “cyberspace,” search of the Journalism &Mass 
Communication Quarterly database through the University of Oregon library website yielded 105 
articles as of Jan. 10, 2015, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/ (last visited Jan. 10, 
2015). 
 
173 See, e.g., Hugh M. Culbertson, Citizen Journalism: Valuable, Useless or Dangerous?, 91 
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q 190 (2014); Kirsten A. Johnson & Susan Wiedenbeck, 
Enhancing Perceived Credibility of Citizen Journalism Web Sites, 86 JOURNALISM & MASS 
COMM. Q. 332 (2009). 	  
174 See, e.g., Itai Himelboim, Tsan-Kuo Chang & Stephen McCreey, International Network of 
Foreign News Coverage: Old Global Hierarchies in a New Online World, 87 JOURNALISM & 
MASS COMM. Q. 297 (2010); Jeongsub Lim, A Cross-lagged Analysis of Agenda Setting among 
Online News Media, 83 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 298 (2006). 
 
175 See, e.g., Kathy Brittain, Politics and the Twitter Revolution: How Tweets Influence the 
Relationship between Political Leaders and the Public, 90 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q 586 
(2013); Dan Drew & David Weaver, Voter Learning in the 2004 Presidential Election: Did the 
Media Matter?, 83 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 25 (2006); Mark Leccese, Online 
Information Sources of Political Blogs, 86 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 578 (2009).  
 
176 Communication Law & Policy, a peer review journal, has published 33 articles regarding the 
“Internet” or “cyberspace” since 1990, addressing various topics such as press freedom, hate 
speech, student’s press freedom etc. Online search through the University of Oregon library 
website was conducted on Jan. 10, 2015, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/ (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
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a theoretical context. The first half of this chapter discusses freedom of speech and the 
press in general. The second half of the chapter delves into key free speech issues in 
cyberspace such as online journalism, anonymity, copyright, privacy, pornography, and 
hate speech.  
              A. Freedom of Speech and the Press: A Theoretical Framework 
Freedom of speech is recognized as a fundamental human right globally. Article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that every citizen has the right of free 
expression that “includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.”177 Regional human rights treaties are no different. Article 10 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,178 Article 13 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights,179 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (more widely known as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR))180 also guarantee freedom of speech as a basic human right.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19, Dec. 10, 1948, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).    
 
178 African Union, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). Article 10 of the African 
Charter says that every individual shall have “the right to receive information” and “the right to 
express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”  
 
179 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13, Nov. 
22, 1969, http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr.html, (last visited Dec. 14, 
2014). Article 13 of the American Convention states that everyone has “the right to freedom of 
thought and expression,” which includes “freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other medium of one's choice.”  
 
180 The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 10, Nov. 4, 
1950, http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2014). 
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Yet freedom of speech is not an absolute right. For example, Article10 of the ECHR 
states that freedom of expression has restrictions “prescribed by law” and “necessary in 
democratic society.” Article 10 of the ECHR provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises. 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or tights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.181 
 
Likewise, free speech in the United States has not been absolute even though the First 
Amendment does not include any limiting clause. Certain types of speech such as 
defamation and child pornography, false advertising, obscenity, “true threat,” and 
incitement are excluded from First Amendment protection.182 
Nonetheless, freedom of speech needs to embrace even “freedom for the thought that 
we hate” to permit the minority’s voice.183 The European Court of Human Rights held 
that freedom of speech should be applied not only to information or ideas that are 
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182 See RONALD E. LEENES ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 279 (2008): David M. O’Brien, CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO LAW: THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT, UNPROTECTED EXPRESSION, AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 15 (2010). 
 
183 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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favorably received but also to “those that offend, shock or disturb.”184 Therefore, a free 
speech principle means that speech should be tolerated, even when it seems to have 
harmful effects, because of its special values.185  
Three classic free speech theories -- “marketplace of ideas,” “democratic self-
governance,” and “human dignity and self-fulfillment” – are closely related to the values 
of free speech in the United States.186 And the theories have also been recognized in the 
United Kingdom, as the House of Lords in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department stated: 
Freedom of expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its 
own sake. But it is well recognised that it is also instrumentally important. It 
serves a number of broad objectives. First, it promotes the self-fulfillment of 
individuals in society. Secondly, in the famous words of Mr. Justice Holmes 
(echoing John Stuart Mill), "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market.": Abraham v. United States 250 
U.S. 616, at 630 (1919), per Holmes J. (dissent). Thirdly, freedom of speech is the 
lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information and ideas informs political 
debate. It is a safety valve: people are more ready to accept decisions that go 
against them if they can in principle seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on 
the abuse of power by public officials. It facilitates the exposure of errors in the 
governance and administration of justice of the country.187 
 
Three theories are identified below to illustrate free speech’s values and purposes. 
1. Marketplace of Ideas 
The marketplace of ideas, grounded in the laissez-faire economic theory, derives from 
a metaphor of an open marketplace where ideas are freely exchanged and compete with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Vogt v. Germany [1995] ECHR 29, ¶ 52. 
 
185 Barendt, supra note 34 at 7.  
 
186 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 2:3 (2014). 
 
187 [2000] 2 A.C. 115, 126.  
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each other. The marketplace theory is traced to John Milton’s Areopagitica in 1644, 
which argued that censorship was unnecessary because truth would always trump 
falsity.188 Later, British philosopher John Stuart Mill emphasized the value of free 
speech, not because truth always prevailed in the marketplace but because people would 
be “deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth” without freedom of 
speech.189  
The marketplace theory was influential especially in the United States. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes of the U.S. Supreme Court injected the marketplace theory into 
American free speech jurisprudence. In his famous dissenting opinion in Abrams v. 
United States,190 he stated: “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon 
which their whishes can be carried out.”191  
The marketplace of ideas theory informs freedom of online speech in the United 
States. The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the marketplace of ideas in Reno v. ACLU192 in 
striking down online indecency regulations. The Supreme Court stated that governmental 
regulation of content of online speech would “interfere with the free exchange of ideas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), available at 
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/areopagitica/text.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 
2015). 
 
189 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 24 (Gateway 1955) (1859). 
 
190 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 
191 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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than to encourage it,” and thus “the interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a 
democratic society” should outweigh the alleged benefit of censorship.193  
The marketplace perspective views government as the enemy that interferes with free 
exchange of ideas. Such “negative freedom” -- freedom from external restraint -- has 
predominated traditional free speech discussion in the United States.194 This negative 
notion of free speech has affected the cyber-libertarian view in the mid-1990s. The cyber-
libertarian political activist John Perry Barlow’s Declaration of Independence for 
Cyberspace195 in 1996 was a challenge to government bodies that attempted to frame and 
regulate the Internet. Barlow declared: “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary 
giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of 
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You 
have no sovereignty where we gather.”196 
However, the marketplace theory has often been criticized because the current media 
market is concentrated in the hands of a small number of giant communication groups.197 
First Amendment scholar Jerome Barron argues that the “romantic” concept of free 
marketplace of media does not exist any more due to “an inequality in the power to 	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communicate ideas just as there is inequality in economic bargaining power.”198 He 
proposes a right of access to prohibit the press from an “arbitrary denial of space” and to 
guarantee a more effective forum for diverse public opinion.199  
Moreover, the marketplace metaphor does not fit the Internet squarely. Dominant 
forces such as established media organizations, web portals, and search engines continue 
to serve as gatekeepers for many online users who receive information passively.200 ISPs 
operated by a small number of Internet companies are another threat to the marketplace 
of ideas, while ISPs are enormously powerful to control online contents but are rather 
nonchalant about the First Amendment mandates of access to the media.201 Therefore, it 
would be unreasonable to insist that cyberspace should be totally out of government 
control, even though the Internet contributes to free discussions and finding truth. 
2.  Democratic Self-governance  
The democratic self-governance theory focuses on the important role of speech for 
democracy. Certainly, free speech is essential to self-governance as (1) a means of 
participation to political issues, (2) the pursuit of political truth, (3) the facilitation of 
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majority rule, (4) the restraint on tyranny, and (5) the assistance of stability.202 Alexander 
Meiklejohn, the leading proponent of the self-governance theory, values freedom of 
expression for its contribution to a self-governing society rather than as a means of 
finding truth:  
The First Amendment is not, primarily, a device for the winning of new truth 
though that is very important. It is a device for the sharing of whatever truth has 
been won. Its purpose is to give to every voting member of the body politic the 
fullest possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which 
the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.203 
 
Because there is no distinction between the governors and the governed, Meiklejohn 
maintained that the self-governing people should be the ruler.204 Using a town meeting 
metaphor for freedom of speech, he stated: “What is essential is not that everyone shall 
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.”205 Meiklejohn pointed out that 
freedom of expression in area of public affairs should be an absolute.206  
American courts have adopted Meikeljohn’s view to give more protection to speech 
related to public issues. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,207 the U.S. Supreme Court 
expanded First Amendment protection for libelous statements concerning public officials, 
noting that the First Amendment reflected “a profound national commitment to the 	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principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”208 
Also, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit differentiated political speech from 
commercial speech in the online context, applying a “less-protective standard” to the 
“less-protected categories of speech such as commercial speech” in a case on disclosure 
of anonymous online speaker.209  
In applying democratic self-governance to cyberspace, Harvard law professor Cass 
Sunstein argues that a system of free expression in cyberspace should be designed for 
citizens to access more diverse opinions.210 Placing too much control in the hands of 
online users may undermine deliberation of ideas necessary for democracy, because 
online users will likely access their private preferences rather than choose to see 
conflicting viewpoints.211 Rejecting the marketplace theory in cyberspace, Sunstein 
emphasized the central role of state regulations to create websites dedicated to public 
discourse.212 Hence, under the view of the democratic self-governance, the Internet 
should be regulated to promote democracy and enlighten citizenship. 
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3. Human Dignity and Self-fulfillment  
The “human dignity and self-fulfillment” theory views freedom of speech not as a 
tool to search for truth or enlightenment but as a central element to protection of the 
dignity and self-realization.213 Because the proper end of man is “the realization of his 
character and potentialities as a human being,” freedom of speech can be justified as the 
right of an individual “purely in his capacity as an individual.”214  
The First Amendment was thought to serve “not only the needs of the polity but also 
those of the human spirit – a spirit that demands self-expression.”215 The role of self-
fulfillment could be justified from a “libertarian perspective” in which free speech 
protects “not a marketplace, but rather an arena of individual liberty from certain types of 
governmental restrictions.”216  
Relying on the human dignity perspective, legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin 
suggests that the government should not discriminate citizens by permitting some views 
and denying other views. Dworkin says: “We retain our dignity, as individuals, only by 
insisting that no one – no official and no majority – has the right to withhold opinion 
from us on the ground that we are not fit to hear and consider it.”217 
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The human dignity and self-fulfillment theory has played a more limited role in free 
speech than marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance did. In the Internet age, 
however, this theory might provide more protection to ordinary online users, including, 
bloggers who do not discuss public issues. Given that the Internet practically makes it 
possible for all the people to speak freely and publicly, the self-fulfillment theory would 
uphold the idea that although some online statements seem to be vulgar or worthless, the 
government should not censor those expressions arbitrarily.  
4. Freedom of the Press v. Freedom of Speech 
It has been long debated whether freedom of the press should be separate from 
freedom of speech and thus secure special constitutional protection for the institutional 
press. Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court, in his 1974 Yale Law School 
address, argued that the press clause of the First Amendment had a distinct, significant 
meaning discrete from the speech clause of the First Amendment.218 Emphasizing the 
press as an “additional check” on government branches, he viewed the institutionalized 
press as “the only organized private business” entitled to special constitutional 
protection.219  
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to accord any exceptional 
protection to the press and journalists because they have “no special immunity from the 
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application of general laws” and “no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of 
others.”220 In Branzburg v. Hayes,221 the Court has denied journalists special rights to 
withhold sources of information, holding that the general obligation for each citizen to 
testify before a grand jury or at a trial outweighed news reporters’ First Amendment 
interests.222  
The United Kingdom is similar to the United States in refusing to prioritize the news 
media. That is, the right of the media to publish was “neither more nor less than that of 
the general public.”223 Nonetheless, U.K. law is different from U.S. law at least in one 
area—journalistic privilege to confidential sources. English journalists are protected, 
albeit in limited circumstances, under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984.224  But there is no such thing as federal shield law in the 
United States. 
                                           B. Free Speech in Cyberspace 
As the Internet makes cyber speech “permanent,” contextually divorced, and 
universally available,225 online speech has more tremendous impact than speech mediated 	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by the traditional media does. A tricky question is whether law should treat cyber speech 
differently from speech on other media such as newspaper, radio, and television. In fact, 
technological differences between various media have affected media laws in that “[e]ach 
method of communication is ‘a law unto itself’ and that law must reflect the different 
natures, values, abuses, and dangers” of each medium.226 
Broadcasting has been regulated more strictly than the print media. Spectrum scarcity 
is the most important factor that justifies the special regulation of broadcasting, even 
though this argument is now hard to sustain with the unlimited channels provided by 
cable, satellite broadcasting, and the Internet.227 Should online speech fit the press model 
or broadcast model?  The U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU228 has treated the Internet 
as a medium close to the print media because it is a pull medium, rather than a push 
medium. The Court has found the Internet different from broadcasting and radio: First, 
the Internet is not so “invasive as radio or television” because online users hardly 
encounter content unintentionally;229 Second, the Internet does not show any “scarcity” 
feature, in contrast with the spectrum scarcity of the broadcasting.230 Evaluating the 
Internet as the most freely accessible medium, the Supreme Court held that governmental 	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regulation would harm the cyberspace and thus the Court has recognized a strong First 
Amendment protection for online communication.231   
Yet the Court’s liberal view on the Internet and its application of the marketplace 
theory is debatable. The Internet, contrary to the Reno court’s view, might be almost 
“invasive as radio or television” at many homes in western countries where fast online 
access is available.232 Also, the Internet is available to children who are often more 
skilled than their parents. If the Internet is close to the broadcasting rather than the print 
media in its pervasiveness, the Internet should be subject to more government regulation. 
1. The Press on the Internet 
Few British courts have addressed who is or who is not a journalist in the Internet 
age. But American courts have long struggled with who is qualified for freedom of the 
press, although they have defined the press broadly enough to include all publications.233 
The issue of protecting journalistic sources is not yet settled as well, but the Internet adds 
another legal anomaly on this struggle: should bloggers be treated like the traditional 
journalists as part of the press?  
As many bloggers write about public issues, bloggers likely argue that they need 
testimonial privilege when they receive a subpoena. For instance, video journalist Josh 
Wolf, who posted his edited clips about anti-G8 protest to a local activist news website, 	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remained in jail for 226 days until 2007 after he refused to comply with a subpoena that 
required him to turn over the video tape.234  
A major concern over a shield law is that journalists might receive less or no 
protection in case that every citizen would be deemed a journalist.235 First Amendment 
lawyer Floyd Abrams, who represented New York Times reporter Judith Miller in grand 
jury investigation of her sources in the CIA leak, said: “[I]f everybody’s entitled to the 
[journalist] privilege, nobody will get it.”236 Nonetheless, Abrams asserted that bloggers 
should be entitled to the same protection available to a traditional journalist so long as 
“information was obtained for the purpose of dissemination to the public at large” like 
what traditional journalists do.237  
Although a blogger has little chance to prevail under a shield law protecting only 
“newspapers,” most state shield laws include a definitional language that leaves open the 
question of whether such protection would be given to bloggers.238 So, the California 
Court of Appeal denied enforcement of a subpoena seeking the names of sources that 	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leaked confidential trade secrets of the Apple computer.239 The court held that the 
blogger’s publication was entitled to the protection of the shield law because “periodical 
publication” under the California reporter’s shield included “all recurring news 
publications.”240 
 By contrast, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the state shield law would 
not apply to bloggers who were “self-appointed journalists or entities with little track 
record” because “[a]ny of the [bloggers], as well as anyone with a Facebook account, 
could try to assert the privilege.”241 Hence, if a blogger does not engage in reporting of 
matters of public interest with more seriousness, the blogger will be unlikely protected 
under the New Jersey shield law. 
Besides bloggers, a website dedicated to informing the public makes it hard to define 
what is the press because the website sometimes provides more information about a 
matter of public interest than the traditional press. For instance, Wikileaks has grabbed 
global attention when it released many confidential documents about toxic dumping in 
Africa, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American diplomacy, money laundering of big 
companies, and other secret information.242 Wikileaks compares itself to the New York 
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Times of the “Pentagon Papers” case,243 but such argument might be hard to accept until 
Wikileaks develop “more formal ethical guideline” and it should be “more sensitive to a 
variety of national context.”244   
2. Online Anonymous Speech 
Anonymous speech has served an important social value when persecuted groups 
criticize the oppressing parties without fear of retaliation.245 The U.S. Supreme Court 
emphasized the importance of anonymity as a “shield from the tyranny of the majority” 
and anonymous pamphleteering as an “honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.”246 
The Supreme Court was aware of the possible danger of abused anonymity to disguise 
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wrongdoing or unethical behavior, but the Court stated that more weight should be given 
“to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse.”247   
While traditional mass media rarely permit publication under anonymity, the Internet 
provides online users with more opportunities to speak behind a cloak of anonymity.248 
An emerging issue regarding online anonymity is when ISPs are required to reveal 
anonymous users who defame others in cyberspace. In Dendrite International Inc. v. 
Doe,249 the New Jersey appellate court outlined four-prong test that should be met before 
a plaintiff could compel discovery of the identity of an anonymous online poster: (1) the 
plaintiff must attempt to notify the anonymous poster, by posting a notice on the same 
message board as the original offending comment was made; (2) the plaintiff must 
identify the specific statements that are allegedly actionable; (3) the plaintiff must proffer 
evidence supporting each element it would have to establish to prove its claim; and (4) 
the court must balance the anonymous poster’s First Amendment right of anonymous free 
speech against the necessity of the disclosure to allow plaintiff to proceed.250 Currently, 
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the Dendrite test has served as a “most appropriate” test for anonymous speech 
lawsuits.251  
In the Unite Kingdom, Norwich Pharmacal proceedings are useful in defamation 
actions in which anonymous speaker posted statements on the Internet.252 In Totalise v 
Motley Fool Ltd.,253 after an anonymous person made numerous defamatory postings on 
the discussion board, the plaintiff sought disclosure of the original poster’s identity. The 
U.K. Court of Appeal granted the relief sought, on the ground that the postings were 
highly defamatory and the plaintiff was the victim of defamation tort.254  
The European Court of Human Rights has addressed anonymous speech issue in a 
criminal case of KU v. Finland.255 An unknown person placed an advertisement on an 
online dating site in the name of the applicant who was a 12-year-old boy, which caused 
contact by an older man.256 The applicant’s father requested the police to identify the 
anonymous person who posted the fake advertisement, but the ISP refused to provide 	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information about the poster.257 The Helsinki District Court and the Finish Court of 
Appeal refused to order the details to be provided.  
The European Court of Human Rights, however, held that Finland was in breach of 
its obligation to protect the applicant’s right to a private life under Article 8 of the ECHR, 
for Finland did not provide an effective criminal sanction for the applicant’s privacy. The 
Court stated that Article 8 should be interpreted to provide the legal framework to 
identify wrongdoers while respecting freedom of expression in cyberspace.258 
As shown in the cases above, anonymous speech on the Internet is no different from 
anonymous speech offline in that it is not entitled to absolution protection. A veil of 
anonymity should be taken off when it is abused against others. 
3. Copyright and ISPs 
In the United States, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 512(h) 
allows a copyright owner to request a court to issue a subpoena requiring an ISP to 
identify alleged copyright infringer.259 The DMCA subpoena provision applies to ISPs 
that stored materials, not to ISPs that simply transmitted infringing materials as mere 
conduits.260 Thus, the DMCA Section 512 stands in contrast with the CDA Section 230, 
which has been applied to all type of ISPs regardless of their roles as publisher, 
distributor, or mere conduit. 
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In addition, Section 512(C) of the DMCA provides a notice-and-takedown system 
that establishes “safe-harbors” against money damages for ISPs that inadvertently 
commit or enable copyright infringement.261 It creates a strong incentive for ISPs to 
cooperate with copyright owners when the ISPs have “both specific knowledge of 
potential infringement and the ability to stop it.”262 The notice-and-takedown system is 
particularly substantial because it is often recommended as an alternative way to modify 
the complete immunity of the CDA Section 230.263 Yet the system has an abuse potential 
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especially when the system has encouraged ISPs to take down any contents that copyright 
owner complained of.264  
Indeed, the copyright owners have frequently used takedown requests to online 
materials even when use of such materials could be protected under fair use.265 For 
instance, an online user Stephanie Lenz sued the Universal Music Group that requested 
YouTube to take down a 29-second video of her baby dancing to the singer Prince’s Song 
“Let’s Go Crazy.”266 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held 
that content owners must consider fair use before sending takedown notices under the 
DMCA with “a good belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not 
authorized” by its owner or agent.267 
Another example of the Section 512 abuse is Viacom v. YouTube.268 In 2007 Viacom 
sent about 100,000 takedown notices to the YouTube and then filed $1 billion lawsuit 
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against YouTube. It alleged that YouTube had allowed its users to upload copyrighted 
materials. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that 
YouTube could be protected against claims of copyright infringement by the safe harbor 
of the DMCA, for it quickly worked with copyright holders to remove protected contents 
when notified.269 Declining to shift a burden from the copyright owner to the ISP, the 
court concluded that mere knowledge of the prevalence of copyright violations would not 
make the ISP responsible for discovery of its users’ illegal activities.270  
In April 2012, the Second Circuit vacated partly the district court’s decision on 
grounds that a jury could conclude reasonably that YouTube had knowledge or awareness 
of some specific clips in violation of the DMCA.271 Yet in April 2013, the federal district 
court again ruled in YouTube’s favor, holding that YouTube’s decision not to monitor 
users’ activities did not preclude application of the safe harbor provision.272 In 2014, 
Google and Viacom eventually settled with undisclosed terms of settlement.273 
Since enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, British courts have recognized the 
possible conflicts between free speech and copyright.274 The U.K. Digital Economy Act 	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2010 requires a copyright owner to make a copyright infringement report to an ISP when 
the owner suspects copyright violation hosted by the ISP.275 The ISP must make the 
website subscriber aware of the report and keep a register of all reports.276 If requested, 
the ISP must provide copyright owners with a list of copyright infringements that contain 
anonymous details of those who have received the reports.277 With this information, 
copyright owners are able to take legal action against infringers by pursuing a court order 
that identifies such offenders, and ISPs that do not comply with the Act could receive a 
fine of up to £250,000.278 
4. Privacy on the Internet 
The right of privacy in the United States has its genesis in the Harvard Law Review 
article titled “The Right to Privacy,”279 which was written by American lawyers Samuel 
D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890. Proposing that an individual have a common-
law right to be let alone, Warren and Brandeis criticized newspapers and photographs that 
invaded private life: “[N]umerous mechanical devices threatens to make good the 
prediction that ‘what is whispered in  the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
housetops.’”280  
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Seventy years after Warren and Brandeis’ privacy article, Dean William Prosser 
identified four types of privacy torts: (1) intrusion on personal privacy; (2) publication of 
truthful but embarrassing private facts; (3) publicity placing someone in a false light; (4) 
appropriation of a person’s personality for the purpose of trade.281 
Yet the law of privacy has not provided enough protection to plaintiffs against the 
news media because the broadly defined “newsworthiness” defense has exempted most 
media reporting that spotlighted private but newsy information.282 
In the United Kingdom, the right of privacy has not been historically recognized. The 
right of privacy was indirectly protected through the existing cause of actions such as 
breach of confidence, trespass, nuisance, and defamation.283  
After Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights that stipulates 
everyone’s “right to respect for his private and family life” was incorporated under the 
Human Rights Act 1998, the U.K. courts have protected privacy particularly against 
media disclosure.284  
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A noteworthy difference between the United Kingdom and the United Sates on 
privacy is that “in America the trump card is freedom of the press and expression.”285 In 
Time, Inc. v. Hill,286 the U.S. Supreme Court held that false light plaintiffs in America 
must prove “actual malice” if they were involved in matters of public concern. Justice 
William J. Brennan wrote for the Court: “Exposure of the self to others in varying 
degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an 
essential incident of life in a society which laces a primary value on freedom of speech 
and press.”287 This view of the Hill Court has been criticized in that freedom of the press 
must not override the right to privacy of a private citizen.288 Hence, the false light tort 
like Hill remains the “least-recognized and most controversial aspect” of invasion of 
privacy.289 
The House of Lords in Campbell v. MGN290 held that privacy of even a public figure 
outweighed freedom of the press when the Daily Mirror had published a true story about 
a supermodel Naomi Campbell’s lie about her drug addict.291 Ruling by a majority 3-2, 
the House of Lords decided that Campbell’s right of privacy should not be deprived just 
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because she was a celebrity and her private life was newsworthy.292 The newspaper 
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, complaining that the award of costs, 
including the success fees, constituted a disproportionate interference with the 
newspaper’s right of free expression under the ECHR.293  
The European Court of Human Rights in MGN Ltd v. United Kingdom294 held that the 
requirement to pay the success fees was disproportionate so that it constituted an 
interference with the newspaper’s Article 10 right.295 But the Court held that the House of 
Lords’ ruling did not violate Article 10 because the publication of the details of a public 
figure’s private life “cannot be deemed to contribute to any debate of general interest to 
society” and in the such case “freedom of expression calls for a narrower 
interpretation.”296  
A leading European court decision relating to the privacy of public figures was the 
Princess Caroline of Monaco case. The Princess claimed that several German magazines 
infringed her right to privacy while publishing photos that the princess involved in 
private activities like shopping, skiing, walking, and eating at a restaurant.297 The German 
Constitutional Court barred publication of the photos of Princess Caroline with her 
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children, but the Court held that the Princess as a contemporary public figure should 
tolerate the publication of the photos that show her daily life in a public place.298  
The European Court of Human Rights disagreed with the German court, finding that 
the Princess’s right of privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR was violated: 
A fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting facts –even 
controversial ones—capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society 
relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and reporting 
details of the private life of an individual who… as in this case does not exercise 
official functions.299 
 
The European Court held that the public does not have a legitimate interest in knowing 
the private life of celebrities even though they were in public places.300  
The Internet, however, challenges the long-standing concept of privacy. For instance, 
social networking sites (SNS) like Facebook and Twitter present new challenges to users 
who want to keep their privacy.301 While abused as a tool of secret surveillance,302 the 
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SNS has been called as online “Panopticon”303 that kept users under surreptitious 
surveillance from others.304   
Google has received continuous complaints in the world since it launched Google 
Street View service in 2007, which provides panoramic views from public roads in the 
world.305 Google has faced fines and other penalties in France, Spain, Italy, and the 
Czech Republic after it advertently collected 600 gigabytes of private information from 
unsecured Wi-Fi networks around the world.306 In addition, the Street View technology 
has encountered great resistance in Germany and Switzerland where data privacy laws 
are strict.307  
Recently, Google confronted an “informational privacy” problem in Europe. In 
Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos,308 the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) held in 2014 that Google must delete links to personal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Panopticon was proposed by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1791 as an advanced 
prison that allows an observer in a tower center to watch all prisoners in the cells; see JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Vozovic ed., 1995) (1787). 
 
304 For a discussion of online Panopticon, see John Edward Campbell & Matt Carlson, 
Panoptiocon.com: Online Surveillance and the Commodification of Privacy, 46 J. BROAD. & 
ELEC. MEDIA 586 (2002) (illustrating how marketers utilize the online technology of surveillance 
for efficiency).  
 
305 See generally Google Maps: Privacy, 
http://maps.google.com/intl/en_us/help/maps/streetview/privacy.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2014). 
 
306 Kevin J. O’Brien, In Europe, Google Faces New Inquiries on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 
2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/technology/21streetview.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 
15, 2014) (reporting that especially the Czech Republic responded to Google’s collection of date 
more sensitively due to its history of secret surveillance during communist regime). 
 
307 Erica Ho, Alas, There Will be No More Google Street View in Germany, TIME, April 11, 2011, 
http://techland.time.com/2011/04/11/alas-there-will-be-no-more-google-street-view-in-germany/ 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2014). 
 
308 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, May 13, 2014. 
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information from search results at the request of a data subject, unless a strong public 
interest suggests otherwise. The CJEC decision has been criticized in that it gave too 
much power to private entities to control public access to information.309 
5. Online Pornography and Obscenity  
Since online pornography has been a global phenomenon, the “new moral panic” 
about pandemic pornography swept through the world in 1990s.310 In the United States, 
the Communications Decency Act imposed criminal sanctions on anyone who placed 
“obscene or indecent” content on the Internet while knowing that a minor might access 
it.311 The federal law was immediately challenged. The U.S. Supreme Court in Reno v. 
ACLU struck down the offending indecency provision.312 The Court held that while 
protection of children was an important goal, it could not be legitimately achieved by 
interfering with the constitutional rights of adults to access indecent expression.313 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 For a discussion of the Google Spain decision and related European and American lawyers’ 
reaction, see Patrick J. Carome, An Examination of Google Spain v. SEPD and Mario Costeja 
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Resource Center (MLRC) Forum 2014, Special Report, Oct. 22, 2014, 
http://medialaw.org/images/stories/Events/MLRC_Forum/2014/Google_v._AEPD_Outline_Upda
ted_10-22-14.pdf  (last visited Jan. 10, 2015). See also Cooper Mitchell-Rekrut, Search Engine 
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Informed by Google Spain, 45 GEO. J. INT’L . L. 861 (2014) (arguing that search engines should 
not be subjected to liability under the right to be forgotten).  
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The U.S. Supreme Court also invalidated the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
(CPPA).314 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,315 the Court refused to add virtual child 
pornography to the categories of unprotected speech on the grounds that government 
failed to show a direct connection between virtual images and its encouragement of a 
pedophile’s illegal conduct.316 
After the Free Speech Coalition, Congress passed the PROTECT Act317 in 2003 to 
curb the pandering and proliferation of child pornography on the Internet. The U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the Act in U.S. v. Williams.318 The Court found that the Act does 
not prohibit the virtual child pornography but makes it crime “only when the speaker 
believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction 
depict real children.”319 
In the United Kingdom, the Obscene Publication Act,320 amended in 1994, does not 
criminalize the mere private possession of obscene material so long as there is no attempt 
to publish, distribute, or show it to others, particularly for gain.321 In the case of child 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The CPPA criminalized creation, distribution, and 
possession of virtual child pornography. 
    
315 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002).  
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317 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat 650 (2003). “PROTECT” stands for "Prosecutorial Remedies and 
Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today." 
 
318 553 U.S. 285 (2008). 
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pornography, however, the Protection of Children Act (POCA)322 and the Criminal 
Justice Act323 makes it a criminal offence to have any indecent photography of a child in 
his possession.324 The POCA did not include images of child pornography into the 
category of a prohibited “photograph,”325 but the Justice Act 2009326 prohibits possession 
of a prohibited image of a child such as pornographic cartoon depicting minors.327 
Likewise, the Convention on Cybercrime by the Council of Europe prohibits materials 
that “visually depicts realistic images” of a minor engaged in sexual conduct.328 
While online pornography becomes a global phenomenon, it is difficult to regulate 
obscene materials that are downloaded from websites hosted by foreign servers. In 
Regina v. Waddon,329 a U.K. case of 2000, the issue was whether “publication” of 
obscene material occurred as a violation of the Obscene Publications Act when a server 
of a pornography website was located in the United States. The U.K. Court of Appeal 
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held that publication occurred both when the defendant uploaded the image to the U.S. 
server and when the material was downloaded in England.330  
6. Online Hate Speech 
International efforts have been made to regulate expression of racial, ethnic, or 
religious hatred particularly since the World War II. The Charter of the United Nations 
encourages “respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”331 Similarly, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights prohibits hate speech in the form of propaganda that incites racial 
discrimination.332 Also, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
states, “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”333 The International 
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)334 and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide335 show a global 
endeavor to regulate incitement to racial hatred.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 Id. ¶ 12. 
 
331 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 
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333 United Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
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335 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 
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European countries regulate hate speech strictly. For example, the German Criminal 
Act outlaws the denial of the genocide committed during Nazi regime.336 In France, the 
Gayssot Act punishes questioning the existence of Nazi crimes in the category of crimes 
against humanity.337 In the United Kingdom, the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006338 
makes it a crime to intentionally stir up racial or religious hatred by using threatening 
words or behavior.339 
By contrast, U.S. law permits hate speech unless the speech is likely to lead directly 
to imminent lawless action and there are no other available measures less intrusive on 
free speech.340 The U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio341 restricted criminal 
punishment for speech attacking racial or religious groups, stating that only the advocacy 
of “imminent lawless action” falls outside of the scope of the First Amendment. Even in 
the speech-restrictive military, a member of the military could not be punished under the 
Uniform Code for Military Justice for posting hateful remarks about white supremacy on 
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the Internet.342 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reasoned that the 
expression in issue did not constitute unprotected “dangerous speech” and there was no 
evidence to show that hate communications either interfered with accomplishment of the 
military mission or presented a clear danger to the troops.343  
The U.S. approach to hate speech is derived from the First Amendment premise that 
American free speech jurisprudence disallows the government from distinguishing 
protected from unprotected speech on the basis of its viewpoints.344 The unique position 
of the U.S. hate speech law reflects the “hard-learned lessons about what is needed to 
adequately protect the right of dissent in a democratic society.”345 By contrast, the Public 
Order Act of the United Kingdom prohibits expression of racial hatred such as 
“threatening, abusive, and insulting words or behavior” to provoke racial hatred.346 
When the electronic media deliver hate speech to the audience, the speech will have a 
great impact on society. The most notorious example of such deliberate “hate media”347 is 
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the Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines in Rwanda, which incited Hutu government 
to massacre Tutsi tribe in 1994.348  
The media sometimes unintentionally spread hate speech while republishing others’ 
hate speech. The issue of whether the media should be liable for hate speech reproduced 
during a reporter’s interview was addressed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Jersild v. Denmark.349 Danish journalist Jens Jersild interviewed three youths of the 
“Greenjackets” who insulted blacks with humiliating words and glorified the Ku Klux 
Klan.350 Jersild, after broadcasting the interview, was accused of violating the Denmark 
Penal Code that punished aiding and abetting hate speech, although he argued that he did 
not sympathize with his interviewees’ statements and just provided a real scene of social 
problem.351  
The European Court of Human Rights found that Jersild’s reporting drew public 
attention to a matter of public concern rather than promote racists views.352 Recognizing 
the press’s important role as a “public watchdog,” the Court held that the punishment of a 
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journalist for disseminating hate statements by third parties violated journalist’s freedom 
of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.353   
The Internet is likely to become more dangerous as a hate medium than the traditional 
media, attracting hate groups to spread their messages rapidly and easily.354 Besides, the 
social networking sites have attracted users to digital hate.355 Another problem for 
regulating online hate speech is that the American ISPs, which are immunized from 
liability for online contents posted by third parties under the CDA Section 230, are less 
likely motivated to address racially inflammatory speech available to foreign users.356 
                                              C. Summary and Conclusions  
Three key theories – marketplace of ideas, democratic self-governance, human 
dignity and self-fulfillment – have served as a useful framework on freedom of speech as 
a right, and they are valuable to examine online communication. More than other 
theories, the marketplace of ideas has prevailed in the United States, which reflects 
Americans’ optimistic approach to the Internet as an ideal tool of two-way 
communications.  
Yet the optimistic views on the Internet have faded recently. The Internet is not 
necessarily encouraging an open marketplace of ideas. Less diversity, not more, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Id. ¶ 35. 
 
354 For a general overview about online hate speech, see Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, 
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L. REV. 1435 (2011) (urging ISPs to be more actively regulating online hate speech). 
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communication via the Internet emerges as a challenge to cyber-speech. Whether State-
dictated or not, there is more widespread filtering or selective access to online 
information. More governments around the world, including the United States, try to 
control the Internet with statutory law and case law. 
Moreover, the Internet makes it more challenging to balance speech rights with other 
individual and societal rights. The distinction between traditional journalists and bloggers 
becomes less clear, so the journalist’s privilege is a more thorny issue. Copyright law is 
another challenge when copyright owners abuse the notice and takedown procedure to 
block contents that are more likely to be a fair use. Privacy is more of a concern than ever 
because private information is disclosed by SNS account owners or by malicious users. 
Extraterritorial issues in Internet law are pressing. Internet pornography and hate 
materials in cyberspace are increasingly intractable, when the materials are downloaded 
from extraterritorial websites.  
All of these issues make ISPs vulnerable to various government regulations, even in 
liberal democracies like the United States and the United Kingdom. ISPs regulations, 
however, should be carefully tailored to their stated objectives. Vague and overbroad 
regulations will undermine the ISPs’ role in mediating online communication and thus 
likely chill the Internet users’ freedom of speech. Regulating ISPs, while not imposing 
over-restrictions on online speech, will continue to be a never-ending challenge in the 
21st century.  
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CHAPTER III 
DEFAMATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
The year 2014 marked the 50th anniversary of the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, 
New York Times v. Sullivan,357 which constitutionalized American defamation law.358 
The primary purpose of post-Sullivan U.S. libel law has been to protect the media from 
liability for defamation “so as not to fetter the free and robust discussion of issues of 
public importance.”359  
The media-friendly change in U.S. libel law has been achieved. The media victories 
continued to rise, with the percentage of media wins being much higher in the 2000s 
(52.1%) than in the 1980s (37.3%).360 The Media Law Resource Center (MLRC) report 
of 2014 states: 
• Media defendants prevailed in the majority of cases after post-trial motions 
and appeals, paying no damages in 55.8 % of cases.  
• Although the overall number of media-related trials has declined, the drop in 
the number of cases involving newspaper defendants has been larger: 164 
cases involving newspapers in the 1980s to only 52 cases in the first decade of 
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the 2000s.361  
 
This trend of diminishing libel suits against media had been noted by law professor David 
Logan a dozen years earlier: “[T]he New York Times/Gertz regime has eviscerated the 
law of libel” so that the libel law has posed little threat to freedom of the press.362 
The triumph of the media in libel suits, however, does not necessarily mean that libel 
law no longer affects the media. Although it often prevails in libel litigation, the media 
has been cautious in reporting, for it should be liable for the cost of litigation.363 
Meanwhile, lawsuits against the press have tapered off. But non-media individuals -- 
especially bloggers and online publishers – have been increasingly sued for libel.364 
Hence, libel law might be more of a threat in the Internet era. 
This chapter provides an overview of American libel law. Section A examines three 
basic elements of libel law. Section B reviews three common law defenses and 
constitutional defenses such as opinion and “neutral reportage.” Section C discusses New 
York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny to highlight the media-friendly defamation law in 
the United States. The final section offers summary and conclusions on Sullivan’s impact 
on the American libel law.  	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                                 A. Elements of Defamation as a Tort 
Defamation, traditionally, has two types: libel as written defamation and slander as 
oral defamation. The scope of liability for libel is broader than liability for slander for 
three reasons: “(1) the written word leaves a more permanent blot on one’s reputation; (2) 
the written word is capable of wider circulation than that which is communicated orally; 
(3) reducing a defamation to writing evidences greater deliberation and intention on the 
part of one who records it.”365  
As television broadcasts image and sound altogether, which follows a prepared 
written transcript, however, the distinction between libel and slander becomes blurred. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals, finding that defamation by television contains features of 
both slander and libel, noted “defamacast” as a separate type of tort.366 
Furthermore, defamatory statements via the Internet bring about more difficult issues; 
disparaging statements mixed with speech, photo, video, and written letters on YouTube 
or Facebook cannot be easily determined as either libel or slander. In this context, Robert 
Sack predicts that the distinction between libel and slander will vanish soon: “[W]e will 
eventually see libel and slander replaced by the single tort of ‘defamation.’”367  
Even though the libel vs. slander distinction disappears, the reason libel has been 
considered a more serious tort than slander might still deserve consideration in online 
defamation. Like the written libel, defamatory statements on the Internet leave permanent 
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366 Strange v. Henderson. 477 S.E.2d 300, 305 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
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blot since it is almost impossible to delete already distributed online information and they 
circulate more widely and quickly than via traditional media. So, online defamation 
might need to be treated at least as seriously as libel, rather than slander as casual speech. 
A cause of action for defamation, the Restatement (Second) of Torts lists four general 
elements: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged 
publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the 
publisher; (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the 
existence of special harm by the publication.368 Although this list of the elements works 
as a useful checklist as the cause of action, its usefulness is rather limited since the 
“constitutionalized” libel law has made these elements rely on at least four important 
factors: the status of the plaintiff, the status of the defendant, the character of the 
allegedly defamatory statement, and the jurisdiction whose law applies.369 
1. Defamatory Statement 
Defamation tends to harm reputation. Reputation, however, cannot be clearly defined 
because it is a socially construed concept in a given society where the defamation law has 
been designed. Legal scholar Robert C. Post, noticing that reputation is “not a single 
idea” but “a mélange of several different concepts,” suggests three distinct concepts of 
reputation as property, honor, and dignity.370 But law professor David Anderson observes 
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369 Sack, supra note 81, § 2:1. 
 
370 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 
74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 740 (1986). See also DAVID ROLPH, REPUTATION, CELEBRITY AND 
DEFAMATION LAW 37 (2008) (arguing that Post’s concept of reputation is “a recognition of the 
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that defamation law should be considered to advance the more important social and 
cultural values of reputation, not as a mere remedy for economic loss.371  
Defamation is defined as the publication of a statement that exposes an individual to 
“hatred, contempt, or ridicule”372 or a statement that  “tends so to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him.”373 Courts have generally defined a defamatory 
statement as one that “exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or 
which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure hum in his 
occupation”374 or tends to “injure the reputation of another person or to expose [the 
person] to public hatred, contempt, ridicule.”375 
Courts have ruled that particular words that were allegedly defamatory must be read 
in the context of communication as a whole. A federal district court noted that the court 
should examine the challenged statement in its totality, considering all the words used, 
not merely particular phrases or sentences, and giving weight to cautionary terms used by 
the person publishing the statement. 376  
Yet the passage of time affects a word’s meaning. Justice Wendell Holmes of the 
U.S. Supreme Court said in 1918: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it 	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is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.”377 Thus, the words such as “communist,” 
“negro,” and “homosexual” have been considered defamatory in one age but not in 
another.378 It might be increasingly difficult to determine whether a statement is libelous 
in a modern society in which technology changes everyday life, idea, and terms faster 
than ever. 
 
2. Identification  
To be actionable, a defamatory statement should be understood as being “of and 
concerning” the plaintiff.379 The policy beneath the “of and concerning” requirement is 
“to protect freedom of public discussion, except to prevent defamatory statements 
reasonably susceptible of special application to a given individual.”380 Whether a 
statement can be reasonably understood to be “of and concerning” the plaintiff relies on 
the circumstances.381 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Towner v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
 
378 See e.g., Gottschalk v. States, 575 P.2d 289, 293 (Alaska 1978) (holding that “labeling 
someone a ‘communist’ or a ‘Marxist,’ which within the past 50 years has been considered first 
defamatory, then non-defamatory, and next defamatory again, depending largely on United States 
foreign policy changes”); Mitchell v. Tribune Co., 99 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951), cert. 
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952) (referring to a white man as a “Negro” and a “Chink” was not 
libelous per se); Wilson v. Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 83, 89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (publicizing someone 
as a “homosexual” not libel per se because being a homosexual is no crime or disease).  
 
379 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977). 
 
380 Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10-CV-05022-LHK, 2011 WL 2441898 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 
2011). 
381 Stanton v, Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 128 (1st Cir. 2006). 
	  	   82 
The element of identification was examined in New York Times v. Sullivan.382 The 
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an article about a government entity can 
be sufficiently “of and concerning” the plaintiff for libel lawsuit. The Court held that 
criticism of a government body could not be defamatory to an unnamed government 
official who was responsible for a criticized governmental action: 
 
Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be 
penalized for his criticism, th[at] proposition relied on strikes at the very center of 
the constitutionally protected area of free expression. We hold that such a 
proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise 
impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official 
responsible for those operations.383 
 
If a government official could sue for libel on behalf of government authorities, it would 
contradict the strong proposition that government may not sue for defamation.384 
Therefore, identification as an element of libel law shuts off the detour for such a libel 
lawsuit to threaten a democratic society. 
 
3. Publication 
Publication and republication as elements of defamation are noteworthy for the media 
and its mediated communication. The person who republishes defamatory comments is 
liable for defamation, for each repetition of libelous statements constitutes a new 
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publication.385 The common law has long held that one who republishes defamation 
should be liable “just as if he had published it originally, even though he attributes the 
libelous statement to the original publisher, and even though he expressly disavows the 
truth of the statement.”386  
Liability for the republication, however, might cause a chilling effect on the reporting 
of controversial maters of public interest. To attenuate the chilling effect on freedom of 
speech and the press, courts have made various efforts such as the application of 
Sullivan,387 fair report privilege, neutral reportage, and enactment of Section 230 of the 
CDA.388  
Another judicial effort to restrict liability relating to republication is the “single-
publication” rule. The single publication rule means: “(a) only one action for damages 
can be maintained; (b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in one 
action; (c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for 
damages bars any other action for damages between the same parties in all 
jurisdictions.”389 Thus, the single publication rule reduces the potential multiple libel 
lawsuits and protects defendants against the prospect of being subject to repeated 	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lawsuits.390  
The single publication rule applies to defamatory publications upon the Internet as 
well.391 Without the single publication rule, lawsuits against online publishers might be 
repeated because publication would occur whenever the defamatory statement is accessed 
online. 
                                                            B. Defenses 
The common law of libel recognizes three primary defenses -- truth, fair comment, 
and fair report privilege. Related to the fair comment and fair report defenses are the 
constitutional defenses “opinion” and “neutral reportage.”   
1.Truth 
The First Amendment does not permit liability for defamation unless the plaintiff 
shows that the defamatory statement was factually false. Truth is a complete defense to a 
defamation claim, although a true statement may be harmful as much as a false statement 
to someone’s reputation.392 A statement will be treated “substantially true” as long as the 
“gist” or “sting” of the libelous expression is correct.393 Truth as an absolute defense 
against defamation was challenged in Noonan v. Staples, Inc.394 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit applied a state libel law that does not allow truth as a 	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single publication applies to online letter to determine statute of limitations).  
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defense for statements made with “actual malice” in common law. The plaintiff Alan 
Noonan was a sales director of the office supply company Staples. After Noonan was 
fired for abusing the company’s travel and expense reporting system, a Staples executive 
sent an email to about 1,500 employees, letting them know that Noonan had been fired 
for violating company policies and reminding them of the importance of compliance.395 
Noonan sued for libel.   
A federal district court granted summary judgment for Staples on the libel claim, 
stating that the statements in the email were true. But the First Circuit court ruled in 
Noonan’s favor, relying on a 1902 Massachusetts law that truth would be a defense 
unless the plaintiff can show the “actual malice” of the defendant.396 The federal appeal 
court inferred the presence of malice of Staples on the ground that the company never 
previously disclosed the name of a fired employee in emails and sent no memos about 
other fired employees for policy violations.397 Noonan might pose a threat to online 
communication, for it conflicts with the basic free speech principle that true expression 
should be protected against libel.398  
2. Fair Comment and Opinion 
The fair comment privilege affords individuals the opportunity to express opinion on 
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matters of legitimate public interest based on true or privileged statements of fact. Fair 
comments are not actionable because “the reader understands that such supported 
opinions represent the writer’s interpretation of the facts presented, and because the 
reader is free to draw his or her own conclusions based upon those facts.”399 The fair 
comment privilege is lost when an opinion is published with “malice” – bad faith or bad 
motive -- in the common law.400  
But the fair comment privilege could not provide an effective guideline because the 
meaning of “fair” and “opinion” is so vague that it leads to some possible danger that 
laws and juries in different jurisdiction might yield inconsistent decisions.401 Now it is 
largely obviated by the First Amendment free-speech doctrine.402 Nonetheless, the fair 
comment privilege is still relevant by filling in gaps in protection for comment. For 
instance, in Magnusson v. New York Times Co.,403 doctor James E. Magnusson sued a TV 
news channel in Oklahoma that broadcast consumers’ complaints about his plastic 
surgeries. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that most contents of the broadcasts were 
interviews of the patients and quotations of the patients’ expressed opinions about their 
medical treatments and thus the common law defense was applied.404 In 2012, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland applied fair comment to protect a newspaper reporter who was 	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sued for articles about a nightclub owner’s involvement in the murders of two 
employees.405 The nightclub owner, Nicholas A. Piscatelli, claimed that the fair comment 
defense would be of no avail because reporter Van Smith based his comments on 
defamatory false facts.406 The highest court of Maryland, however, ruled that Smith’s 
reporting would be protected because it was based on Piscatelli’s privilege testimony at 
the murder trial.407  
“Opinion” that has emerged as a narrow constitutional defense has its origin from the 
fair comment defense. To provide more concrete constitutional protections, the Supreme 
Court in Gertz stated in its dictum:  
Under the First Amendment there is not such thing as a false idea. However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. This 
principle, together with the implication in Gertz that only a falsehood can be 
defamatory, seemed to lead to a simple but powerful syllogism: A defamation is 
actionable only if it is false: opinions cannot be proved false; therefore, opinions 
can never be actionable, no matter how derogatory they may be.408  
 
But the Gertz dictum led to an unintended idea: opinions cannot be false; therefore, 
opinions can never be actionable.409 Moreover, the post-Gertz courts confronted another 
hard question such as what is a protected opinion and what is an actionable assertion of 
fact.  
To resolve this issues, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Ollman v. 	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Evans410 provided a useful criteria: For determining whether the average reader would 
view the statement as fact or opinion, the court will consider (1) the common usage or 
meaning of the specific language of the challenged statement itself; (2) “the verifiability” 
of the alleged defamation; (3) “the full context of the statement” such as the entire article 
or another unchallenged language; (4) “the broader context or setting in which the 
statement appears.”411  
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal,412 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize a 
First Amendment privilege for “opinion” as a category of speech. A wrestling coach 
Michael Milkovich brought suit against a newspaper columnist who published an article 
that implied Milkovich had lied under oath. The Court held that the Gertz passage that 
“there is not such thing as a false idea” was not “intended to create a wholesale 
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled ‘opinion.’”413 Emphasizing that 
expressions of opinion may “often imply an assertion of objective fact,”414 Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist rejected the idea that a statement such as “in my opinion John Jones is 
a liar” should be automatically protected by a separate privilege for “opinion.”415 
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, noting that defamatory statements as a matter of 
constitutional law must be based on provably false statements of fact, stated that 	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“imaginative expression,” “rhetorical hyperbole,” or “loose, figurative, or hyperbolic 
language” would not be actionable for libel.416 
Although the opinion defense is applied to online expression, courts have been 
troubled in determining whether a statement is an opinion or fact, especially on social 
networking sites (SNS) such as Twitter or Facebook.417 Due to the character limit on 
SNS, brief statements on SNS are frequently implicit and thus hard to make a distinction 
between facts and opinion. For instance, in Patterson v. Grant-Herms,418 an agent of 
Southwest Airlines sued a passenger Natalie D. Grant-Herms who posted allegedly 
libelous statements on her Twitter and Facebook sites. Grant-Herms posted comments 
such as “the WORST customer service” on her SNS and the airline’s website.419 The 
Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that Grant-Herms’ statements were “expression of 
her frustration and complaints” about the flight experience, and thus those statements did 
not rise to the level of actionable defamation.420 Yet the court did not suggest whether 
there could be a difference between online expression on SNS and statements on 
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traditional media.421  
Similarly, there have been lawsuits regarding the customer review websites. Some 
courts found that customers’ gripes would be likely recognized as expression of 
subjective opinion rather than facts.422 Given that the websites for review or rating are 
dedicated to consumers’ appraisals or critiques on goods and services, more free 
expression should be allowed unless it includes substantially false facts. 
3. Fair Report Privilege and Neutral Reportage 
The fair report privilege, as one of the common law privileges, permits the press to 
republish reports of judicial, legislative, or executive proceedings if the press report is 
“accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported.”423 Historically, 
the fair report privilege has promoted the system of self-governance through fair and 
accurate report of official proceedings.424 In order to be entitled to the privilege, the 
publication in issue must clearly attribute the statement to the official proceeding or 
documents from which it is quoting. For example, a blogger, who stated that a person is 
reputed to be an embezzler without consulting official documents, will not be immunized 
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even though a prosecutor in a court had made such a false statement.425  
The fair report privilege is able to overcome the common law malice or the “actual 
malice” of Sullivan,426 for this privilege exists even when the publisher knows the 
defamatory comments to be false. Hence, abuse of this privilege occurs when the 
publisher does not deliver a fair and accurate report about the official proceedings.427 
The fair report privilege can be extended to online publication. In Amway Corp. v. 
Procter & Gamble Co.,428 Amway sued Proctor & Gamble and an operator of an anti-
Amway website. The website operator published a complaint filed by Proctor& Gamble 
against Amway in a federal district court and alleged that Amway used an illegal pyramid 
scheme.429 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that website posting of 
complaint was protected under the fair report privilege of Michigan defamation statute, 
since the defendants did not add any statement to the actual complaint before online 
publication.430  
But not all the online publishers fall within fair report privilege. In Ascend Health 
Corp. v. Wells,431 blogger Brenda Wells was sued for disparaging comments about a 
private hospital and its doctors on her two blogs and Facebook. A federal district court in 	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North Carolina examined whether Wells’ blog was entitled to fair report privilege under 
Texas defamation law. The court ruled that the fair report privilege could not be applied 
to the blog because the Texas law only extends the fair report privilege to newspapers 
and “other periodical[s].”432 The court stated that Well’s blog was not akin to a 
newspaper or other periodicals, since the blogs were not composed of articles and news 
items and not published at regular intervals.433 To apply the fair report privilege, the 
notion of “the press” will pose continuous problems in cyberspace. 
Although the fair report privilege strongly protects the press republication, such 
protection might be limited: the fair report privilege is only applied to the stories related 
to official proceedings. Sometimes a statement can be newsworthy “simply because it is 
made.”434 To address this issue, courts have developed the constitutional protection for 
republication of newsworthy statements under the “neutral reportage” privilege. The 
Second Circuit in Edwards v. National Audubon Society435 stated: 
Succinctly stated, when a responsible, prominent organization like the National 
Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First 
Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, 
regardless of the reporter’s private views regarding their validity. What is 
newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made. We do not believe 
that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress 
newsworthy statements merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth. 
Nor must the press take up cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish 
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them without fear of liability for defamation.436 
 
The neutral reportage, which the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet ruled on, is more 
media-friendly than the actual malice rule: the press defendant can be protected from 
reporting false statement even if the defendant knew about the falsity of statement. So the 
press can more easily avoid liability for republishing newsworthy allegations about 
public figures.  
While some state and lower federal courts have adopted the neutral reportage 
privilege,437 the privilege has more often been rejected.438 For instance, the Court of 
Appeals of Michigan refused to accept the privilege because the press was “adequately 
protected” by the Sullivan rule.439 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 
Dickey v. CBS Inc.440 stated that neutral reportage had its foundation on the questionable 
“newsworthiness” of the alleged defamatory statements, which the Supreme Court had 
rejected.441 More recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Norton v. Glenn,442 a 
decisive case against neutral reportage, strongly repudiated the privilege as a libel 	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defense, since the balance between reputation and the media freedom could not be so 
sharply tilted in favor of protecting the media.443  
                C. Sullivan and Its Progeny: Constitutionalizing Libel Law 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s “consistent view” of defamation before Sullivan was that 
defamatory statements were entirely outside the First Amendment.444 Very much similar 
to English common law of libel, the pre-Sullivan libel law burdened the libel defendant 
with strict liability. The Sullivan Court began the process of constitutionalizing libel law, 
holding that a public official could not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood 
without proving “actual malice.”  
1. Sullivan: Constitutional Revolution for Press Freedom  
The Sullivan case started from the civil rights campaign in the South. On March 29, 
1960, the New York Times published a full-page advertisement titled “Heed Their Rising 
Voices” to defend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. who was arrested in charge of a perjury. 
After the advertisement was published, L. B. Sullivan, a city commissioner in 
Montgomery, Alabama, sued the New York Times for libel in Montgomery County.445 
Because Sullivan was the commissioner who supervised the police in Montgomery, he 
claimed that the word “police” accused him of coercing Dr. King’s protests with 
“intimidation and violence.”446 The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial judge’s 
ruling against the New York Times, pointing that “malice could be inferred from the 	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Times’ irresponsibility in printing the advertisement” without checking facts from its 
previously published articles.447 
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
judgment, stating that the Alabama courts failed to safeguard freedom of speech in a 
defamation lawsuit brought by a public official.448 Justice William J. Brennan of the 
Supreme Court, who wrote the opinion of the Court, stated that the public debate often 
can be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”449 
After reviewing the history of the Sedition Act, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 
that erroneous statement was “inevitable in free debate” and should be protected to give 
freedom of speech the “breathing space” to survive.450 To support the public’s “privilege 
for the citizen-critic of government,”451 the Court established the “actual malice” rule: 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a 
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his 
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ 
– that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not.452 
 
As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court established a rule that a public official could win a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 Id. at 263. 
 
448 Id. at 264. 
 
449 Id. at 270. 
 
450 Id. at 272. 
 
451 Id. at 282. 
 
452 Id. at 279-80. 
	  	   96 
libel suit relating to criticism of his official conduct only when he could prove “actual 
malice.” Sullivan was welcomed as a landmark decision in support of freedom of 
expression.453 
2. The Aftermath of Sullivan: Extending the Actual Malice Rule 
To explain the effect of libel law on news media, professors John Soloski and Randall 
Bezanson argued that libel law is a “prism” of journalism in a given society: 
Libel represents the most dramatic and frequent conflict at the intersection of law 
and journalism, and it thus involves the judicial system in a surprisingly broad 
array of questions, ranging from the meaning of reputation in an organized 
society, the modes of interpreting words and symbols, and the very idea of falsity, 
on the one hand, to the mundane facts of journalistic existence, such as the 
reliability of sources, the confidentiality of sources, and the limits of acceptable 
misquotation. Libel law, therefore, is effectively a prism through which the entire 
journalistic enterprise is explored.454  
 
When looked though the prism of libel law, the U.S. Supreme Court has approached libel 
law in the framework of giving more protection to freedom of speech and the press since 
Sullivan. 
Three years after the Sullivan decision, the actual malice rule has been extended to 
include “public figures” in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.455 Writing the plurality 
opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan noted access to the media as a justification to 
require public figures to prove “actual malice” in defamation lawsuits. Justice Harlan 
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held that public figures, like public officials, have often played a substantial role in 
ordering society and had as ready access as public officials to mass media to influence 
policy and to counter criticism of their ideas and activities.456  
The “actual malice” rule was applied to even private figures related to the matter of 
public interest in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.457 A plurality of the Rosenbloom Court 
observed that the First Amendment’s impact on defamation law after Sullivan stemmed 
not so much from the plaintiff’s status but from “the question whether the allegedly 
defamatory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest.”458 The Court held 
that the public’s primary concern might be “in the event,” in other words, whether the 
allegations involved a matter of a public concern.459 Hence, even a private figure 
involved in matters of public concern was required to prove “actual malice” under the 
Rosenbloom.460 
Yet Rosenbloom was overruled after three years by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.461 The 
U.S. Supreme Court found differences between public official/figures and private figures.  
To begin with, public officials and public figures have more chances than private 
individuals to rebut false statements as a “self-help” remedy. Secondly, public figures 	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voluntarily take the risk of strict public scrutiny than ordinary people.462 The Gertz Court 
emphasized the dangerous application of strict liability for defamation on the grounds 
that coercing a speaker to guarantee the accuracy of his factual assertions may result in 
intolerable self-censorship.463 To resolve conflicts between freedom of speech and 
reputational interests, the Gertz Court ruled that public figures must prove “actual 
malice” to win their libel lawsuits while private figure plaintiffs only had to prove some 
degree of fault.464 In addition, the Court held that the states would not permit recovery of 
presumed or punitive damages without showing “actual malice.”465 But the Gertz Court 
failed to provide a clear standard for determining who is a “public figure.” 
Public figures and public officials in U.S. libel law are required to prove “actual 
malice” to win libel lawsuits. By contrast, private plaintiffs must prove at least 
negligence in all states to win, whereas they have to prove “actual malice” to win 
punitive or presumed damages. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, revisited the public 
concern standard in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.466 Dun & 
Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, sent its subscribers a false report that Greenmoss 
Builders filed for bankruptcy.467 Greenmoss sued the Dun & Bradstreet. Writing for the 
plurality, Justice Lewis F. Powell held that the Gertz rule on punitive and presumed 	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damages was not applicable to the case that did not involve matters of public concern.468 
Justice Powell reasoned that the state had a stronger interest in protecting private 
individuals’ reputations, for they did not voluntarily thrust themselves to controversy and 
did not have effective means to access the media to rebut defamatory statements.469 The 
Court concluded that the Gertz rule -- recovery of presumed and punitive damages 
requiring a showing of actual malice – would not be applied to private matters of 
“reduced constitutional value.”470 
But Rodney Smolla criticized Dun & Bradstreet for failing to set forth what fault 
level should be required for punitive and presumed damages in private figure and private 
matter lawsuits.471 The private figure and private matter issue has been in dilemma. 
Several courts ignored Dun & Bradstreet in their fault discussions by relying on state 
precedents;472 other courts simply refused to defer to Dun & Bradstreet by requiring 
private figure plaintiffs to prove “actual malice” when suing over a matter of public 
concern.473 Media law professors Ruth Walden and Derigan Silver argued in 2009 that 
the unsolved questions from Dun & Bradstreet are likely to become more serious while 
the issues of private figures on private concerns will be more flourishing on the 	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Internet.474  
The Supreme Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps475 held that the private 
plaintiff suing a media defendant relating to public concern was required to prove falsity, 
in addition to negligence under Gertz.476 The Court reasoned that such a burden was 
required to ensure “true speech on matters of public concern.”477 Yet the holding of 
Hepps did not give any direction for the burden on a non-media defendant of proving as 
to matters of public interest. Thus while public officials bear the same burden of proof in 
media and non-media cases under the Sullivan case, the burden of proof in non-media 
cases for private figure plaintiffs is still unclear.478 
For online defamation, it has been a much debatable issue whether the Gertz rule 
should apply to a defamed person on the Net. A federal district court in the District of 
Columbia ruled in Ellis v. Time, Inc.479 that a photojournalist was a limited-purpose 
public figure when he had thrust himself into the forefront of a public online 
controversy.480 Professional photojournalist Richard Ellis claimed on a CompuServe 
journalist discussion group that Time staged several photographs depicting child 	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prostitution in Russia.481 Although Time stated that the photos were possibly staged, Time 
asserted in its editor’s letter that Ellis had urged a Russian pimp to change his story about 
the pictures for money from Time. Ellis sued Time for defamation.  
To determine whether Ellis was a public figure, the court asked three questions: Did 
there exist a “public controversy”?  Did Ellis achieve a “special prominence in the 
debate”?  And was the alleged defamation “germane” to Ellis’ participation in the raging 
controversy?482 Because Ellis initiated an online debate on the Time photographs,483 the 
court found that Ellis played a major role on the public controversy and related 
defamation.484 As a public figure, Ellis had to show that Time had published the libelous 
statement with “actual malice,” but he was unsuccessful.485 Still, the court refused to 
accept Time’s argument that “a person who posts a message on an electronic bulletin 
board is by definition a limited purpose public figure.”486 
Similarly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a businessman must prove 
“actual malice” as a public figure online. In Hibdon v. Grabowski,487 jet ski business 
owner Kerry Hipdon sued his business competitor George Grabowski for posting 
negative comments about his business practices on a news group website. The online 
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controversy over Hipdon, the court noted, was “public” due to “the international reach of 
the Internet news group” website.488 Because of the existing public controversy, the court 
considered Hipdon a “limited purpose” public figure when he injected himself into the 
controversy voluntarily by boasting about his business online.489 Yet the Tennessee 
court’s decision raises a question of whether every online user who has advertised or 
exposed his or her business on the Net would be treated as a public figure. Moreover, 
should an online controversy be treated as a “public controversy” because of the 
Internet’s technological feature of wide accessibility? 
In 2010, a student singer and actor was held not to be a public figure in spite of his 
promotion of his entertainment career on his website. In D.C. v. R.R.,490 a high school 
student known by D.C. sued fellow students and their parents for defamation, hate crime, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with derogatory website 
comments.491 The California appellate court found that D.C. was not a public figure, 
because he did not “achieve pervasive fame or notoriety” and he was “not in the midst of 
particular public controversy.”492  
As shown above, American courts remain uncertain whether an online speaker who 
has initiated or participated in debates on controversial issues should be treated as a 
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public figure.493 Given that Section 230 precludes individuals from obtaining a remedy 
from ISPs, the only way for getting a damage award in a libel lawsuit is suing the original 
online speaker. If the definition of a public figure under Gertz is sweepingly applied to 
online defamation, few defamed private individuals will be compensated for their 
reputational damage from the original speaker. Thus, the courts should be extra-cautious 
in broadening the public figure doctrine in online defamation law.  
                                           D. Summary and Conclusions  
The impact of libel law on free speech and a free press is inevitable. Too much 
protection of reputation will result in far less room for the open marketplace of ideas. 
Thus, the balancing of reputation with freedom of expression has led common law and 
constitutional law to recognize several libel defenses.  
The old common law libel defenses—truth, fair comment, and fair report privilege—
were useful to the press in libel lawsuits in the past. But they were not sufficiently 
attentive to freedom of expression in conflict with reputation. They were often hampered 
by procedural and substantive conditions attached to their applications. Not surprisingly, 
truth and fair comment are not as crucial as they were in the pre-Sullivan era. The rules 
on truth as a defense have been revised because the burden of proof has shifted from the 
media to the plaintiff. Fair comment has been partially superseded by the constitutional 
defenses, although it remains important in some states.  	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The Sullivan “actual malice” as a new constitutional test for defamation law has 
reconciled reputational interests with freedom of the press in favor of more vigorous 
public debates. “Actual malice” has informed American courts in ruling on libel issues 
for the past 50 years. As a result, the clear trend in American libel law since Sullivan has 
been to prioritize freedom of speech and the press over reputational interests.  
The Sullivan rule, however, was designed primarily for the established news media 
that serve as a watchdog of government that deserve special constitutional protections 
against public officials and public figures. In the 21st century, the media environment has 
dramatically changed because of the Internet and other new media technologies. Bloggers 
and citizen journalists have emerged as an alternative to the legacy media. Individual 
Internet publishers are often sued for their postings on SNS and various websites.  
In this fast-changing media environment, it can be questioned whether Sullivan and 
its progeny would survive in the Internet era. As the application of Gertz rule on the 
Internet illustrates, courts need to carefully examine whether to adjust traditional 
standards of libel law to cyber speech. Instead of focusing on the technological features 
such as the defamed individual’s easy access to the Internet and voluntary participation in 
online discussion, attend should be focused on whether online speech in issue fulfills its 
purpose of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate as the Sullivan court 
envisioned.  
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CHAPTER IV 
DEFAMATION LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
British defamation law remains not much different from what has evolved through the 
centuries of common law while it has become more media-friendly in recent years.494 It 
presumes that defamatory statements are false and the burden of proving truth is on the 
defendant.495 It is easier for a public plaintiff –a public official or public figure— to win a 
libel suit in England than in America, for the plaintiff does not have to prove the Sullivan 
“actual malice” on the part of he defendant.496 
U.K. defamation law strikes the balance between speech and reputation in favor of 
reputation, while American law prefers freedom of speech.497 This disparity between 
U.K. and U.S. law has led to “libel tourism,” which has triggered debates about free-
speech issues.498 Congress in 2010 enacted the SPEECH (Securing the Protection of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 For recent liberalization of U.K. libel law, see infra Section C, “Reynolds and the Public 
Interest Defense.”  
 
495 Smolla, supra note 75, § 1:9.50. 
 
496 David Hooper et al., Survey of English Libel Law, in MEDIA LIBEL LAW: MLRC 50-STATE 
SURVEY (Media Law Resource Center ed. 2010). 
 
497 See e.g., Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, An Opportunity Lost: The United Kingdom’s 
Failed Reform of Defamation Law, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 621 (1997) (criticizing that the 
Defamation Act 1996 erected substantial obstacles for the press to fulfill its central role to warn 
the public of abuse of the governor’s power while rejecting a public figure defense). 
 
498 For discussions of libel tourism, see Robert L. McFarland, Please Do Not Publish This Article 
in England: A Jurisdictional Response to Libel Tourism, 79 MISS. L.J. 617 (2010) (proposing 
traditional jurisdictional principles to respond to libel tourism instead of “adopting isolated non-
recognition statutes such as the SPEECH Act”); Doug Rendleman, Collecting a Libel Tourist’s 
Defamation Judgment?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2010) (suggesting that U.S. courts 
evaluate foreign judgments in a nuanced and discerning way instead of simply rejecting 
enforcement of such judgments); Daniel C. Taylor, Libel Tourism: Protecting Authors and 
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Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage) Act499 in response to a widely 
discussed U.K. libel tourism case, Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz,500 to stop threat of libel 
laws from abroad.501 In varying degrees, anti-libel tourism U.S. law has inspired the U.K. 
Parliament to enact the Defamation Act in 2013. The Defamation Act, which consists of 
seventeen sections, revised statutory law while codifying the common law principles. It is 
likely to effect a dramatic change in U.K. libel law.502  The Defamation Act reflects the 
continuing liberalization of U.K. law that started in the late 1990s. Lord Donald Nicholls 
in Reynolds noted in 1999:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Preserving Comity, 99 GEO. L.J. 189, 226 (2010) (proposing federal legislation authorizing U.S. 
authors to sue foreign defamation plaintiffs for money damages). 
 
499 Section 4102(a) of the SPEECH Act states: 
 
(a) First Amendment Considerations. 
     (1) In general. -- Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or State law, a 
domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless 
the domestic court determines that – 
           (A) the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s adjudication provided at least 
as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by 
the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and 
law of the State in which the domestic court is located. 
 
SPEECH Act, 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (2010). 
 
500 [2005] EWHC 1156 (QB) (American author Rachel Ehrenfeld wrote “Funding Evil: How 
Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop it” to reveal that international networks financed 
terrorists. Although only 23 copies of Ehrenfeld’s book were sold in England, three Saudi 
Arabian financiers named in the book sued Ehrenfeld for defamation in England. The High Court 
ordered Ehrenfeld and her publisher to pay £10,000 in damages to the plaintiffs with additional 
£80,000 costs).  
 
501 For a thoughtful overview on libel tourism and the SPEECH Act, see HARRY MELKONIAN, 
DEFAMATION, LIBEL TOURISM AND THE SPEECH ACT OF 2010: THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
COLLIDING WITH THE COMMON LAW (2011) (maintaining that American courts need to revisit 
the refusal to grant comity in enforcing U.K. judgments, for English courts have permitted 
speech-friendly decisions since Reynolds). 
 
502 For a discussion of the UK Defamation Act of 2013, see infra Chapter VI, Section A.3, 
“Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013.” 
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The common law has long recognised the ‘chilling’ effect of this rigorous, 
reputation protective principle [of libel law]. There must be exceptions. At times 
people must be able to speak and write freely, uninhibited by the prospect of 
being sued for damages should they be mistaken or misinformed. In the wider 
public interest, protection of reputation must then give way to a higher priority.503 
 
The liberalization of U.K. libel law has been reinforced by the House of Lords decision 
of 2006, Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe.504 The U.K. courts505 sought to promote 
the “public interest” libel defense to ensure that the U.K. law meets the requirement of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.506  
This chapter examines U.K. defamation law to place Chapter VI on the Internet law 
in perspective. Section A analyzes the main elements of a cause of action in libel law. 
Section B reviews what libel defenses are available in U.K. law. Section C discusses the 
Reynolds defense and its impact on U.K. decisions. The final section offers a summary 
and conclusions of the ongoing libel law issues in the United Kingdom.  
                                  A. Elements of Defamation as a Tort 
In common law, the plaintiff only has to prove that the published statement conveyed 
a defamatory meaning relating to him- or herself. So far as the falsity of the defamatory 
allegation is concerned, English defamation law does not require the plaintiff to prove the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 192-93 (H.L.). 
 
504 [2006] UKHL 44.  
 
505 In the U.K. legal system, the highest court is the Supreme Court, which opened in October 
2009 with 12 Justices to hear appeals. Until opening of the Supreme Court, the House of Lords 
had been the highest court where 12 Law Lords heard cases from the lower courts, most often 
from the Court of Appeal. For more information on the U.K. judicial system, see Introduction to 
the Justice System, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/ or the 
Supreme Court, http://supremecourt.uk/about/index.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2014).  
 
506 Richard Mullender, Case and Comment: Defamation, Fair Comment and Public Concerns, 69 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 443, 443 (2010). 
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falsity of the statement’s defamatory imputation.507 The presumption that the defamatory 
statement is false has been justified to protect an individual’s reputation.508 In 
establishing a cause of action for defamation, the plaintiff has to prove three elements: 
the statement’s defamatory nature, publication of the statement, and reference to the 
plaintiff.  
1. Defamatory Statement 
The defamatory statement is defined as “one which injures the reputation of another 
by exposing him to hared, contempt, or ridicule, or which tends to lower him in the 
esteem of right-thinking members of society.”509 But it is often difficult to determine 
what expression would expose a plaintiff to such reputational injury that it would justify a 
claim for damages. In Berkoff v. Burchill,510 a media libel case of 1997, for example, a 
Sunday Times reporter wrote two articles about actor and director Steven Berkoff, 
describing him as “notoriously hideous-looking” like “Frankenstein.”511 After a high 
court ruled that such statements were defamatory of Berkoff, the reporter appealed.512 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the reporter’s story exposed Berkoff to 
ridicule and caused him to be avoided.513 But Justice Peter Millett dissented, arguing that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Drummond-Jackson v. British Medical Association [1970] 1 All E.R. 1094, 1099. 
 
508 Mullis & Doley eds., supra note 252, at 33. 
 
509 Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240 (H.L.).  
 
510 [1997] EMLR 139.  
 
511 Id. at 141. 
 
512 Id. 
513 Id. at 151. 
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the comments at issue were not attacks on his reputation but attacks on his appearance.514 
As the Berkoff case shows, the line between mockery and defamation is sometimes hard 
to draw. 
To decide whether a news story is libelous, the article needs to be understood as a 
whole by readers. Charleston v. News Group Newspapers Ltd,515 a 1995 House of Lords 
case, arose from publication of a story about two famous actors. The story’s headline and 
its accompanying photograph showed that the actors posed in a pornographic way. Yet 
the text of the article itself contained no defamatory statements. The House of Lords held 
that the two actors’ libel claim could not be founded on a headline or photograph in 
isolation from the text, and thus ordinary readers would not find defamatory meaning 
after reading the story as a whole.516  
The Defamation Act 2013 creates a new hurdle to determine whether a statement is 
defamatory. It requires that “a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has 
caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.”517 The new 
Defamation Act applies to defamation claims where the cause of action has arisen since 
January 1, 2014. The only decision in which the new Act has applied to date was Cooke 
v. MGN Ltd.518 In August 2014, the Cooke decision discussed specifically the “serious 
harm” test under Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act. Ruth Cooke, chief of the Midland 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Id. at 153. 
 
515 [1995] UKHL 6. 
 
516 Id. 
 
517 Defamation Act 2013, § 1(1) (emphasis added). 
 
518 [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB). 
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Heart Housing Association, sued the Sunday Mirror for a story that described her as 
“making money from the misery” of slum residents. In assessing the likelihood of 
“serious harm,” Justice David Bean of the U.K. High Court paid attention to the 
newspaper’s apology, which the Sunday Mirror published one week after publication of 
the challenged defamatory article.519 The High Court considered the apology “sufficient 
to eradicate or at least minimize any unfavourable impression” from the original article, 
and thus there was no specific evidence of causing serious harm.520 Yet Justice Bean 
offered little discussion of the meaning of “serious harm,” so it remains unclear what 
kind of harm would amount to the “serious harm” under the Defamation Act 2013.  
2. Publication 
“Publication” in defamation law refers to communication of defamatory material to a 
person other than the plaintiff in a form capable of being understood by its recipients.521 
At common law, not only the original speaker of defamatory statements but also another 
person may be liable if the person participates in, secures, or authorizes the 
publication.522 In Slipper v. British Broadcasting Corp.,523 a BBC libel case of 1991, a 
retired policeman sued a filmmaker who depicted him as an incompetent police officer. 
He  also sued BBC journalists who published film reviews that contained the filmmaker’s 
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defamatory statement.524 The BBC journalists claimed that their defamatory repetitions 
should be actionable only when they had authorized the materials in issue. But the Court 
of Appeal disagreed, holding the journalists liable for any republication of defamatory 
material as long as republication was reasonably foreseeable.525  
English libel law had followed the “multiple publication rule” in which each 
publication was an independent tort, and thus printers and distributors were liable even if 
they were unaware that the publication contained defamatory material.526 The multiple 
publication rule had been criticized, especially with the development of online archives, 
for online publishers might have been potentially liable for any defamatory material 
accessed online long after their initial publication.527 To address these concerns, the 
Defamation Act 2013 stipulated the “single publication rule,”528 which replaces the 
multiple publication rule. The new rule applies to material which has already been 
published to the public, including publication to a “section of the public.”529 But it does 
not cover the subsequent publication if it is “materially different from the manner of first 
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526 The multiple publication rule stems from the case of Duke of Brunswick v Harmer [1849] 14 
QB 185 (holding that the purchase of a single back issue of a newspaper 17 years after its original 
publication constituted a separate publication for a separate cause of action). The multiple 
publication rule was upheld in Times Newspaper Ltd. v. United Kingdom, [2009] ECHR 451, by 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Court, however, suggested that the libel proceedings 
against a newspaper “after a significant lapse of time” might interfere with freedom of the press. 
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publication.”530 But the single publication rule will likely generate questions over what 
constitutes a “section of the public” in the online context and how the “material 
difference” of a subsequent publication should be determined.531 
3. Identification 
Defamation is actionable only when the defamed person can be identified in the 
challenged defamatory publication.532 To decide whether the publication is of and 
concerning the plaintiff, a “reasonable” person should understand that the defamatory 
imputation referred to the plaintiff.533 If the name itself does not suffice to identify the 
defamed, the context of the publication will be taken into account.534  
                                                         B. Defenses 
The main common law libel defenses in England are (1) truth, (2) honest opinion, and 
(3) privilege.   
1. Truth (formerly “Justification”) 
”Justification” means that the challenged statement is true or substantially true.535 
Because the crucial purpose of libel law is to compensate damage of the defamed, the 
plaintiff is not entitled to be compensated for a false reputation if the allegedly 	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531 BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE DEFAMATION ACT 2013, § 6.33 (James Price & Felicity 
McMahon eds., 2013). 
 
532  Knupffer v. London Express Newspapers Ltd.  [1944] A.C. 116, 119 (H.L.) (“The only 
relevant rule is that in order to be actionable the defamatory words must be understood to be 
published of and concerning the plaintiff.”). 
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defamatory statement is true.536 The basis of the general principle of truth as a defense is 
that the “the law will not permit a man to recover damages in respect of an injury to a 
character which he does not or ought not to possess.”537 In addition, freedom of speech 
underpins the truth defense because free speech should not be curtailed unless the 
publication of the defamatory material is not wrongful.538 
English law presumes falsity of the allegedly libelous statement so that the defendant 
must prove that the words were true.539 But the media defendant challenged the rule of 
burden of proof. In Berezovsky v. Forbes,540 a media libel case of 2001, the news media 
defendant argued that the defense of “justification” should be reassessed under the 
European Convention on Human Rights to relieve the burden of proof on the press. The 
Court of Appeal, however, rejected such argument and held that requiring the defendant 
to prove truth was not inconsistent with freedom of expression in order to protect 
ordinary people from the publication of unjustified falsehood.541  
Section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 codifies “justification” as a statutory defense of 
truth, replacing the common law defense of justification.542 Even if some part of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
536 David PRICE, KORIEH DUODU & NICOLA CAIN, DEFAMATION LAW, PROCEDURE & PRACTICE 
57 (4th ed. 2009).  
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538 See, e.g., Holley v. Smith [1998] Q.B. 726. 
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defamatory statement’s imputations is not shown to be “substantially true,” the defense 
will not be defeated if the false imputations do not “seriously harm” the plaintiff’s 
reputation.543 The defense of partial truth will likely raise the bar for the plaintiff in 
connection with the requirement of “serious harm” under Section 1. 
2. Honest Opinion (formerly “Fair Comment”) 
The purpose of the “fair comment” defense is to protect “the right of the citizen 
honestly to express his genuine opinion on a matter of public interest, however wrong or 
exaggerated or prejudiced that opinion may be.”544 To rely on “fair comment” as a 
qualified defense, the defendant must prove that (1) the comment is a matter of public 
interest; (2) the comment is recognizable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of 
fact; (3) the comment is based on facts that are true or protected by privilege; and (4) the 
comment is fair in the sense that an honest person could have made the statement on the 
proved facts.545 
Yet to distinguish an expression of opinion from a statement of fact is far from clear-
cut. It is difficult to determine whether critical languages that include some portion of 
facts are opinions.546 A good example is a libel case of the U.K. Court of Appeal that 
arose from comments by a noted British science writer, Simon Singh.547 The British 
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Chiropractic Association (BCA) sued Singh over his writing on the Guardian’s opinion 
page in which he criticized the BCA for defending chiropractors who used treatments 
with little evidence on children with special conditions.548 Justice David Eady of the High 
Court rejected Singh’s fair comment defense because the judge considered his remarks as 
factual assertions, not an expression of opinion.549 The Court of Appeal, however, 
reversed Justice Eady’s ruling in 2010, holding that Singh’s statement was an opinion.550  
In part as a reaction to the Singh case, the new Defamation Act introduces a qualified 
privilege to protect peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals.551 The 
defense will be defeated where the plaintiff shows the publication was made with 
malice.552  
In 2010, the U.K. Supreme Court reviewed the fair comment defense in Joseph v. 
Spiller,553 the first libel decision by the newly opened Supreme Court. The defendant 
booking agency posted on its website a statement that the agency was “no longer able to 
accept bookings” for Craig Joseph and his other music players because they were “not 
professional enough to feature in our portfolio and have not been able to abide by the 
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terms of their contract.”554 Justice Eady of the High Court struck out the fair comment 
defense, for the defendant’s statement did not identify the matters on which it was based 
with sufficient particularity to enable the reader to judge for him- or herself whether it 
was well founded.555 The Court of Appeal affirmed the High Court’s ruling.556  
The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court and the Court of Appeal on how 
particular or general the facts underlying a statement of opinion should be to avoid 
liability for defamation. Noting that the burden on the defendant to prove facts should be 
reduced, the Supreme Court stated that the comment did not need to specifically identify 
the facts on which it was based to enable readers to verify for themselves.557 Yet the 
comment should refer in general terms to the facts that led to the comment.558  
Although the facts were not particularized, the Supreme Court found that the 
defendant had posted sufficiently identifiable facts.559 Therefore, the court upheld the fair 
comment defense.560 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the social circumstances of 
libel law has changed due to the Internet: 
The creation of a common base of information shared by those who watch 
television and use the internet has had an effect which can hardly be overstated. 
Millions now talk, and thousands comment in electronically transmitted words, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Id. ¶ 14. 
 
555 [2009] EWHC 1152 (QB). 
 
556 [2009] EWCA Civ. 1075. 
 
557 [2010] UKSC 53. 
 
558 Id. ¶ 102. 
 
559 Id. ¶ 126. 
 
560 Id. ¶ 127. 
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about recent events of which they have learned from television or the internet. 
Many of the events and the comments on them are no doubt trivial and ephemeral, 
but from time to time … libel law has to engage with them. The test for 
identifying the factual basis of honest comment must be flexible enough to allow 
for this type of case, in which a passing reference to the previous night’s celebrity 
show would be regarded by most of the public, and may sometimes have to be 
regarded by the law, as a sufficient factual basis.561  
 
As a consequence, the Supreme Court suggested reform of libel law to broaden the scope 
of fair comment.562  
Section 3 of the Defamation Act has abolished the common law defense of fair 
comment and replaced it with “honest opinion.” To rely on the defense, the defendant 
should show three conditions:  
• The statement complained was a statement of opinion; 
• The statement indicated the basis of the opinion, whether in general or specific 
terms; 
• An honest person could have held the opinion of the basis of any fact which 
existed at the time of publication or anything asserted to be a fact in a privileged 
previous statement.563  
 
Key differences between “fair comment” and “honest opinion” are the removal of the 
requirement of a “matter of public interest” and the simplification of the law on “any fact 
that existed” or “something asserted to be a fact” in an early privileged statement. It is 
expected that the new “honest opinion” defense would expand protection for free 
expression, shielding an honestly held opinion even if the speaker has grounded it in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 Id. ¶ 131 (Lord Walker).  
 
562 Id. ¶ 127 (Lord Phillips).  
 
563 Defamation Act 2013, § 3(1)-(4). 
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some false facts with other true factual support.564 
3. Privilege 
Although freedom of speech must be balanced with the protection of reputation, the 
law recognizes certain circumstances that it would be better for individuals to speak 
freely without fear of being sued.565 This is the rationale behind the libel defenses of 
absolute and qualified privileges. Absolute privilege is a complete bar against any 
defamation action to provide complete protection for free speech,566 and thus it cannot be 
defeated by the presence of malice. It applies to statements made in the course of judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceedings567 by any participant in those proceedings such as judge, 
witness, counsel, and the parties themselves. In addition, absolute privilege protects 
statements in the course of parliamentary proceedings568 and “a fair and accurate report 
of proceedings” in U.K. courts, the European Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and international criminal tribunals.569  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564 Farrer & Co., A Quick Guide to the Defamation Act 2013, 25(2) ENT. L.R. 55, 57 (2014). 
 
565 Price et al., supra note 536, at 85. 
 
566 See, e.g., Westcott v. Westcott [2008] EWCA Civ. 818, ¶ 32 (oral or written complaints made 
to police were absolutely privileged because the “due administration of criminal justice that 
complaints of alleged criminal conduct should always be capable of being made to the police free 
from fear that a person accused will subsequently involve the complainant in costly litigation.”). 
 
567 The factors that determine whether a particular tribunal exercises a quasi-judicial role is (1) 
under what authority the tribunal acts; (2) the nature of the question into which it is its duty to 
enquire; (3) the procedure adopted by it in carrying out the inquiry; and (4) the legal consequence 
of the conclusion by the tribunal.  See Trapp v. Mackie [1979] 1 All E.R. 489. 
 
568 Defamation Act 1996 § 13(4) protects “words spoken or things done in the course of, or for 
the purpose of or incidental to, proceedings in Parliament.” 
 
569 § 14 of the Defamation Act 1996 protects “a fair and accurate report of proceedings in public 
before a court.” 
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Qualified privilege is defeated when the defendant publishes the allegedly defamatory 
statement with a malicious motive. It covers news reports to the public at large of 
legitimate concern such as the proceedings of courts or of Parliament. This type of 
qualified privilege still exists, but it has mostly been replaced by the absolute privilege 
for reports of judicial proceedings in Section 14 of the Defamation Act 1996 and other 
qualified privilege for accurate and fair reports in Schedule 1 of the Defamation Act.570 
Those provisions were amended by the Defamation Act 2013. Section 7 of the new Act 
expands this privilege to court proceedings worldwide and to any court or tribunal 
established by the Security Council of the United Nations or by international agreement, 
irrespective of whether the United Kingdom is a party.571 
One of the qualified privileges arises from a duty and interest defense, which is 
available if a publisher has “an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral” to communicate 
the information and if the reader has a corresponding interest in receiving it, as long as 
the publisher was not malicious.572 Publication to persons who lack the requisite interest 
in receiving the material is not privileged. Therefore, media publishers do not have the 
general duty or interest, but the common law has evolved to recognize occasions when 
the public interest requires protection for publication to the world at large. For instance, a 
fair and accurate report of the proceedings of the Parliament is privileged because such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Schedule 1 of the Act states that a “fair and accurate report” of public proceedings of a 
legislature, court and so on and a “fair and accurate copy of or extract” from matter published by 
government or legislature can be protected under qualified privilege. 
 
571 Defamation Act 2013, § 7. 
 
572 Adam v. Ward [1918] A.C. 309, 334 (H.L.). See also, Toogood v. Spyring [1834] 1 C.M. & R. 
181, 193 (qualified privilege for “common convenience and welfare for society); Macintosh v. 
Dun [1908] A.C. 390, 399 (H.L.) (qualified privilege for the “general interest of the society”). 
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information should be communicated to members of the public “who have the deepest 
interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing that on what is there said and 
done, the welfare of the community depends.”573 
The reciprocity of duty and interest has to pass a strict test because matters of mere 
public interest are not regarded as privileged. Rejecting a claim of a blanket protection 
for “fair information on a matter of public interest,” the Court of Appeal in Blackshaw v. 
Lord574 noted that there would be “extreme cases where the urgency of communicating a 
warning is so great, or the source of information so reliable, that publication of suspicion 
and speculation is justified,” for example, dangerous situations of “a suspected terrorist or 
the distribution of contaminated food or drugs.”575 Hence, a reciprocal duty and interest 
for a statement to the public at large occurs only in exceptional circumstances. Yet the 
defense of Reynolds privilege successfully limited the threats of libel lawsuits related to 
reporting on matters in public interest.  
                           C. Reynolds and the Public Interest Defense  
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers576 has expanded the qualified privilege for the media 
to communicate information to the general public. Albert Reynolds, a former Prime 
Minister of Ireland, sued the Times over an article, which claimed that he was guilty of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
573 Wason v. Walter [1868] L.R. 4 Q.B. 73, 89 (holding London Times not liable for printing an 
account of a libelous debate in the House of Lords, so long as it was accurate and in good faith).  
 
574 [1984] Q.B.1 (no privilege for a newspaper that published press release from government 
press officer about the claimant). 
 
575 Id. at 26. 
 
576 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.). 
	  	   121 
malpractice in carrying out his duties.577 The newspaper argued that the public had a 
legitimate interest in knowing about Reynolds as a Prime Minister.578 At the trial the jury 
returned a verdict in Reynolds’ favor and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal denied 
the Times the qualified privilege for political speech.579 The Times appealed to the House 
of Lords, arguing for a libel defense for “political information” as a new “subject matter” 
category of qualified privilege. 
Lord Donald Nicholls, who delivered the majority opinion of the House of Lords, 
extended the duty and interest defense for those who published to the world at large. On 
the importance of press freedom, Lord Nicholls noted that the press serves “vital 
functions as a bloodhound as well as a watchdog”580 and thus “[w]ithout freedom of 
expression by the media, freedom of expression would be a hollow concept.”581 To show 
how other countries have balanced press freedom with reputation, Lord Nicholls cited 
New York Times v. Sullivan582 and other foreign cases.583 
Although press freedom is significant, Lord Nicholls did not accept the Times’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 Id. at 133. 
 
578 Id. 
 
579 [1998] EWCA Civ. 1172. 
 
580 Reynolds, [2001] 2 A.C. at 205. 
 
581 Id. at 200. 
 
582 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
583 Reynolds, [2001] 2 A.C. at 199 (quoting Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 126 D.L.R. 
(4th) 129 (1995) (Canada); Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp., 189 C.L.R. 520 (1997) (Australia), 
Nat’l Media Ltd. V. Bogoshi, 4 SA 1196 (1998) (South Africa,); and Lange v. Atkinson, 3 NZLR 
424 (1998) (New Zealand)). Lord Nicholls did not indicate which case had informed his opinion 
in Reynolds. 
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argument that political speech should necessarily create a privilege for the press.584 Such 
qualified privilege for the press, he stated, would fail to adequately protect an 
individual’s reputation.585 Especially, the politician defamed would have no means of 
clearing his name unless the press later retracts the allegations.586 Further, it would be 
difficult to distinguish political information from other matters of public concern.587 Lord 
Nicholls refused to embrace a new “subject matter” category of qualified privilege 
whereby publication of all “political information” would be privileged, regardless of the 
circumstances.588 He also refused to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff, because the 
defendant newspaper would know much more of the facts involved.589 Lord Nicholls, 
however, set forth “responsible journalism” as a defense for the news media. He provided 
a non-exhaustive list of factors that a court should consider in determining whether a 
publication is “responsible” enough to be protected against liability: 
1. The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge, the more the 
public is misinformed and the individual harmed, if the allegation is not true. 
2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which the subject natter is a 
matter of public concern. 
3. The source of the information. Some informants have no direct knowledge of 
the events. Some have their own axes to grind, or are being paid for their 
stories. 
4. The status of the information. The allegation may have already been the 
subject of an investigation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 Id. at 200. 
 
585 Id. at 201. 
 
586 Id.  
 
587 Id. at 203. 
 
588 Id. at 204. 
 
589 Id. at 203. 
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5. The steps taken to verify the information. 
6. The urgency of the matter. News is often a perishable commodity.  
7. Whether comment was sought from the claimant. He may have information 
others do not possess or have not disclosed. An approach to the claimant will 
not always be necessary. 
8. Whether the article contained the gist of the claimant’s side of the story. 
9. The tone of the article. A newspaper can raise queries or call for an 
investigation. It need not adopt allegations as statements of fact. 
10. The circumstances of the publication including the timing.590 
 
Under the Reynolds test, judges will closely scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the 
publication of the allegation in weighing free speech against reputation.  
Although the subject matter in this case was of public concern, Lord Nicholls held 
that the Times’ allegations were “not information the public had a right to know,” for they 
were not a fair and accurate report due to the newspaper’s exclusion of Reynolds’ own 
explanation.591 Therefore, the newspaper’s failure to give its readers Reynolds’ side of 
the story precluded the application of the “responsible journalism” privilege in the 
case.592  
Nonetheless, Reynolds has broadened the application of the qualified privilege’s 
“duty and interest” test.593 The test has protected the British press more than ever while 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 Id. at 205. 
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592 Id. at 205-206. Lord Johan Steyn and Lord David Hope dissented from the majority on the 
“responsible journalism.” Lord Steyn reasoned that the Times had not received adequate notice of 
the need to give evidence of all the circumstance of the publication; See Id. at 227. Lord Hope 
argued that the Times’ failure to notice before publication did not go to the question whether the 
occasion was privileged but it related to the issue of malice; see id. at 237. 
 
593 DUNCAN AND NEIL ON DEFAMATION 204 (Brian Neil et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009). See also 
RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ANDREW T. KENYON, DAVID F. PARTLETT, & CLIVE P. WALKER, THE 
RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, REPUTATION AND FREE SPEECH 33-34 (2006) (noting the 
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shielding the publisher against bearing the heavy burden of proving truth or fair 
comment.594 The Reynolds privilege is not necessarily for the news media. But the media 
would be most likely to benefit from the new libel defense because it is generally the 
media that publish information of public interest to the public.595  
However, the ten criteria of the Reynolds test have worked as ten “hurdles” for the 
press due to its vagueness and the Reynolds privilege was “a snare and an illusion” to the 
news media.596 In fact, a number of post-Reynolds decisions found that news reporting 
challenged for defamation was not sufficiently responsible and could not pass the 
Reynolds test.597  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
pre-Reynolds common law approach focused on media defendants being required to prove truth 
or fair comment, providing only limited privilege for the media). 
 
594 See, e.g., GKR Karate v. Yorkshire Post Newspaper [2000] EMLR 410 (newspaper protected 
under Reynolds because of the importance of news material about a spokesman of the governing 
body); Al Fagih v. HH Saudi Research & Marketing Ltd. [2001] EWCA Civ. 1634 (holding that 
newspaper’s failure to verify defamatory allegation not fatal to applying Reynolds). See also 
ANDREW T. KENYON, DEFAMATION: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 372 (2006) (arguing 
that the British media could raise more allegations of public interest under the Reynolds defense);  
 
595 Flood v. Times Newspapers [2012] UKSC 11, ¶ 44. 
 
596 Robertson & Nicol, supra note 67, at 160-61. 
 
597 See, e.g., Gilbert v. MGN Ltd. [2000] EMLR 680 (news material was of far less public 
interest, and publication could be delayed until the newspaper had spoken to the plaintiff); 
Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers [2001] EWCA Civ. 536 (newspaper did not show urgency 
and failed to obtain plaintiff’s comment); Miller v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2003] EWHC 
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Confronting the growing criticisms of Reynolds, the House of Lords in 2006 revisited 
the privilege in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe.598 The Wall Street Journal Europe 
reported that Saudi billionaire businessman Mohammed Jameel was suspected of 
channeling funds to the Al-Qaeda while being monitored by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Authority at the request of the U.S. authorities.599 Justice Eady of the High Court refused 
to apply the Reynolds defense because the newspaper failed to delay publication without 
waiting long enough for Jameel’s comment.600 The Wall Street Journal Europe appealed, 
but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.601  
Yet the House of Lords unanimously overturned the judgments of the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal. Lord Thomas Bingham held that the lower courts had erred in 
interpreting the Reynolds defense too narrowly. He pointed out that the newspaper article 
concerned a matter of great public interest and unsensational, that the reporter attempted 
to verify his story, and that Jameel’s response was sought.602 Lord Bingham characterized 
the publication at issue as “the sort of neutral, investigative journalism” that Reynolds 
privilege protected.603  	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For a more flexible application of Reynolds, Lord Leonard Hoffmann in Jameel set 
forth three questions: (1) whether the subject matter of the article was a matter of public 
interest;604 (2) whether the inclusion of the defamatory statements was justifiable;605 and 
(3) whether the steps taken to gather and publish the information were responsible and 
fair.606 Applying the three-prong standard, Lord Hoffmann found that the Wall Street 
Journal Europe had important public interest and inclusion of Jameel’s name was a 
substantial part of the story.607 He also observed that the newspaper met the responsible 
journalism standards because it verified the story and provided an opportunity for 
comments to Jameel’s adviser before publication.608  
The first post-Jameel case was Roberts v. Gable609 in which the Court of Appeal has 
applied the duty and interest test. Justice Alan Ward emphasized that the public would be 
entitled to know information when the article as a whole was in the public interest and the 
publisher achieved responsible journalism regarding its subject matter and value of the 
article to the public.610 The judge found that the magazine article about political parties 
had a corresponding legitimate interest in the public as a piece of responsible 
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journalism.611 
The Times Newspaper avoided liability for libel under the Reynolds privilege. In 
Flood v. Times Newspapers,612 a detective sergeant Gary Flood sued the Times over a 
story that claimed he was the subject of internal police investigation for corruption.613 
The High Court ruled in favor of the newspaper under the Reynolds privilege,614 but the 
Court of Appeal disagreed.615 Justice David Neuberger of the Court of Appeal held that 
the Times journalists could not rely on Reynolds, for they did not verify the serious 
allegations responsibly when their only written evidence did not identify Flood as a 
person who received the alleged bribes.616 Because the journalists had published the 
“unsubstantiated unchecked accusations,” the court stated that it was not “responsible 
journalism.”617 
On appeal, however, the UK Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Court of 
Appeal decision.618 Lord Nicholas Phillips held that the story was of high public 
importance because the journalists published it to ensure that police properly investigated 	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the allegations.619 He agreed with the Times on naming of Flood, although he was not a 
public figure, for it was impossible to publish the story without disclosing him as an 
officer to whom the story related.620 The journalists’ naming of the plaintiff involved 
responsible journalism and public interest.621 Likewise, Lord Jonathan Mance supported 
the news media’s editorial freedom to decide how much detail should be included in a 
news story. He noted, however, that journalists must consider carefully the public interest 
when accuracy of the allegations have not been determined.622  
 Meanwhile, “reportage” has emerged as a defense for the news media from the 
Reynolds “responsible journalism.” Lord Hoffmann in Jameel stated: 
In most cases the Reynolds defence will not get off the ground unless the 
journalist honestly and reasonably believed that the statement was true but there 
are cases ("reportage") in which the public interest lies simply in the fact that the 
statement was made, when it may be clear that the publisher does not subscribe to 
any belief in its truth. In either case, the defence is not affected by the newspaper's 
inability to prove the truth of the statement at the trial.623 
 
The reportage defense was adopted in 2001 by the Court of Appeal in Al-Fagih v. HH 
Saudi Research and Marketing Ltd624 in which the defendant newspaper was sued for 
repeating a defamatory statement made by a member of the Saudi Arabian political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Id. ¶ 69. 
 
620 Id. ¶ 74. 
 
621 Id. 
 
622 Id. ¶ 177. See also Thomas D.C. Bennett, Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd – Reynolds 
Privilege Returns to the UK’s Highest Court, 23(5) ENT. L.R. 134 (2012) (noting that the 
Supreme Court in Flood has further developed Reynolds privilege with “more rounded 
consideration” of Lord Nicholls’ ten factors). 
 
623 Jameel, [2006] UKHL, ¶ 62. 
 
624 [2001] EWCA Civ. 1634. 
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organization in England.625 Although the newspaper had in no way attempted to verify 
the truth of the allegations, the Court of Appeal held that the newspaper could publish the 
statement to the public when it had reported the allegations in a neutral and balanced 
way.626  
In Roberts v. Gable,627 the Court of Appeal explicitly connected the U.K. “reportage” 
defense to an American libel case of 1977, Edwards v. National Audubon Society,628 
noting that there was no precedent regarding reportage in any commonwealth 
authority.629 The Court of Appeal, calling reportage “a form of, or a special example of, 
Reynolds’ qualified privilege,” said the reportage not only had to be neutral but also must 
meet the standards of responsible journalism that was developed from Reynolds.630 
Applying the reportage defense, the court found the defendant magazine had reported the 
story neutrally in practicing responsible journalism.631 Given that the standard of 
responsible journalism should guide reportage, however, it is still unclear how a 
journalist could demonstrate that he behaved responsibly when he did not make efforts to 	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627 [2007] EWCA Civ. 721. 
 
628 556 F.2d 113 (holding that the defendant newspaper was privileged under the First 
Amendment if he reported accusations about the plaintiff fairly and accurately).  
 
629 Roberts, [2007] EWCA Civ., ¶ 44. 
 
630 Id. ¶ ¶ 60-61. But cf. Jason Bosland, Republication of Defamation Under the Doctrine of 
Reportage—The Evolution of Common Law Qualified Privilege in England and Wales, 31 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 89 (2011) (arguing that reportage should be recognized as different 
privilege from Reynolds, focusing on when defamatory allegations have been made rather than 
when the allegations broadly related to public concern). 
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verify his defamatory statement before publication.632 
The Defamation Act 2013 replaces the common law test developed in Reynolds. 
Section 4 of the Act states that the defendant may rely on a defense when it shows that 
the statement complained of was a “statement on a matter of public interest” or that the 
defendant “reasonably believed” that publication was in the public interest.633  
Section 4(2) states that the court should “have regard to all the circumstances of the 
case.”634 Yet it needs to be clarified what would constitute “all the circumstances” that 
the court must consider. Although Section 4(2) emerged from parliamentary criticism of 
the Reynolds checklist approach, Lord Nicholls’ ten factors in Reynolds will likely 
continue to be relevant as a “reminder of the principal factors” in future cases.635  
Furthermore, Section 4(3) codifies neutral reportage as part of Reynolds, allowing 
news media to report on issues of public interest.636 Yet the defense is also based on 
“reasonable” belief that publication of the statement was in the public interest. Such 
requirement of “reasonable belief” might restrict the application of the reportage defense, 
because the journalists are likely to confront difficulty in proving why he or she 
“reasonably” believed that the reported dispute involved public interest. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 Godwin Busuttil, Reportage: A Not Entirely Neutral Report, 20(2) ENT. L. REV. 44, 49 
(2009). 
 
633 Defamation Act 2013 § 4(1). 
 
634 Id. § 4(2). 
 
635 Price & McMahon eds., supra note 531, § 5.60.  
 
636 § 4(3) of the Act states: “If the statement complained of was, or formed part of, an accurate 
and impartial account of a dispute to which the claimant was a party, the court must in 
determining whether it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that publishing the statement 
was in the public interest disregard any omission of the defendant to take steps to verify the truth 
of the imputation conveyed by it.” 
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                                         D. Summary and Conclusions 
U.K. defamation law has followed the traditional common law. It presumes 
defamatory statements to be false and places the burden of proving truth on the 
defendant. Nonetheless, British courts have notably moved forward to more protection of 
freedom of speech since the late 1990s. Although the U.K. courts refused to adopt the 
U.S. “actual malice” rule, Reynolds and Jameel have allowed British news media greater 
protection by recognizing “responsible journalism” as a qualified privilege to report on 
matters of public interest. Furthermore, British courts have embraced the neutral 
reportage defense, which should be more speech-protective than “actual malice.”  
The judicial and non-judicial efforts in U.K. law to rebalance between reputation and 
freedom of speech have led to the wholesale reforms of the Defamation Act. The 
Defamation Act 2013 is likely to give more winning chances to the news media by 
requiring libel plaintiffs to establish their reputational “serious harm” and by codifying 
the “single publication” rule. In addition, the new Defamation Act adopts a statutory 
defense of “responsible” publication in the “public interest.” 
 The new “public interest” defense is based on the common law defense developed 
since Reynolds. Yet the “public interest” defense is defined so vaguely that courts will 
have to determine what kinds of conducts of the press would be considered as 
“responsible” ones. If courts continuously stick to the list of Reynolds factors while 
scrutinizing the journalist’s conducts, the new defense might not provide the kind of 
protection for the press that the proponents of the Defamation Act 2013 envisioned. 
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                                                           CHAPTER V 
 ISP LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in 1996, Section 
230 has guaranteed freedom of speech in cyberspace by immunizing Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) against liability for content provided by third parties. Section 230 has 
been the most important law on online free speech so that as Yale law professor Jack M. 
Balkin noted, it has produced “enormous consequences for securing the vibrant culture of 
freedom of expression.”637  
Yet Section 230 is not perfect. The provision has attracted criticism mainly because 
of its broad protection of ISPs.638 Critics argue that Congress should revise Section 230 
because reputational harm online is so serious that it no longer can be overlooked.639 By 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637 Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Press in the Digital Age: The Future of Free Expression in a 
Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 434 (2009). 
  
638 For comments on § 230, see the “Literature Review” section of Chapter I. See also Solove, 
supra note 23, at 154: 
 
Section 230 might be read to grant immunity only before the operator of a website is 
alerted that something posted there by another violates somebody’s privacy or defames 
her. If the operator of a website becomes aware of the problematic material on the site, 
yet doesn’t remove it, then the operator could be liable. 
 
639 For suggested revisions of the CDA, see e.g., Michael Burke, Cracks in the Armor?: The 
Future of the Communications Decency Act and Potential Challenges to the Protections of 
Section 230 to Gossip Web Sites, 17 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 232  (2011) (arguing that court 
should treat online defamation cases under the pre-CDA common law); Colby Ferris, 
Communication Indecency: Why the Communications Decency Act, and the Judicial 
Interpretation of It, Has Led to a Lawless Internet in the Area of Defamation, 14 BARRY L. REV. 
123 (2010) (suggesting that Congress adopt liability regime similar to DMCA or reinstate 
distributor liability for ISPs); Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral Immunity: Using a Totality of the 
Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307 (2010) (claiming that the original purpose of § 230 is abused by 
courts and thus blanket immunity for ISPs should be reconsidered).  
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contrast, supporters claim that immunity under Section 230 has expanded online free 
speech.640 
Nonetheless, problems with the actual or perceived abuse of Section 230 are 
increasingly in need of being addressed.641 As ISPs do not have legal incentives to delete 
harmful contents under Section 230, malicious gossips and rumors on the Internet are 
attracting more viewers.642 JuicyCampus had been notorious for its invitation to post 
vicious gossips at American colleges and universities.643 Another infamous gossip 
website TheDirty.com was sued for defamation on the grounds that the website operator 
requested other users to post scandalous photos and demeaning comments on the 
photos.644 Similarly, Don’tDateHimGirl.com, which invites users to post warnings about 
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641 In 2013, state Attorneys General asked Congress to exclude state criminal prosecutions from 
Section 230 to hold defendants liable for online contents. See Elizabeth Heichler, U.S. States’ 
Attorney General to Take Aim at Internet ‘Safe Harbor’ Law, TECHHIVE, June 18, 2013, 
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642 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 23, at 50-75.  
 
643 JuicyCampus was closed in 2009 for alleged economic reasons. See Official JuicyCampus 
Blog, http://juicycampus.blogspot.com/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).  
 
644 Nina Mandell, Thedirty.com in Trouble Again for Publishing Alleged Nude Photos of TV 
Reporter Lauren Lee Gauck, DAILY NEWS, June 2, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-
06-02/news/29631811_1_nfl-cheerleader-forbes-com-mark-zuckerberg (last visited Dec. 1, 
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those whom they have dated with, was sued for defamation after it refused to remove the 
false personal information.645  
This chapter examines why Congress included Section 230 in CDA and how 
American courts have interpreted Section 230 since 1997. Section A discusses pre-CDA 
cases on Internet defamation, the history and purposes of Section 230, and the threshold 
Section 230 case, Zeran v. America Online, Inc. Section B traces the development of ISP 
immunity under CDA and shows trends and analysis of Section 230 cases. The final 
section offers summary and conclusion about the impact of Section 230 on American free 
speech law. 
 A. Statutory Law 
Before Congress enacted the CDA, ISP’s liability was determined under the common 
law on republisher’s liability. In 1996, Congress provided ISPs with broad immunity 
from tort claims. This section reviews how and why those statutory changes took place in 
the 1990s.  
1. Early Cases Prior to the CDA 
At common law, one who reproduces a defamatory statement faces the same liability 
as the originator of the statement.646 The person who publicizes another’s libel may be 
treated as a primary publisher, as a distributor, or as a conduit.647 Primary publishers are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 Debra Cassens Weiss, DontDateHimGirl.com Suit Dismissed, ABA JOURNAL, Apr. 9, 2007, 
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2014).  
 
646 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) (“[O]ne who repeats or otherwise 
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).  
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generally held to a standard of liability comparable to that of authors because they 
actively cooperate in publication.648 Distributors are subject to an intermediate standard 
of responsibility and may be held liable as publishers “if they knew or had reason to 
know” of the defamatory nature of the matter they disseminate.649 Once a distributor 
knew the existence of defamatory material within its possession or under its control, it 
must remove the material to avoid its continued publication.650 Conduits lack the ability 
to screen and control the information that they mediate and thus, conduits are generally 
immune from liability.651 
Because ISPs republish defamatory statements by third parties, deciding on ISP’s 
liability for their republication was an important issue in the early Internet era.652 The 
first ISP-related online defamation case was Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe.653 CompuServe 
offered “CompuServe Information Service,” which provided online users with access to 
information sources and forums.654 One of the forums was a journalism forum managed 
by a subcontractor, which contracted in turn with a publisher of a newsletter titled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). 
 
649 Church of Scientology v. Minn. State Med. Ass’n Found., 264 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978); 
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650 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2) (1977). 
 
651 Id. § 612(1977). Courts have relieved telegraph companies of liability for transmitting 
defamatory expressions to their customers. See Annotation, Liability of Telegraph or Telephone 
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A.L.R.3d 105 (1979). 
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“Rumorville USA.”655 When Cubby, Inc. developed a competing online gossip forum, 
the Rumorville alleged that Cubby obtained contents “through some back door” and was 
“bounced” from his previous employer.656 Cubby filed a libel lawsuit against 
CompuServe instead of the Rumoville, accusing that CompuServe was a publisher of the 
false and defamatory statements.657  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that CompuServe 
was a distributor. The reason was that CompuServe did not have authority to review the 
Rumorville’s contents and thus could not be held liable for defamation unless Cubby 
proved that CompuServe knew or had reason to know of the defamatory contents when it 
distributed them to its subscribers.658  
In addition, the Cubby court relied on a 1987 decision in which an ISP was decided as 
a distributor. In Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co.,659 a news database of Dow Johns was sued 
for issuing an allegedly false news report on investment. The New York City Civil 
Court660 held that the news service of Dow Jones was functionally identical to the 
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658 Id. (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down an ordinance that imposed liability on a bookseller for possession of an obscene book 
regardless of whether the bookseller knew of the book’s contents). 
 
659 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). 
 
660 The Civil Court of New York has jurisdiction over civil cases involving up to $25,000 and 
other civil matters. See New York State Unified Court System, 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/nyc/civil/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
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“distribution of a moderate circulation newspaper or subscription newsletter.”661 The 
court stated that the First Amendment protected the Dow Jones news service from 
liability to its subscribers: “The defendant’s service is one of the modern, technologically 
interesting, alternative ways the public may obtain up-to-the-minute news. It is entitled to 
the same protection as more established means of news distribution.”662 Therefore, the 
Cubby court viewed computer database as a distributor of news information in the 
modern society and concluded that the ISP as a distributor was not liable for defamation 
while not exercising control over the bulletin board.663 
Four years after Cubby, however, a New York City trial court made a contrary 
decision in which an ISP was found to be a “publisher” of defamatory statements posted 
on its bulletin. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,664 an anonymous user 
posted derogatory statements on a bulletin board “Money Talk” hosted by Prodigy 
Services Company.665 The posted message alleged that a securities-investment firm 
Stratton Oakmont committed criminal and fraudulent acts relating to stock offers.666 
Prodigy claimed that it could not review 60,000 messages a day posted on the bulletin 
and thus should be immunized as an innocent distributor.667  	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664 1995 WL 323710, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
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To determine the role of Prodigy, a New York trial court in Stratton Oakmont 
reviewed Cubby in which CompuServe was considered an equivalent of a newsvendor.668 
The Stratton Oakmont court found two important distinctions between Prodigy and 
CompuServe: First, Prodigy held itself out that it exercised editorial control over its 
contents to differentiate itself from other ISPs and compared itself to a newspaper;669 
Second, Prodigy maintained editorial control through its automatic screening software 
and created an editorial staff to enforce the guidelines.670 Thus, the court found that 
Prodigy was a publisher rather than a distributor with the substantial editorial power to 
monitor the bulletin board.671  
Yet the Stratton Oakmont decision was controversial. The substantial issue was 
whether Prodigy exercised “sufficient” editorial control.672 Although Prodigy argued that 
reviewing all contents was almost impossible, the court held that Prodigy was a publisher 
because Prodigy advertised that it had exercised editorial control and hired staff members 
to check contents. Prodigy’s advertisement about editorial judgment might have been a 
marketing strategy, but the court did not consider whether Prodigy had really edited or 
censored postings on its service. 
While reaching different conclusions under the common law liability, the courts in 
Cubby and Stratton Oakmont failed to understand the unique feature of the Internet. The 	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courts did not pay attention to the role of ISPs in online publications, while primarily 
focusing on whether the ISPs in question exercised editorial control over online postings. 
So, Cubby and Stratton Oakmont yielded a paradox: If an ISP exerts no editorial control 
over contents on its computer, it will be free from liability, while if an ISP tries to 
exercise editorial control over harmful contents, it will be held liable for its contents.  
Recognizing this irony that ISPs might give up editorial control to avoid publisher 
liability, Stratton Oakmont stated that the proposed Communications Decency Act would 
preempt this issue.673 Indeed, Stratton Oakmont provided a strong incentive for Congress 
to pass the CDA in order to protect ISPs that police online contents.674 
2. Section 230 of the CDA 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides immunity under the heading 
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material”:      
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
      No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider. 
(2) No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of: (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to 
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described 
in paragraph (1).675  
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The CDA was originally designed to prohibit transmission of obscene and indecent 
materials via telecommunication devices.676 In 1995, Sen. James Exon and Sen. Slade 
Gorton proposed the CDA to “provide much needed protection for children” against 
online pornography.677 Sen. Exon’s proposal was a response to a serious social issue 
about online pedophiles and obscene materials.678 
Yet the original Senate bill of the CDA did not include Section 230. Later, Rep. Chris 
Cox and Rep. Ron Wyden proposed a bill to add Section 230 as amendment of Title II of 
the Communications Act of 1934 to “encourage and protect private sector initiatives that 
improve user control over computer information services.”679 Section 230 states that its 
goal is to promote “the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media to preserve the vibrant and competitive 
free market… unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”680 
Rep. Cox, one of the Section 230 sponsors in Congress, spoke of its two main 
purposes: First, Section 230 will protect “computer Good Samaritans,” i.e. ISPs, from the 
kind of liability that was imposed in the Stratton-Oakmont case when they screen 
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677 141 Cong. Rec. S8090 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). 
 
678 Sen. Exon presented a blue binder of “disgusting materials” that was available online at that 
time. See Charles A. Gimon, Exon Amendment Passes the Senate, INFONATION, 
http://www.gimonca.com/personal/archive/exon.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2014). 
 
679 H.R. 1978, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 
680 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006). 
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indecency and offensive material for their customers; Second, it will establish as the 
policy that online contents would not be regulated by the federal government.681  
Hence, the important purpose of Section 230 was overruling Stratton-Oakmont and 
protecting ISPs that screen harmful contents as “Good Samaritans.” The Conference 
Report explains: 
One of the specific purposes of this section [Section 230] is to overrule Stratton-
Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decision which have treated such 
providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own 
because they have restricted access to objectionable material. The conferees 
believe that such decisions create serious obstacles to the important federal policy 
of empowering parents to determine the content of commutations their children 
receive through interactive computer services.682 
 
Another Congressman criticized the absurdity of Stratton Oakmont, noting that Section 
230 intended to provide ISPs with a reasonable way to “self-regulate themselves without 
penalty of law.”683 Likewise, Rep. Bob Goodlatte claimed that ISPs should not be held 
liable as publishers because it would be impossible for ISPs to edit “thousands of pages 
of information everyday” on their websites.684  
Another significant purpose of Section 230 was to protect online communication 
from government coercion.685 Congress recognized that the Internet and ISPs would 
“offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
681 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
 
682 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Congressional Conference Committee, H.R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 104-458, at 194 (1996), reprinted in 142 Cong. Rec. H1078, H1138 (Jan. 31, 1996).  
 
683 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-H8461, H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Barton). 
 
684 Id. at H8471. 
  
685 141 Cong. Rec. H8469-H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995). 
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development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity”686 and they have “flourished, 
to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.”687 Thus, 
Congress stated that the U.S. policy was “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free 
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”688 To ensure against government regulation, 
Rep. Cox and Rep. Wyden emphasized the collaboration of private sectors -- parents, 
schools, and ISPs -- to prevent objectionable online materials from reaching children.689  
Congress trusted ISPs as reliable gatekeepers to check dangerous materials vigorously 
and to protect freedom of speech online. Section 230, however, has changed the whole 
landscape of the Internet while providing blanket immunity for ISP’s tort liability.690  
3. Threshold Ruling on Section 230: Zeran v. America Online 
One year after enactment of the CDA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit made the first appellate decision on Section 230.691 The Zeran case started in 
1995 when an unidentified person posted an advertisement on the America Online 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). 
 
687 Id. § 230(a)(4). 
 
688 Id. § 230(b)(2). 
 
689 See, e.g., Congressmen Cox and Wyden Demonstrate New Internet Blocking Technologies, 
BUSINESS WIRE, July 17, 19995, 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Congressmen+Cox+and+Wyden+demonstrate+new+Internet+bloc
king...-a017278694 (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).  
 
690 Later, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the CDA was unconstitutional on the First 
Amendment ground, but § 230 was not affected and remained fully effective. See Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down anti-indecency provisions that violated the First 
Amendment). 
 
691 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 
(1998). 
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bulletin board to sell “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts” featuring offensive slogans about 
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.692 The posting 
advertised that someone interested in the shirts should call Kenneth Zeran’s home phone 
number in Seattle.693 As a result of the online advertisement, Zeran received a number of 
calls with derogatory messages and death threats.694 Although Zeran requested AOL to 
eliminate the advertisement repeatedly, the message did not disappear as fast as Zeran 
expected.695 Zeran sued AOL because he could not identify the original poster. After the 
trial court granted AOL’s motion because Section 230 barred Zeran’s claim, Zeran 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that Section 230 left intact distributor liability for 
ISPs.696 
To examine the distributor liability under Section 230, the Fourth Circuit analyzed 
two main purposes of the provision: The first purpose was to protect freedom of online 
speech as “Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of 
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”697 Concerned that ISPs might 
restrict online speech severely if they would face potential liability for contents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 Id. at 329. 
 
693 Id. 
 
694 Id. 
 
695 Id. (The parties disputed the date that AOL removed the original posting from its bulletin 
board). 
 
696 Id. at 330. 
 
697 Id. 
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republished by ISPs,698 the court emphasized that Section 230 rejected imposition of 
publisher liability on ISPs “for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory 
functions.”699 The second purpose of Section 230, according to the court, was to 
encourage ISPs’ self-regulation on offensive materials, removing disincentive to self-
regulation created by Stratton Oakmont.700 
When considering the two statutory purposes to protect ISPs that exercise self-
regulation, it might be logical that immunity should be given to only ISPs that try to 
screen harmful contents. But the court did not limit application of Section 230 to ISPs 
that perform self-regulation. Regardless of whether AOL attempted to regulate harmful 
contents, the Fourth Circuit held that Section 230 eliminated both publisher and 
distributor liability for ISPs because distributor liability was “merely a subset, or a 
species, of publisher liability.”701 As the first reported federal appellate court’s ruling on 
Section 230, Zeran has substantially influenced other cases about ISP liability, cited in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 Id. at 331. 
 
699 Id. 
 
700 Id. 
 
701 Id. at 332. Judge James Harvie Wilkinson quoted PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS: 
 
Those who are in the business of making their facilities available to disseminate the 
writings composed, the speeches made, and the information gathers by others may also 
be regarded as participating to such an extent in making the books, newspapers, 
magazines, and information available to others as to be regarded as publishers. They are 
intentionally making the contents available to others, sometimes without knowing all of 
the contents – including the defamatory content- and sometimes without any opportunity 
to ascertain, in advance, that any defamatory matter was to be included in the matter 
published. 
 
Prosser & Keeton eds., supra note 647, at 803.  
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200 court decisions.702 Such blanket immunity under Section 230 makes the United 
States the minority of one in the world that allows the kind of protection for ISPs against 
liability.703 
                                                B. Case Law 
1. Sweeping Immunity for ISPs under Section 230 
The cause of action most frequently associated with Section 230 is defamation,704 for 
Congress enacted the CDA in response to a defamation case of Stratton Oakmont.705 Yet 
application of Section 230 was not limited to defamation. The provision has been applied 
to other types of torts when the plaintiff’s claim treated a computer service as “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702 Westlaw search shows that Zeran has been cited in 200 federal and state cases as of Dec. 1, 
2014. In addition, Zeran has been discussed in almost 600 law review articles.  
 
703 In April 2014, Congress in Brazil passed the “Internet Bill of Right.” Article 19 of the law” 
states: 
 
Art. 19. In order to ensure freedom of expression and prevent censorship, the provider of 
internet applications can only be subject to civil liability for damages resulting from 
content generated by third parties if, after an specific court order, it does not take any 
steps to, within the framework of their service and within the time stated in the order, 
make unavailable the content that was identified as being unlawful, unless otherwise 
provided by law. 
 
Internet Bill of Rights, Law No. 12,965/2014. 
 
Although the Brazil statutory law provides broad protection for ISPs, it protects only ISPs that 
took proper steps to take down unlawful contents. Professor Eric Goldman argues that the new 
Brazil law “more closely resembles Section 230 than the European notice-and-takedown rules.” 
Eric Goldman, Brazil’s Internet Bill of Rights Compared to Section 230, Tech. & Marketing Law 
Blog, http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/08/brazils-internet-bill-of-rights-compared-to-
section-230-excerpt-from-my-internet-law-casebook.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
 
704 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Law Professor David S. Ardia 
found in his empirical research that defamation claims “topped the list,”  “making up 17.2% of all 
claims” in the context of Section 230. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield For 
Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 373, 429 (2010). 
 
705 For a discussion of the CDA history, see supra Section A. 2, “Section 230 of the CDA.”  
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publisher or speaker” of the content in issue.706 Section 230 has been utilized to a variety 
of claims such as anti-discrimination,707 negligence,708 invasion of privacy,709 spam 
filtering,710 public nuisance,711 negligent misrepresentation,712 intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.713 Most online defamation cases have primarily involved Section 
230(c)(1) to determine whether an Internet service provider is liable for allegedly 
defamatory statements issued by others.714 Section 230(c)(2) has been less utilized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706 § 230(c)(1). But the grant of immunity under § 230 does not provide immunity for intellectual 
property claims. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or 
expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”). See also Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project 
Playlist, Inc., 603 F.Supp.2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the CDA did not bar New York 
state law claims for copyright infringement and unfair competition). 
 
707 See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157 
(9th Cir. 2008) (Roomates.com violated the Fair Housing Act by presenting a questionnaire to 
users). 
 
708 See, e.g., Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 600 (2008); 
Black v. Google In., No. 10-02381, 2010 WL 3222147 (N.D. Cal. Aug 13, 2010) (Google not 
liable for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress relating to online comments 
posted upon the Google website). 
 
709 See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (ISP was not liable to athletes for 
customer’s use of service to display images of athletes who were unknowingly recorded 
unclothed). 
 
710 See, e.g., Holomaxx Technologies v. Microsoft Corp., No. CV-10-4924-JF, 2011 WL 865278 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) (Microsoft’s filtering of plaintiff’s marketing emails was protected 
under Section 230). 
 
711 See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (Craigslist was not liable 
for publication of prostitution ads posted by its users). 
 
712 See, e.g., Schneider v. Amazon.com, 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 824 
(2001) (Amazon was immune under § 230, although it promised to remove offensive book 
reviews but reposted the reviews). 
713 See, e.g., Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d. 288 (D.N.H. 2008) (tort liability 
of an operator of adult web community was precluded by the CDA). 
 
714 See, e.g., Zango, Inc., v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) (a distributor of 
software to filter and block potentially malicious software protected under Section 230).  
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because it protects only intermediaries that work for restricting or blocking harmful 
contents.715 
As explained in the method section of Chapter I, this research found 85 cases in 
which one of causes of action is defamation and the ISP is at least one of the 
defendants.716 Table 1 (see Appendix E for all tables) shows case name, decision year and 
marks whether the ISP was eventually immune from liability.717 As Table 1 illustrates, 
Section 230 has strongly shielded ISP from liability for defamation: ISP was held 
unprotected against liability in only 2 cases out of 85 defamation cases. In other words, 
just 2.4 percent of Section 230 cases have been ruled against ISPs. 
One of the cases in which the ISP failed to be immunized is Hy Cite Corporation v. 
Badbusinessbureau.com.718 A seller of dinnerware sued website operators who posted 
defamatory consumer complaints.719 The website operators claimed CDA immunity and 
moved to dismiss. Yet a federal district court in Arizona denied the motion because the 
operators themselves allegedly had produced editorial comments, titles, and other original 
contents in the defamatory postings.720 Because the operators did author libelous 
contents, the court found that the ISPs were obviously not entitled to immunity. Another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
715 See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007) (Google was immune 
under § 230(c)(2) for screening and deletion of contents). 
 
716 For an in-depth empirical study of § 230 cases, see Ardia, supra note 704 (Ardia examined 
184 decisions of various Section 230 claims, including anti-spam, breach of contract, child sexual 
abuse, false advertisement, negligence, and defamation).  
 
717 Table 1, “U.S. Decisions about ISP Liability for Defamation under Section 230.” 
718 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
 
719 Id. 
 
720 Id. at 1148-49. 
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case is Ascend Health Corp. v. Wells.721 A blog operator Brenda Wells was sued for 
disparaging comments about a private hospital and its doctors on her two blogs and 
Facebook. Although a federal district court in North Carolina allowed immunity for 
statements by a third party that Wells simply reposted, some of the defamatory comments 
could not be protected because Wells herself allegedly authored much of the contents.722 
Therefore, ISPs will successfully get blanket immunity unless they authored or 
developed harmful contents. Section 230 has been nearly impregnable as a defense for 
ISPs against defamation claims so far. 
2. Three Prong Requirements of Section 230 
When courts apply Section 230, they generally rely on a three-prong approach to 
determine whether ISPs are entitled to protection.723 The three prongs are: 
• The defendant provides or uses an “interactive computer service”;  
• The complaint treats the defendant as a “publisher or speaker” of information; 
and  
• The information at issue was provided by “another information content 
provider.”724  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
721 No. 4:12-CV-00083-BR, 2013 WL 1010589 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2013). 
 
722 Id. at *9-10. 
 
723 See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting § 230 
requirement of the three-prong test); Joyner v. Lazzareschi, No. 05CC10627, 2009 WL 695539, 
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2009) (applying § 230 to soccer community website under three 
prongs); Parisi v. Sinclair, 774 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.D.C. 2011) (immunizing booksellers from 
online libel under three prongs). 
 
724 See, e.g., Price v. Gannett Co., No. 2:!1-cv-00628, 2012 WL 1570972, *2 (S.D. W. Va. May 1, 
2012) (“To obtain § 230 immunity, three elements are required.”). 
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Consequently, the ISP defendant, to be immune from defamation liability, must show 
that it is a provider or user of Interactive Computer Service (ICS); that the cause of action 
treats it as a publisher or speaker of defamatory statements; and that the statement in 
issue was provided by another Information Content Provider (ICP). This section analyzes 
how courts have applied the three-prong test and the ISP has met the three requirements 
for asserting CDA immunity.  
      a) Provider of Interactive Computer Service 
Immunity under Section 230 is given to a provider or a user of “interactive computer 
service,” which CDA defines as “any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server.”725 So intermediaries that provide access to the Internet – such as America Online 
and Comcast - can be qualified as providers of computer service. 
Yet the CDA definition is so broad that almost all types of service providers can be 
qualified for immunity so long as they do not provide specific contents as original 
providers.726 Providing access to the Internet is not the only way to be a provider of 
interactive computer service. Section 230 extends far beyond access providers, and even 
online commerce companies like Amazon or eBay were entitled to immunity. Indeed, a 
couple of Internet libel plaintiffs argued that Amazon or eBay should not be entitled to 
Section 230 when the ISPs had editorial discretions over customer reviews.727 But the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
725 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (emphasis added). 
 
726 See, e.g., Barrett, 799 N.E.2d at 922 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ISP could not be a 
provider of computer service because it was not in the business of providing Internet access). 
727 See, e.g., Grace v. eBay, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004) (superseding lower court’s decision of not 
immunizing eBay from distributor liability).  
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Washington Court of Appeals held that Amazon must be immune as a provider of 
computer service while enabling users to access user comments on its website.728 
Moreover, courts have applied Section 230 to various types of intermediaries 
regardless of their main functions. An operator that hosts message boards or chatting 
rooms has been treated as a provider of computer service for the purpose of Section 230 
if it did not author the defamatory contents.729 Likewise, an individual blogger could be a 
provider of computer services, if a third party originally authored harmful postings on the 
blog.730 Social Networking Site (SNS) also has been treated as a provider of computer 
service when users posted comments on the SNS as third parties.731 A public library or 
print shops were treated as providers of interactive computer service when they supplied 
computer access to users who made defamatory comments while utilizing a computer 
provided by the library or the print shop.732 Search engines like Google were protected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
728 Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 40-42 (Wash. Ct. App.), cert denied, 531 U.S. 
824 (2001). 
 
729 See, e.g., DiMeo v. Max, 48 Fed. Appx. 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) (website operator allowing 
users to post anonymous comments protected under CDA); Universal Comm’n Sys., Inc., v. 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (Lycos not liable for pseudonymous postings on its 
message board); Collins v. Purdue Univ., 703 F.Supp.2d 862 (N.D. Ind. 2010) (newspaper 
company not liable for website postings); Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2009), cert. denied, 203 P.3d 870 (N.M. 2009) (website operator not liable for defamatory 
statement posted by others). 
 
730 See, e.g., Kuersteiner v. Schrader, No. 100089/08, 2008 WL 8152695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 
2008) (blogger who neither authored nor edited harmful postings by others protected under § 
230). 
 
731 See, e.g., Finkel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 102578/09, 2009 WL 3240365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sep. 15, 
2009) (Facebook not liable for defamatory statements posted by users).  
 
732 See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (no 
liability to public library for providing citizens with Internet access); PatentWizard, Inc. v. 
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from liability regarding display of search result that included defamatory statements.733 
The traditional media were not liable for defamatory comments by other users if they 
were more or less ISPs.734 Linking to defamatory content was also protected by Section 
230.735 Thus, nearly every type of ISPs is likely to get protections under Section 230, if 
the ISPs might simply not fall into the category of “ information content provider”: 
[R]eviewing courts have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a 
relatively expansive definition of “interactive computer service” and a relatively 
restrictive definition of “information content provider.” Under the statutory 
scheme, an “interactive computer service” qualifies for immunity so long as it 
does not also function as an “information content provider” for the portion of the 
statement or publication at issue.736 
 
So the first prong relating to a “provider or user of interactive computer service” has not 
effectively worked to identify who qualifies for Section 230 immunity. If the defendant is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kinko’s Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D.S.D. 2001) (Kinko’s not liable for disparaging statements 
by anonymous user). 
 
733 See, e.g., Dowbenko v. Google Inc., No. 14-10195, 2014 WL 4378742 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014) 
(Google not liable for defamatory search results); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 
(E.D.Pa. 2006) (Google not liable for defamatory statements from search query of plaintiff’s 
name). See also Steele v. Mengelkoch, No. A07-1375, 2008 WL 2966529 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 
5, 2008) (CDA barred libel claim against Google); Supplementmarket.com, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 
No. 09-43056, 2010 WL 6309991 (Pa.Co.Pl. July 16, 2010) (Google not liable for failure to 
delete libelous search results). 
 
734 See e.g., Hadley v. GateHouse Media Freeport Holdings, Inc., No. 12 C 548, 2012 WL 
2866463 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2012) (newspaper not liable for others’ defamatory comment on its 
website); Delle v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., No. 110810, 2011 WL 7090709 (Mass. 
Sept. 14, 2011) (newspaper immune from defamation liability for online “comments section”); 
Miles v. Raycom Media, Inc., No. 1:09CV713-LG-RHW, 2010 WL 3419438 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 
26, 2010) (television station was not liable for reader comments under § 230).  
 
735 See, e.g., Vazquez v. Buhl, 90 A.3d 331 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014) (ISP not liable for hyperlinking 
to article written by third party). 
 
736 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. 
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not an original poster, the defendant will likely have little difficulty in asserting immunity 
without regard to its functions or roles. 
      b) Not Treated as the Publisher 
Section 230 prohibits a provider of computer service from being treated as “the 
publisher or speaker” of any contents provided by a third party.737 It is intended to protect 
online service providers that repeat or convey information obtained from others and to 
safeguard “the provider’s inherent decisions about how to treat postings.”738 Yet Section 
230 does not speak directly to liability of the provider under the common law. Thus, it is 
debatable whether the statute abrogates the common law principle of distributor or the 
knowledge-based liability. 
Traditional distributors like newspaper vendors and booksellers are liable at common 
law if they had notice of a defamatory statement in their merchandise.739 If the common 
law rule applies, an online defamation plaintiff can argue that ISPs should be liable as 
distributors when they received notifications from the plaintiff. But courts have rejected 
the distinction between publisher and distributor for ISP liability: 
There is no reason inherent in the technological features of cyberspace why First 
Amendment and defamation law should apply differently in cyberspace than in 
the brick and mortar world. Congress, however, has chosen for policy reasons to 
immunize from liability for defamatory or obscene speech “providers and users of 
interactive computer services” when the defamatory or obscene material is 
“provided” by someone else.740 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  
 
738 Universal Comm’n Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 
739 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578(1) (1977). 
 
740 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004). 
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Zeran was the first federal appellate court ruling on Section 230(c), in which both 
publishers and distributers were held immune to liability for defamatory content provided 
by others.741 Zeran argued that Congress focused on “publisher” in Section 230 and thus 
it left “distributor’s” liability intact.742  
The Fourth Circuit in Zeran held, however, that Congress intended Section 230(c) to 
immunize both publishers and distributors because distributor liability is “merely a 
subset” of publisher liability.743 Because publisher/distributor distinction would not make 
any difference for purposes of Section 230,744 the most consequential aspect of Zeran was 
that Section 230 has immunized ISPs from liability not only as primary publishers but 
also as distributors.745 
The publisher/distributor liability was a controversial issue again in Barrett v. 
Rosenthal.746 A trial court in California dismissed Barrett’s claim, since the operator of 
online medical support group had no liability when the operator merely republished the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
741 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327. 
 
742 Id. at 331. 
 
743 Id. at 332 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577: “Publication of defamatory 
matter is its communication intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person 
defamed”)). 
 
744 Id. 
 
745 Justice R. Fred Lewis of the Supreme Court of Florida rejected Zeran, claiming that Zeran had 
fatal flaws when deciding that distributor must be merely an internal category of publisher. See 
Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 2001) (Lewis, J., dissenting). See also 
Doe v. GTE Corp., 357 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that § 230(c)(1) might be a 
definitional clause rather than an immunity clause to harmonize the text with the caption 
“protection for ‘Good Samaritan’”). 
 
746 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
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libelous messages.747 Yet the California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s 
decision, noting that Section 230 only barred holding an ISP as a publisher of a 
defamatory statement made by another and the statute did not immunize the ISP from 
distributor liability.748 Challenging Zeran, the California appeal court held that Rosenthal 
could be found liable as a distributor if she knew or had reason to know of the 
defamatory nature of the statement.749 
But the Supreme Court of California disagreed with the Court of Appeal. The 
Supreme Court held that Section 230 should be applied without regard to the traditional 
publisher-distributor distinction at common law: 
Given that “distributors” are also known as “secondary publishers,” there is little 
reason to believe Congress felt it necessary to address them separately. There is 
even less reason to suppose that Congress intended to immunize “publishers” but 
leave “distributors” open to liability, when the responsibility of publishers for 
offensive content is greater than that of mere distributors.750 
 
The California Supreme Court pointed out a unique feature of online publication: 
“Whenever such information is copied from another source, its publication might also be 
described as a ‘distribution.’”751 Emphasizing the unclear line between distribution and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747 Id. at 514. 
 
748 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 
749 Id. at 167. 
 
750 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 519. 
 
751 Id (emphasis added). 
	  	   155 
publication in cyberspace, the court concluded that immunity should be given to any 
intermediary that published third party’s content.752  
Imposition of notice-based liability753 on ISPs has been rejected. The Fourth Circuit 
in Zeran held that notice-based liability should not burden ISPs because (1) notice 
liability provides a natural incentive for ISPs to simply remove messages and eventually 
chills freedom of online speech, (2) notice-based liability deters ISPs from actively 
screening harmful contents, and (3) notice liability provides third parties with a no-cost 
means for users who want to lodge complaints whenever they were displeased by an 
online posting.754 In 2006, the California Supreme Court in Barrett, following Zeran, 
rejected the notice-based liability for posing a “daunting and expensive challenge” to 
ISPs. The court reasoned that ISPs under the notice-based system should examine 
whether the allegedly defamatory statement at issue “is true or false, factual or figurative, 
privileged or unprivileged, whether the matter is of public or private concern, and 
whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure.”755 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
752 Id. at 520. See also Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. 2005) (immunizing operator of 
electronic bulletin board devoted to discussion of local government activities); Blumenthal v. 
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998) (emphasizing that Congress made no distinction 
between publishers and distributors in providing immunity). 
 
753 Notice-based liability similar to § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has 
been recommended to limit blanket CDA immunity. See, e.g., Olivera Medenica & Kaiser 
Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility? Lessons from the DMCA Applied to Online 
Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 265 (2007) (“The DMCA and its legacy can 
provide a blueprint for approaching an amendment to Section 230.”). 
 
754 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  
 
755 Barrett, 146 P.3d at 525. See also Eckert v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-11888, 2007 WL 496692 
(D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Microsoft should face notice-
liability after it failed to remove harassing emails after being notified). 
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Because the CDA immunity from both publisher and distributor liability provides no 
incentive for ISPs to eliminate libelous postings, ISPs have no responsibility even when 
ignoring notification and causing serious harm to the reputation of individuals.756 Thus, 
some type of compulsory procedure needs to be considered so that ISPs will heed 
notifications from defamation victims.  
      c) Provided by Another Information Content Provider 
ISP will not be treated as a publisher or a speaker if “another information content 
provider” provides information in issue.757 The “information content provider,” which 
does not receive protection under Section 230, is “any person or entity that is responsible, 
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet.”758 The most important point to determine who qualifies as the “information 
content provider” is what constitutes the “creation or development” of information. 
Courts have ruled that simple dissemination of defamatory statements without 
contributing to the libelous content does not constitute “creation or development” to be 
an information content provider.759  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756 The Seventh Circuit criticized CDA immunity for defeating claims by victims of tortious 
conduct. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 
757 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 
758 Id. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added). 
 
759 See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding ISP not liable for 
distributing postings that it did not induce); Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. Ct. App. 
2003) (defendant not ICP when distributing articles authored by users); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. 
at 50 (AOL not ICP because it simply distributed Drudge’s report). 
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The Ninth Circuit in Batzel v. Smith760 focused on whether an operator of an 
electronic newsletter, who selected, made minor word changes, and distributed an 
allegedly defamatory email, would be covered by Section 230. The Ninth Circuit found 
the website operator not liable because the website operator’s conduct of selecting and 
editing emails for publication did not constitute a “creation or development” of the 
information.761 Other courts also held that ISPs should be immune under Section 230 
even though they distributed or tried minor changes of contents by third parties.762 The 
New Mexico Court of Appeals emphasized that “the exercise of traditional editorial 
function such as selecting material for publication or editing portions of material before 
posting” would not rise to the level of creation or development of content.763  
In Blumenthal v Drudge,764 former White House adviser Sidney Blumenthal sued 
Matt Drudge and America Online for allegedly defamatory statements in the edition of 
the Drudge Report, which was available to AOL subscribers under a licensing 
agreement.765 AOL could remove the allegedly defamatory information. But the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that AOL’s editorial right to make 
changes in the Drudge Report was not sufficient to make it a joint publisher of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004). 
 
761 Id. at 1031.  
 
762 See, e.g., Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding immunity for the 
ISP’s transmission of defamatory messages); Kuersteiner v. Schrader, No. 100089/08, 2008 WL 
8152695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 2008) (blog operator who exercised a “publisher’s traditional 
editorial function” entitled to immunity under CDA). 
 
763 Woodhull, 202 P.3d at 133. 
 
764 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 
765 Id. at 47. 
	  	   158 
report.766 The court reasoned that Congress chose a policy to immunize ISPs “even where 
the self-policing [of ISP] is unsuccessful or not even attempted.”767  
Similarly, in Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online,768 AOL had deleted and 
altered inaccurate information that originally came from independent stock quote 
providers.769 Ben Ezra Company, which claimed defamation by incorrect stock price 
information concerning itself, maintained that AOL worked so closely with the stock 
quote providers in creating and developing the information and thus AOL should be 
considered an “information content provider.”770 Yet the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that such ISP’s editorial function did not render the ISP liable as a content 
provider.771 Other courts ruled that ISP’s editorial functions would not lose its immunity 
if a third party created the content in issue.772 In addition, a website operator’s failure to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
766 Id. at 50. 
 
767 Id. at 52. See also Cornelius v. DeLuca, 709 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D. Idaho, 2010) (appointing 
moderators on online forum and allowing moderators to censor content does not make ISP liable 
as ICP). 
 
768 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000). 
 
769 Id. at 983. 
 
770 Id. at 984. 
 
771 Id. at 986.  
 
772 See, e.g., Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. 2005) (operator not liable though operator 
“shaped and selectively edited website content, and website’s anonymous format encouraged” 
publication of defamatory messages); Fox v. Albanese, No. 108169/20102011, WL 1130499 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar 24, 2011) (procedure of sending messages for pre-publication review and 
potential editing does not change ICS status to ICP); Reit v. Yelp!, Inc 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (Yelp’s selection of posts considered the selection of materials for 
publication); Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011) 
(moving its user’s comments and adding headings of comments did not “develop or contribute to” 
defamation); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, 544 F.Supp.2d 929 (D. Ariz. 2008) 
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verify the content of material posted by third parties does not constitute “develop,” and 
thus the operator is not treated as an information content provider.773 
If a website operator provides a profile abused by its users, does the provider 
“develop” the harmful contents? This question was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in 
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.774 Actress Christianne Carafano sued an operator of 
online dating service Matchmaker.com for false contents in a dating profile provided by 
an anonymous user.775 After the fake profile invited many harassing, threatening emails 
and phone calls to Carafano, Matchmaker.com blocked her profile.776 The trial court 
ruled that Matchmaker.com was not eligible for immunity because the company 
developed defamatory contents by providing the fake profile to malicious users.777  
The U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, reversing the trial court’s decision, 
held that the fact that defamatory content was formulated in response to Matchmaker’s 
questionnaire in the profile should not make the operator liable.778 The court noted that 
Matchmaker.com only created its questionnaire to facilitate matching profiles and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Ripoff Report not liable for encouraging publication of postings from others for financial gain). 
 
773 See Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (vouching for truthfulness of third- 
party statement not make website operator an ICP); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F.Supp.2d 646 
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (failing to verify listing provided by third party not remove immunity). 
 
774 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 
775 Id. at 1120. 
 
776 Id. at 1122. 
 
777 Carafano, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1067-68 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 
778 Carafano, 339 F.3d. at 1124. 
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users made actual selection of the content in each profile.779 Since Carafano, courts have 
ruled that a website operator’s facilitation of false or unauthorized profiles would not 
amount to the “creation or development” of information.780  
In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 
Inc.,781 the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether providing forums or spaces for 
discrimination would constitute “creation or development.” Community advertising 
website “Craigslist” was alleged to have violated the Fair Housing Act with its 
discriminatory housing advertisements. The federal court of appeals held that Craigslist 
did not “cause” unlawful discrimination by simply providing a forum.782 
Notably, however, providing more than simple space for harmful statements may 
constitute “development” and lead an ISP to lose immunity. While defamation was not a 
claim, ISPs in two important Section 230 cases were found to be liable. Fair Housing 
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com783 involved a roommate search 
service Roommates.com. The process of creating profiles in Roommates.com required 
subscribers to answer a series of questions and to disclose sex, sexual orientation, and 
whether they would bring children to a household as well as their preferences in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
779 Id. 
 
780 See, e.g., Universal Commc’n Sys. Inc., v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) (§ 
230 bar claims that defendants acted wrongfully by encouraging anonymous submission of 
profiles or by failing to verify submitter’s identity); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc. 540 F. 
Supp. 2d 288, 297 (D.N.H. 2008) (service provider’s exercise of editorial prerogatives as to 
information from another content provider does not transform service provider into content 
provider). 
 
781 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 
782 Id. at 668. 
 
783 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
	  	   161 
roommates.784 In addition, Roommates.com encouraged subscribers to provide 
“Additional Comments” describing themselves in an open-ended essay.785 The Fair 
Housing Council sued Roommates.com for violating the federal and state housing 
discrimination law.786 A federal district court in California found that the Fair Housing 
Council’s claim was barred by Section 230.787 
Yet the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Section 230 would not protect 
Roommate.com when it “created or developed” the forms of profiles and questionnaire 
used by subscribers for discriminative contents. The Ninth Circuit noted that 
Roommate.com was “directly involved with developing” discriminatory housing 
practices while it required its users to submit racial and sexual preference.788 But the 
website could be immune as to claims based on “Additional Comments” on the website, 
which entirely came from subscribers and passively displayed by Roommates.com.789 
To determine the meaning of “development,” the Ninth Circuit relied on the concept 
of “material contribution” as a specific action: 
[W]e interpret the term “development” as referring not merely to augmenting the 
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In 
other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
784 Id. at 1167. For instance, a subscriber was directed to make a selection from a drop-down 
menu to indicate whether he/she was willing to live with “white male roommates” or “black gay 
male.” 
 
785 Id. at 1161. 
 
786 Id. at 1162. 
 
787 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, No. CV 03-
09386PA(RZX), 2004WL3799488, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004). 
 
788 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1172. 
 
789 Id. at 1173-74. 
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exception to Section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the 
conduct.790 
 
The concept of the “material contribution” does not mean a “mere action” necessary to 
the display of illegal contents. It involves a more active action such as requiring users to 
enter their preferences through drop-down menus or the supply of means for users to 
search along the same lines.791  
After Roommates, the term of “development” has evolved under case law. The Tenth 
Circuit in F.T.C. v. Accusearch, Inc.792 held that a website operator, which sold others’ 
personal data and helped to “develop” unlawful contents by paying users to acquire 
telephone records and other illegal information, was not protected by Section 230. By 
contrast, several consumer review websites have been held not liable because courts 
found that those websites did not “develop” the challenged defamatory comments.793 
Will a website dedicated to insulting or mocking others fall within Section 230? The 
answer is, not surprisingly, yes. In Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
790 Id. at 1167-68 (emphasis added). 
 
791 Id. at 1169. 
 
792 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 
793 See, e.g., Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., No. 155629/12, 2013 WL 3335071 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 
2013) (Yelp’s filtering out of positive reviews and placement of “Best of Yelp” list not make 
Yelp creator or developer of reviews); Frontier Van Lines Moving and Storage, Inc. v. Valley 
Solutions, Inc., No. 11cv0526, 2011 WL 2110825 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2011) (review website for 
moving companies not shape service reviews); Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So.3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“appalling” business practices of Ripoffrport.com did not affect §230 
application); Kimzye v. Yelp Inc., No. C13-1734RAJ, 2014 WL 1805551 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 
2014) (Yelp’s star rating program not transform ISP into developer of false information); Seldon 
v. Magedson, No. CV-13-00072-PHX-DFC, 2014 WL 1456316 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014) 
(Ripoffreport not responsible for defamation by third parties through forum it provided). 
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LLC,794 cheerleader Sarah Jones sued the operators of TheDirty.com for defamation and 
invasion of privacy. Jones claimed that TheDirty.com had participated in developing 
defamatory posts by appending a “tagline” to the postings of others and adding the 
website operator’s own comments. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Kentucky ruled that the website and operators should be liable upon the website name, 
the manner in which it is managed, and the operator’s personal comments because all 
these have “specifically encouraged development of what is offensive.”795 
But the federal district court’s decision was overturned. Applying the “material 
contribution” test in Roommates, the Sixth Circuit held that the operators, who simply 
selected posts for publication, did not materially contribute to defamation.796 The federal 
appeals court stated that the website did not “require” uses to post illegal contents and the 
name of the website did not suggest that only illegal content would be published.797 The 
court pointed out that the operators of the Dirty.com, unlike the F.T.C. decision, did not 
compensate the users for the submission of unlawful content.798  
As Jones demonstrates, ISPs would have little difficulty in operating their websites 
for socially undesirable purposes. For instance, few individuals have won against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
794 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012). 
 
795 Id. at 1012. 
 
796 Jones, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 
797 Id. at 416. 
 
798 Id. 
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ISPs that maintain “revenge websites” under Section 230.799 Although California and 
several other states passed “revenge porn” laws,800 it might be a more practical and direct 
way for the targets of revenge porn to have the ISPs take down the harmful contents. 
Nonetheless, as long as the CDA Section 230 is a statutory tool for ISPs against liability, 
those whose names and photos were revealed with no consent may be left vulnerable 
perpetually. 
Given that Congress originally intended Section 230 to protect an ISP that would act 
as a “computer Good Samaritan,” some should wonder why abusive ISPs should benefit 
from the broad applications of the CDA. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in 2014: 
“Congress has not provided an all purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that 
publish user content on the Internet, though any claims might have a marginal chilling 
effect on Internet publishing business.”801 So, ISPs that violate individuals’ rights should 
be punished instead of being given leeway.  
                                        C. Summary and Conclusions  
Common law and constitutional law in the United States strike a delicate balance 
between reputation and freedom of speech. But when it comes to liability for online 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
799 Barbara Herman, Illinois Passes Revenge Porn Law With Teeth: Other States Should Copy,’ 
Says Privacy Lawyer, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/illinois-passes-
revenge-porn-law-teeth-other-states-should-copy-says-privacy-lawyer-1774974 (last visited Jan. 
8, 2015) (revenge porn website operator Hunter Moore, who paid someone to obtain 
pornographic images for his website, claiming §230 protection). 
 
800 Eric Goldman, California’s New Law Shows It’s Not Easy to Regulate Revenge Porn, FORBES, 
Oct. 8, 2013, ttp://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/10/08/californias-new-law-shows-its-
not-easy-to-regulate-revenge-porn/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2015) (California anti-revenge porn law 
would not cover victims who made the recording themselves and the law would not outlaw 
malicious hackers). 
 
801 Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 776 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2014) (CDA § 230 not bar 
plaintiff’s claim for defendant company’s negligence in warning). 
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defamation, the traditional reputation vs. free speech structure has been sweepingly 
altered in U.S. law. Since Congress passed the Communications Decency Act in 1996, 
Section 230 has provided complete immunity for Internet service providers for 
defamatory contents created by third parties. Such immunity was entirely a matter of 
policy choice made by Congress to ensure that the Internet industry and online freedom 
of speech would thrive. 
Yet the decisional law on Section 230 in 1997-2014 shows that the sense of balance 
has been lost. In nearly all the cases, ISPs have won because courts have interpreted the 
“interactive computer service” provider so broadly. Such broad ISP interpretations are 
unwarranted, since the first prong of the Section 230 application to “interactive computer 
service” has identified none of the unqualified ISPs. The second prong has been equally 
ineffective by treating ISPs as non-publishers and rejecting the notice-based liability. The 
notice-based liability for defamation similar to Section 512 of the DMCA will chill 
freedom of speech. Nonetheless, a more speech-sensitive approach to notice-based 
liability will better rebalance reputation with free speech. When it comes to applying the 
third prong, the judicial effort to reinterpret the “creation or development” of information 
has resulted in a more concrete notion of “material contribution.” Still the courts should 
apply the “material contribution” test more inclusively to punish the operators of 
insulting or revenge porn websites. 
There is no denying that Section 230 has contributed to protection of online freedom 
of speech. Probably far more than envisioned by Congress in 1996. But protection of free 
speech at the expense of reputational interest is seemingly extreme. This should lead 
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courts to consider rebalancing ISPs’ immunity insofar as its interpretations of Section 230 
comply with its legislative intent.  
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CHAPTER VI 
ISP LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom, online defamation is increasing, while defamation against the 
traditional media tends to decrease.802 The use of social media sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter has fueled online defamation, making online users more vulnerable to libel 
lawsuit.803 Not surprisingly, ISPs have emerged as central players in defamation law as 
cyber-speech has more often related to all kinds of critical commentaries on a wide range 
of controversial issues and people on and off line.  
Although the term “ISP” has been generally used in England, its concept is still 
unsettled. That is why the law classifies and limits the liability of the ISPs where they act 
as mere conduits, caches, or hosts of material.804 But the ISPs often do more than mere 
facilitation of online communication while offering a range of services, including e-mail 
accounts, website hosting, and newsgroups. Hence, the court has found it difficulty in 
drawing the line between publishers and non-publishers online.805 
Moreover, free speech advocates have been concerned that ISPs might abstain from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802 Thomson Reuters, News Release: Defamation Cases Against Media Groups Halve in Five 
Years, Nov. 11, 2013, http://thomsonreuters.com/press-releases/112013/media_defamation_cases 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014) (downward trend of newspaper libel cases resulting from cost-related 
willingness of newspaper groups to negotiate out-of-court settlements). 
 
803 Roy Greenslade, 23% Increase in Defamation Actions as Social Media Claims Rise, 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/oct/20/medialaw-
social-media (last visited on Nov. 9, 2014) (increasing online libel cases reflect people’s concern 
about online reputation and easiness of spreading harmful information). 
 
804 For a discussion of liability of mere conduits, caches, and hosts on the Internet, see infra 
Section A, “Statutory Law.”  
 
805 For a discussion of liability for online publisher and non-publisher, see infra Section B, ”Case 
Law.”  
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providing their services or they would threaten to forgo online speech by simply deleting 
online expressions.806 To address these and related concerns, a reform of defamation law 
had been demanded for years. It led to the new Defamation Act 2013.807 The U.K. 
Ministry of Justice expects the new Defamation Act to better protect website operators 
hosting user-generated content.808 Yet it has yet to be determined whether the new 
defamation law would provide a greater degree of protection for ISPs and online speech. 
This chapter analyzes statutory and cases law on ISP liability for defamation in the 
United Kingdom. It examines various statutory defenses for ISPs and court cases in 
which the defenses were applied. Then it identifies early ISP issues, liability of search 
engines, and liability of other types of ISPs such as blog operator. It suggests that the 
Defamation Act 2013 will offer more positive opportunities for ISPs. It also highlights 
obstacles in defamation law and problems with the court decisions.  
                                                         A. Statutory Law 
The Defamation Act 2013 came into force on January 1, 2014. The new Defamation 
Act has a separate clause of Section 5 for ISP liability. But ISPs are still able to rely on 
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, the Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
806 Department of Trade and Industry, DTI Consultation Document on the Electronic Commerce 
Directive: The Liability of Hyperlinkers, Location Tool Services and Content Aggregators, 20-21 
(2005). 
 
807 For the new Defamation Act 2013, see infra Section 3, “Section 5 of the Defamation Act 
2013” under the Section A. 
 
808 Press Association, Libel: New Defamation Act Will Reverse ‘Chilling effect,’ Ministers Claim, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/31/trivial-libel-claims-
targeted-new-law (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). 
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other traditional defenses such as truth and honest comment.809 
1. Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996  
In July 1990, Lord Chancellor810 published a consultation paper to invite views on 
modifying the common law defense of innocent dissemination.811 The main issue of the 
consultation paper was whether the innocent dissemination defense should be expanded 
to cover liability of printers regarding defamatory contents in the printed materials. 
Because new technologies have made the “camera-ready” copy available, the printer has 
less opportunity to read and modify the text in print than when he worked in hand and hot 
metal composing.812  
The consultation paper noted that the modern printer would have “an unfair burden” 
without defense, “even where there is no knowledge or negligence” about defamatory 
contents.813 Besides, it was argued that printers might delete injurious contents and such 
action would harm the author’s freedom of expression.814 The paper states: 
If it is known that his [printer’s] system of work need not and does not include 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809 For a discussion of common law defenses, see supra Chapter IV, Section B, “Defenses.”  
 
810 Lord Chancellor is a Cabinet minister and a member of the House of Commons. Lord 
Chancellor had been the presiding officer of the House of Lords and the head of the judiciary, but 
the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 transferred those roles to the Lord Speaker and the Lord 
Chief Justice. For more information, see The Lord Chancellor, UK Parliament, 
http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/principal/lord-chancellor/ (last visited Aug. 6, 
2014). 
 
811 Lord Chancellor’s Department, Defamation: The Defence of Innocent Dissemination (1990). I 
would like to appreciate the UO Knight Library, which obtained for me an electronic copy of this 
uncirculated document from the UK Leicester University Library. 
 
812 Id. at 4.  
 
813 Id. at 5. 
 
814 Id. at 4.  
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any inspection of the text, his share may be negligible. On the other hand, it may 
be argued that the voluntary adoption of a system which reduces or eliminates the 
chance of detecting libelous content should increase a participant’s responsibility 
for its publication. It may be said that the balance which has to be struck between 
the printer and the plaintiff is not affected in principle by the change in 
technology.815 
 
The consultation paper, without determining whether the innocent dissemination defense 
should be applied to printers, invited more opinions. The 1990 paper is noteworthy 
because the printer’s position discussed in the consultation paper is similar to current 
situation that the ISP confronts: both the printers and the ISPs, as products of new 
technology, are involved in mass communication, but it is unclear how much liability 
they should bear for the contents they mediated.  
When the Defamation Bill was introduced in the House of Lords in 1996,816 Lord 
Chancellor claimed that the innocent dissemination defense should be codified in order to 
create a statutory defense for distributors, printers, and others who do not have primary 
responsibility for a defamatory publication.817 Although special protection for ISPs was 
not identified in the bill,818 the Parliament during debate reviewed protections for ISPs as 
well as their responsibilities. Paul Boateng, a member of Parliament stated: 
The Bill considers the responsibilities of operators of Internet communications. It 
seeks to protect them against liability for defamation resulting from innocent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815 Id. at 7. 
 
816 570 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th Ser.) (1996) 578. 
 
817 See 570 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th Ser.) (1996) 577. Lord Chancellor expected that Section 1 would 
replace the innocent dissemination defense, but the common law defense has been not abolished; 
see e.g., Metropolitan International School Ltd, [2009] EWHC, ¶¶ 65-70.  
 
818 See, 570 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th Ser.) (1996) 605 (During the debate in the House of Lords, it 
was noted that ISPs would be covered by §1(3)(e), although §1 does not specifically refer to 
ISPs). 
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dissemination of material. That is all well and good, as far as it goes. The Bill 
does not help, however, in that it does not say how the Internet is effectively to be 
policed to tackle the dissemination of defamatory material. It does not say how 
defamatory material, once identified, might easily and without undue cost be 
removed.… Policing the Internet and ensuring that defamatory material is 
removed remain significant problems. Some time, it will be necessary for the 
House to legislate more comprehensively on that than it has done.819 
 
Although more inclusive legislation for online defamation was urged, the Defamation Act 
1996 adopted no separate provision for ISP liability.820 Lord Inglewood, Parliamentary 
under-secretary of National Heritage, rejected online defamation legislation during the 
Parliament debate. He stated that it would be desirable to let the court decide whether to 
immunize ISPs.821 
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 created a general statutory defense for 
distributors, printers, and others who have secondary responsibility for defamation. To 
rely on Section 1 defense, the person who wishes to invoke Section 1 must show that he 
was “not the author, editor or publisher of the statement,” that he “took reasonable care” 
regarding the publication, and that he “did not know, and had no reason to believe” that 
he caused or contributed to the defamatory publication.822 In interpreting “reasonable 
care” and “reason to believe,” courts are required to consider the extent of responsibility 
regarding online publication, the nature or circumstances of the publication, and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 278 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th Ser.) (1996) 132-33. 
 
820 During the Parliament debate, no American ISP cases such as Cubby and Stratton Oakmont 
were discussed. The only American case mentioned in the debate was New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and the “Sullivan defence” was rejected. See 570 PARL. DEB. H.L. 
(5th Ser.) (1996) 608 (Sullivan not adopted, since U.S. culture stands out from other countries, 
including U.K.). 
 
821 570 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th Ser.) (1996) 605. 
 
822 Defamation Act, § 1(1) (Eng.). 
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previous conduct or character of the author, editor or publisher.823  
But Section 1 might lead ISP to face a dilemma: If an ISP scrutinizes the 
intermediated contents to do “reasonable care,” the ISP risks being an “editor” who 
cannot rely on the Section 1 defense. By contrast, if an ISP does not screen contents, it 
likely means that the ISP did not take reasonable care.824 Thus, it is unclear to what extent 
ISPs should exercise the function of control to show that they took reasonable care. 
The definition of “publisher” in Section 1(2) is also controversial because its meaning 
of publisher is different from the normal meaning of “publisher” at common law.825 As 
Section 1(2) defines “publisher” as a “commercial publisher,” the provision does not 
cover a noncommercial publisher.826 Generally, ISPs are not commercial publishers, so it 
is questionable whether ISPs always would not be treated as publishers under Section 1.  
Section 1 excludes from its protection those who were aware that they were dealing 
with defamatory materials.827 Therefore, if an ISP was notified by its user of the existence 
of allegedly defamatory material, the ISP would be treated as knowing of the material 
and then confront the risk of losing the defense. In that case, the only way to avoid 
liability is deleting the material complained of as quickly as possible. Hence, Section 1 
defense would lead to chilling speech.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
823 Id. § 1(5). 
 
824 Neil et al. eds., supra note 593, at 247. 
 
825 Smith, supra note 58, at 327. 
 
826 See also Metropolitan International School Ltd, [2009] EWHC, ¶ 71 (holding that there exists 
“some confusion about the terminology” in § 1 defense). 
 
827 Law Commission, Defamation and the Internet: A Preliminary Investigation, Scoping Study 
No. 2, ¶ 2.4 (2002). 
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2. Electronic Commerce Regulations 
The U.K. Electronic Commerce Regulations (EC Regulations)828 incorporate the EU 
Electronic Commerce Directive (E-Commerce Directive)829 into the law of the United 
Kingdom.830 The EC Regulations provide the safe harbor provisions for the online 
intermediary in three provisions.831 Section 17 establishes limitations on the liability of 
ISPs who offer “mere conduits,” when they did not initiate the transmission, did not 
select the receiver, and did not select or modify contents.832 The mere conduit’s action 
includes “the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information 
transmitted” for just carrying out the online transmission.833 Thus, ISPs that pass email 
messages are likely to fall within the ambit of the “mere conduits,” because the copy of 
email is usually deleted from server once the information has been delivered to a 
receiver.834  
Section 18 protects “caching” intermediaries that store information temporarily on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
828 2002, S.I. 2000/2013. 
 
829 E-Commerce Directive aims to establish cross-border provision of online services in the 
internal market and to enhance administrative cooperation between the member states. The 
Directive applies to online services including information, selling, and advertising. European 
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/directive_en.htm (last visited July 
6, 2014).  
 
830 For general information about the EC Regulations, see Out-law.com, The UK’s E-Commerce 
Regulations, http://www.out-law.com/page-431 (last visited Jan. 3, 2015). 
 
831 See the EC Regulations, §§ 17~19. 
 
832 Id. § 17(1). 
 
833 Id. § 17(2). 
 
834 Neil et al., supra note 593, at 249. 
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their networks for efficient transmission to users.835 Yet the protection will be lost if the 
ISP modifies the information or does not comply with conditions on access to the 
information and any rules regarding the updating of information. Further, Section 18 will 
not apply when the ISP interferes with the lawful use of technology in accessing the 
information or if it does not act “expeditiously” to remove or to disable access to the 
information when it actually knew that the initial source has been removed from online or 
that a court or an administrative agency has ordered such removal.  
Section 19 provides the lowest degree of protection to “hosting,” in other words, 
long-tern storage of content at the hosting server.836 The hosting intermediaries cannot 
rely on Section 19 if they had “actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information” or 
they did not remove or disable access to the information “expeditiously” after obtaining 
such knowledge or awareness.837 To decide whether an ISP has “actual knowledge” for 
application of Section 18 and Section 19, the court should consider whether an ISP has 
received a notice and  “the extent to which any notice identifies the notice sender and 
location of the information, in addition to the unlawful nature of the activity in 
question.”838 
ISPs in the United Kingdom expected the EC Regulations to provide additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835 EC Regulations, § 18(a). 
 
836 Id. § 19. 
 
837 Id. § 19(a). 
 
838 Id. § 22. 
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protections for the Internet industry.839 But Section 19 might not provide extra 
protections because the defense also will be lost like Section 1 of the Defamation Act 
1996 when an ISP was notified of existence of harmful information but did not delete it 
promptly.  
3. Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 
Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 immunizes website operators completely 
against liability for defamatory posts by identifiable third parties. In addition, it offers 
ISPs qualified protection for anonymous posts. 
a) History of Section 5  
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 had been discussed as a topic of reform 
primarily since 2002. The Law Commission published a paper, titled “Defamation and 
the Internet” in 2002.840 The paper addressed the necessity to reform libel law on the 
grounds that “the current law places pressure on secondary publishers (ISPs) to remove 
material,” regardless of whether the content was in the public interest or true.841 The Law 
Commission’s paper criticized the CDA Section 230 and the Zeran decision in the United 
States842 for giving “very little weight” to reputation as a protected interest. The U.K 
reform paper suggests that the innocent dissemination defense for ISPs should be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
839 See, e.g., Matt Loney, ISPs Win Crucial Legal Protection, ZDNET UK, Aug.15, 2002, 
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/it-strategy/2002/08/14/isps-win-crucial-legal-protections-2120825/ 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2014) (U.K. ISP industry had lobbied hard to incorporate EC Directive after 
ISP defendant lost in Godfrey). 
 
840 Law Commission, Defamation and the Internet: A Preliminary Investigation, Scoping Study 
No. 2 (2002). 
 
841 Id. ¶ 1.12. 
 
842 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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extended, along with a clearer guidance to ISPs on how to deal with complaints about 
defamatory materials.843 
Attempts for libel reform in England have been urged on the government.844 Interest 
groups that consisted of publishers, journalists, and scientists, launched the “Libel 
Reform Campaign.”845 The Ministry of Justice conducted a consultation on reducing 
costs in defamation proceedings in 2008.846 The Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
inside the Parliament published a research paper “Press Standards, Privacy and Libel” in 
March 2010 to identify a host of libel law problems.847  
In 2010, a prominent human right lawyer Lord Anthony Lester published a private 
Defamation Bill848 to push forward the libel law reform. Lord Lester’s Bill provided the 
defense for “facilitator,” unless the plaintiff shows that the notice requirements have been 
complied with, 14 days of the notice period has expired, and the expression complained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Law Commission, supra note at 840, ¶ 2.55. 
 
844 For a brief history of libel law reform, see UK Parliament, Policy Background of the Draft 
Defamation Bill, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtdefam/203/20305.htm#a1 (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 
845 Libel Reform Campaign is a coalition of English PEN, Index on Censorship, and Sense About 
Science to reform the libel laws of England and Wales. See Libel Law Reform, 
http://www.libelreform.org/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 
846 Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, A Comparative Study of Costs in 
Defamation Proceedings Across Europe (2008), 
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/defamationreport.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 4, 2014).  
 
847 Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Press Standards, Privacy and Libel: Second Report of 
Session 2009-10 (this report does not pay attention to the Internet libel issues and ISP liability).  
 
848 Defamation Bill [HL] 2010. 
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of has not been removed.849  
The Government’s draft bill was published in 2011 but it included no specific clause 
for ISPs. After reviewing the Government draft bill, the Joint Committee on the draft bill 
recommended that the innocent dissemination defense should be strengthened because 
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 had been “unduly harsh on secondary 
publisher.”850 For online defamation, the Joint Committee proposed that a new “notice 
and take-down” procedure should be adopted for the rapid resolution of disputes.851 The 
Committee suggested that if author of the online publication is identifiable, the ISP 
should publish a notice of complaint promptly and then take down defamatory material 
when the complainant wishes. The Committee further suggested that if the defamatory 
content is unidentifiable, the harmful posting must be taken down by ISPs except when 
the ISP believes that there are significant reasons for public interest in the material.852 
The Joint Committee report concludes: “Liability should be determined by the way in 
which the host or service provider responds to a request for a defamation notice or a take-
down order.”853 
In response to the Joint Committee’s report, the government was concerned that the 
ISPs might confront “significant practical and technical difficulties” to delete contents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
849 Id. § 9(1), (2). 
 
850 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, First Report, HL Paper 203/HC 930-I, Oct. 19, 
2011, ¶ 60, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtdefam/203/20302.htm 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 
851 Id. ¶ 101. 
 
852 Id. ¶¶ 104-5. 
 
853 Id. ¶ 106. 
	  	   178 
under the takedown system.854 Also, the government stated that it would be difficult for 
ISPs to determine whether the content serves public interest or not.855 The government 
recommended a system that the ISPs could act as a “liaison point” to contact the author 
and to remove material with the author’s consent, but if the issue remains in dispute after 
an initial exchange of correspondence, the ISP would be exempted simply by providing 
details of the author to the complainant.856  
Yet the Defamation Bill 2012857 did not adopt the “liaison” system that the 
government proposed. Instead, the Bill 2012 contained a specific immunity clause for 
“operators of websites,” reflecting the Joint Committee’s report of exempting the ISP 
when the original author is identifiable. Section 5 of the Bill, titled “operators of 
websites,” is strikingly similar to the current Section 5 clause and after going through 
Parliament’s revision of terms and definition, it became Section 5 of the Defamation Act 
2013. 
b) Defense for the ISP under Section 5 
Section 5 applies when a website operator is sued for libelous statements on its 
website.858 Section 5(2) states that the ISP, to rely on the defense, should show that it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
854 Ministry of Justice, The Government’s Response to the Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Defamation Bill, Feb. 2012, ¶ 78, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Draft-
Defamation-Bill/Government%20Response%20CM%208295.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2014). 
 
855  Id. ¶ 79. 
 
856 Id. ¶ 85. 
 
857 Defamation Bill, HC Bill 5, presented to Parliament on May10, 2012.  
 
858 Id. § 5(1). 
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“not the operator who posted the statement.”859 But the ISP’s defense will be defeated 
when the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff could not identify the person who posted the 
statement, that the plaintiff notified the operator regarding the posting, and that the 
operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint.860 The Section 5 defense will be 
defeated when the ISP has acted with malice regarding the libelous contents as well.861 
The defense, however, will not be defeated by the mere fact that the ISP “moderates” 
statements posted by others.862  
For the meaning of a notice of complaint, the provision requires that the notice 
specify the complainant’s name, set out the defamatory statement and explain why it is 
defamatory of the complainant, clarify where the statement was posted, and include other 
information as may be specified in regulations.863 The Defamation Regulations 2013 
requires that the ISP remove the statement within 48 hours of receiving the original 
poster’s agreement of deletion.864  
When compared with Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, Section 5 of the new 
Defamation Act is likely to work more positively for ISPs. If an identifiable person posts 
a libelous content, an ISP can be immunized under Section 1 only when the ISP does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
859 Id. § 5(2) states: “(2) It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who 
posted the statement on the website.” 
 
860 Id. § 5(3). 
 
861 Defamation Act 2013, § 5(11). 
 
862 Id. § 12. 
 
863 Id. § 5(6). 
 
864 Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013, Schedule §7. 
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know of the existence of such content. Yet Section 5 still protects ISPs even when the 
ISPs have knowledge of the existence of the libelous material posted by the identifiable 
person. Moreover, Section 5 focuses on whether the original speaker is identifiable, 
instead of categorizing the ISP’s role as hosting, caching, and mere conduits. Given that 
the ISP’s functions will be more complicated and unpredictable with technological 
advances, this new type of takedown system would be more effective than Section 1 of 
the Defamation Act 1996 and the EC Regulations. 
Nevertheless, Section 5 poses several problems for ISPs. First, it might not provide 
sufficient protection for the defamed individual. When the original poster does not wish 
defamatory statements to be removed, the ISP must inform the complainant that the 
poster did not agree with removal of the complained-of material, and thus the statements 
would not be removed from the online location.865 The only option for the complainant is 
suing the original poster. As a consequence, the libelous statements would continue to 
remain on the Net until the allegedly defamed person won the case. Hence, suing the 
original online poster will not be always the best way.  
To eliminate harmful postings or repair the damaged reputation, the ISP should be 
able to delete defamatory contents as promptly as possible. It might be more reasonable 
to require ISP to block the libelous contents temporarily or to notify the public that a third 
party contests the material. As U.K. law professors Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott 
argued, the U.K. Parliament should have imposed on ISPs an obligation to attach a notice 
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of complaint to a challenged statement that the ISP chose not to delete.866 Such a 
mandatory notice might protect the complainant’s reputation more effectively by letting 
readers know that the material was contested.867 
Another problem with Section 5 is derived from its vagueness. The provision states 
that an ISP will be immunized when it is “not the operator” that posted a defamatory 
comment.868 Yet it is hard to predict when an ISP would not be treated as the “operator” 
of a harmful statement. If an ISP authorizes other users to publish libelous comments but 
has no function to control its contents, is the ISP the “operator” of the statement or not? 
In a similar context, “moderates” is not clear-cut. Section 5(12) provides that the fact that 
the operator “moderates” the statements of others does not defeat the defense. The levels 
of the ISP’s moderation, however, vary. Some ISPs may involve simple removing or 
blocking banned words automatically, whereas others may substantially monitor and 
remove offensive contents.869 Courts will have to define the statutory term of moderation 
for the ISPs so that they can predict what sort of moderations is allowed under the 
Defamation Act 2013. 
Although Section 5 suffers from a vagueness problem, ISPS will likely benefit from 
the provision. Whether or not the author of harmful content is identifiable, the ISP will 
not lose protection merely because of its knowledge of the existence of the defamatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
866 Alistair Mullis & Andrew Scott, Tilting at Windmills: the Defamation Act 2013, 77 MODERN 
L. REV. 87, 102 (2014). 
 
867 Id. 
 
868 Defamation Act 2013, § 5(2). 
 
869 Price & McMahon eds., supra note 531, § 6.33. 
	  	   182 
material. If the ISP takes action promptly for the author-unidentifiable material, it is 
likely to avoid liability.  
B. Case Law 
As online defamation becomes more pervasive, individual online speakers have been 
increasingly sued for defamatory comments on SNS.870 Although the potential liability of 
the individual speakers for defamation is a major issue, the liability of ISPs or the website 
operators is the central focus of this dissertation.  
As noted in the methodology section of Chapter I, my research has found 9 ISP cases 
in which one of the causes of action was defamation.871 Table 2 (see Appendix E) sets out 
the case name and decision year of each case, and whether the ISP was held immune to 
liability.872  
As Table 2 illustrates, Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 and the EC Regulations 
did not provide enough protection for ISPs. ISPs were held unprotected against liability 
in 4 cases of the 9 defamation cases. In other words, 44.5 percent of ISP defamation cases 
in England have ended against ISPs. Why Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 and the 
EC Regulations have failed to protect ISPs is discussed in the following subsections. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
870 See e.g., McAlpine v. Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) (Bercow’s tweet bore “natural and 
ordinary” defamatory meaning that Lord McAlpine was “pedophile”); Cairns v. Modi [2012] 
EWCA Civ 1382 (Modi defamed Cairns with a match-fixing tweet). 
 
871 For a discussion of how the UK ISP cases were selected for this research, see supra Chapter I, 
D, “Methodology.”  
 
872 For a table of “U.K. Decisions about ISP Liability for Defamation under Section 1 and EC 
Regulations, see Table 2. 
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1. Early ISP Cases 
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 was for the first time tested for ISP liability in 
Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd.873 In January 1997, an anonymous person posted a 
defamatory message about physics lecturer Laurence Godfrey on a newsgroup website 
hosted by Demon Internet.874 Although Godfrey informed Demon Internet of the 
offending post and requested the ISP to delete it from the news server, the posting had 
remained for 10 days.875 Godfrey sued Demon Internet for the 10-day libelous posting.876 
The High Court found Demon Internet liable for the libelous contents hosted. Justice 
Michael Morland of the High Court pointed out that publication occurred whenever users 
accessed and read the posting: 
[T]he defendants, whenever they transmit and whenever there is transmitted from 
the storage of their news server a defamatory posting, publish that posting to any 
subscriber to their ISP who accessed the newsgroup containing that posting. Thus 
every time one of the defendants’ customers accesses “soc.culture. thai” and sees 
that posting defamatory of the plaintiff there is a publication to that customer.877 
 
Justice Morland rejected Demon Internet’s argument that it was a mere owner of an 
electronic device, which simply stored postings within its computer.878  
Justice Morland also referred to Byrne v. Deane,879 in which liability arose for not 
removing defamatory material that was in the defendant’s power to remove once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
873 [1999] EWHC 244 (QB).  
874 Id. ¶ 12. 
 
875 Id. ¶ 13. 
  
876 Id. ¶ 15. 
 
877 Id. ¶ 33. 
 
878 Id. ¶ 35. 
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notified.880 He compared the ISP to a traditional distributor such as a bookseller or a 
library that circulates a defamatory book, for the ISP transmitted the libelous statement to 
others from the storage of its server.881 The court concluded that the ISP would not rely 
on Section 1 because it knew of the harmful content after the plaintiff’s notification.882  
Justice Morland found American ISP cases “educative and instructive” for online 
issues at the early stage of the Internet.883 But he held the U.S. decisions to be of little 
assistance because of the fundamental difference in U.S. and U.K. libel laws.884 
Operators of bulletin boards are liable as publishers in England, while ISPs in America 
are immunized.885  
Godfrey made other ISPs concerned about online libel lawsuits.886 It gave ISPs a clear 
lesson: once a notice arrives, take down the material as soon as possible to avoid liability. 
Therefore, ISPs are more likely to choose to eliminate postings regardless of whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
879 [1937] 1 KB 818 (golf club’s proprietors were liable for publication by allowing libelous 
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880 Godfrey, [1999] EWHC, ¶ 32. 
 
881 Id. ¶ 34, quoting Weldon v. “The Times” Book Co. Ltd, [1911] 28 T.L.R. 143 (bookseller 
selling defamatory book); Vizetelly v. Mudie’s Select Library, 2 Q.B. 170 [1990] (library 
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882 Id. ¶ 50.  
 
883 Id. ¶¶ 36-48 (quoting Cubby v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Stratton 
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886 Matt Wells, Freedom Fear on Website Closure, GUARDIAN, Apr. 3, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2000/apr/03/freespeech.internet (last visited Aug. 10, 
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information posted is true. For they see no merit in defending against third parties’ 
postings.  
The issue of whether a website operator would be a publisher was questioned again in 
a contempt of court case of 2001. In Totalise Plc v Motley Fool Ltd,887 an Internet service 
provider Totalise sued other ISPs that operated a website on which an anonymous person 
posted defamatory materials about the Totalise. Totalise sought disclosure of the identity 
of the anonymous poster under Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act.888  
Judge Robert Owen of the High Court held that Section 10 had no application to the 
facts involved, because the defendant ISPs took no responsibility for postings on their 
discussion boards while exercising no editorial control on the website.889 But the Totalise 
court did not make clear why the website operators should not be treated as publishers, 
whereas the operator was liable as a secondary publisher in Godfrey.  
The challenge to Godfrey was repeated in Bunt v. Tilley.890 John Bunt sued three 
individuals who wrote libelous postings and three ISPs (AOL UK, Tiscali UK, and BT) 
that had published the offending comments via their services.891 Bunt did not claim that 
the ISP defendants were the hosts of contents at issue. Therefore, Justice David Eady of 
the High Court addressed the ISP liability, focusing on the fact that the ISPs were mere 
conduits, not on the fact that they hosted the harmful websites. When the ISP merely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
887 [2001] EWHC 706 (QB). 
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890 [2006] EWHC 407 (QB). 
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facilitated online publication like postal services, Justice Eady held, it should not be 
responsible as a publisher. 892 He emphasized that the ISPs simply provided a means of 
transmitting communications without participating in the process of publication.893  
Furthermore, the court found that Bunt did not notify the ISPs effectively of the 
existence of defamatory materials, just sending the ISPs two emails titled “AOL customer 
detailed disclosure request” without identifying the libelous stings.894 In the emails, Bunt 
reported that one of AOL customers had libeled him and requested to disclose the name 
of the anonymous author.895 This fact was in contrast to Godfrey, in which the ISP was 
clearly requested by Godfrey to remove libelous contents.896 
Therefore, Justice Eady held that the ISPs had no reason to believe that they were 
causing defamatory publication and thus were simply passive media of communication 
without any knowledge of harmful publication.897 As mere conduits, ISPs did not need to 
rely on any defense. Justice Eady stated that even if the ISPs were to be viewed as 
publishers, ISPs would be completely protected under Section 1 of the Defamation Act 
and Section 19 of the EC Regulations.898 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
892 Id. ¶ 9 (Justice Eady extensively relied on Matthew Collins’ book “The Law of Defamation 
and the Internet,” which claims that conduit are mere facilitators of Internet publication and thus 
they are not responsible for publication). 
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As shown above, the U.K. court decisions on the ISPs have been inconsistent. In 
Godfrey, the ISP was considered a publisher, but ISPs in Totalise and Bunt were 
evaluated as mere conduits. In those cases, the role of ISPs appears not much different in 
that they are operators of websites where third parties could leave defamatory materials. 
Internet law expert Matthew Collins points out that the status of ISPs who unknowingly 
host or cache contents posted by others has been unsettled.899  
2. Liability of the Search Engine 
As Google has grown as a global search engine, the search engine’s liability for 
defamation has emerged as a significant issue in Internet law. In Metropolitan 
International Schools Ltd v. Designtechnica Corp,900 the liability of Google was first 
addressed in England. Whenever it was searched on Google.co.uk and Google.com, the 
search results of the Metropolitan International School, a distance learning company, 
included the snippet of a statement that its business was a “new SCAM.”901 The 
Metropolitan sued Google for defamation.  
Justice Eady of the High Court relied on his earlier opinion, Bunt: If an ISP 
participates in communication as a passive medium, the ISP should not be treated as a 
publisher and thus there is no need for defense against liability.902 Examining Google’s 
role in the present case, Justice Eady found no participation by Google in formulating 
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900 [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB). 
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902 Id. ¶ 36 (citing Bunt, [2006] EWHC 407 (QB)).  
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search terms and thus Google could not prevent appearance of a snippet on its screen.903 
With no input from Google, the search engine merely played a “role of a facilitator.”904 
Justice Eady stated: “[O]ne cannot merely press a button to ensure that the offending 
words will never reappear on a Google search snippet: there is no control over the search 
terms typed in by future users.”905 Therefore, Google did not have to rely on Section 1 as 
a non-publisher at common law.906  
Could Google be liable after being alerted to a defamatory snippet thrown by the 
search engine?907 Justice Eady replied: Although the ISP defendant in Godfrey became 
liable for the defamatory postings after being notified, search engines would not be liable 
even after notified. Justice Eady noted that it would be hardly possible for Google to take 
down contents due to authorship or authorization with original posters.908 A similar 
conclusion about Google’s role was reached in Budu v. BBC.909 Samuel Budu sued the 
British Broadcasting Corp. (BBC) for articles on BBC website and Google for snippets 	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904 Id. ¶ 51. 
 
905 Id. ¶ 55. 
 
906 Justice Eady noted that “publisher” under the Defamation Act was confusing. Because Section 
1(2) of the Act defines a publisher as a “commercial publisher,” Google might become a 
publisher under the Act engaging in a business issuing contents to the public, even though it is not 
a publisher at common law. See id. ¶ 73. 
 
907 Id. ¶ 54. 
 
908 Id. ¶ 58. Compare an Australian case Trkulja v. Google Inc., [2012] VSC 533 (holding that the 
search engine’s performance established liability as a publisher at common law), with another 
Australian Bleyer v. Google Inc., [2014] NSWSC 897 (rejecting the Trkulja decision, holding 
that at least prior to notification of complaint, Google cannot be liable as a publisher of the search 
results). 
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from the archived articles.910 BBC articles stated that an illegal immigrant was turned 
down for the post as head of diversity for police.911 In subsequent articles, the BBC 
named Budu as the person rejected but published his argument that he did not illegally 
immigrate to England.912 Justice Victoria Sharp of the High Court held that the BBC 
articles were not defamatory because if the readers saw Budu’s name, they would see his 
denials of the allegation in the same articles.913 Budu claimed that Google should be 
liable for republication of the story through Google searches that contained snippets of 
the BBC stories. But the High Court, referring to Metropolitan, held that Google was not 
liable as a mere facilitator when it did not participate in formulating the snippets.914 Thus, 
a search engine as a mere facilitator would be totally immune to liability for defamation 
in England. 
Still unclear is why the court has considered Google a mere passive facilitator. Given 
that Google has ability to control over its snippets, it may be treated as a secondary 
publisher. Besides, Google’s system as search engine is designed to publish online 
contents for its business purpose. Why should it not be treated as a publisher? Courts 
should provide clearer answers to why the search engine was ruled to be mere facilitator. 
3. Confusing Roles and Liabilities of ISPs 
As the Internet has evolved, ISPs have varied in their functions. One of the notable 	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912 Id. ¶¶ 23-6. 
 
913 Id. ¶ 44. 
 
914 Id. ¶ 77 (citing Metropolitan, [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB)).  
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functions is the ISP’s role as an operator or a manager of a website. In Karim v. 
Newsquest Media Group, 915 it was discussed whether a newspaper publisher could be 
protected as an operator of the bulletin board. A solicitor Imran Karim sued the 
Newsquest Media Group that hosted the bulletin board posted with defamatory comments 
by users. The Royal Court of Justice held that the Newsquest was entitled to rely on 
Regulation 19 of the EC Regulations because Newsquest as a hosting provider did not 
have “actual knowledge of unlawful activity of information” until it was notified by 
Karim.916 In addition, the court pointed out that Newsquest quickly took down the 
materials as soon as it was notified.  
In this case, Newsquest did not claim application of Section 1 for undisclosed reason. 
Probably it is because the newspaper company as a commercial publisher might hesitate 
to rely on Section 1, which excludes a “commercial publisher” from protection.917 
Although the Karim court did not consider the Demon decision or Section 1 defense, 
Karim shows that the ISP would be successfully immunized even under Regulation 19 
when it promptly responded to the complaint. The Karim decision sends a positive signal 
for the press, showing that online commercial publishers will be protected relating to 
their users’ comments.  
By contrast, it was ruled that an operator of a blog should not avoid liability for user-
generated contents if the operator checked or moderated the content. In Kaschke v. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
915 [2009] EWHC 3205 (QB). 
 
916 Id. ¶ 15. 
 
917 Defamation Act § 1(2). 
	  	   191 
Gray,918 a local political activist Johanna Kaschke claimed that a defamatory post written 
by a user name “Gray” was placed on a blog called “Labourhome.org” which was 
operated by Alex Hilton.919 The blog post argued that Kaschke was arrested on suspicion 
of a terrorist group member.920 Kaschke sued both the original author “Gray” and the 
blog operator Hilton. The blog operator claimed that he did not edit the articles posted by 
other users and thus should be protected under Regulation 19.921  
Judge Nicholas Felix Stadlen of the High Court pointed out that the blog operator had 
exercised “editorial control” on some parts of the blog by providing more details about 
each post, fixing spelling and grammar, and removing blog posts on grounds of bad 
language, political provocation or offensiveness.922 On this basis, Judge Stadlen held that 
the blog operator’s Regulation 19 defense would fail, and the appeal was dismissed. 
Kaschke suggests that a blogger is unlikely to be protected when it exercises an editorial 
control. Yet it is doubtful whether a blogger’s mere action of correcting grammar or 
removing post is entitled to the editorial function, which led the blogger to lose 
protection.923 
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921 Id. ¶ 13. 
 
922 Id. ¶¶ 77-9. 
 
923 Steven James, Tightening the Net: Defamation Reform and ISPS, 23(7) ENT. L.R. 197 (2012)  
(commenting that Kaschke “made life even harder for ISPs” because “the threshold for becoming 
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In Davison v Habeeb,924 Google’s role, not as a search engine but as an operator of 
Blogger.com, was the central issue. Andrea Davison, an owner of a small business, sued 
the editor and columnists of the Palestine Telegraph for defamation over their news 
articles and a blogger of the ‘Blogger.com’ on which the articles claimed that Davison 
involved in a criminal conspiracy of theft and fraud. Also Davison sued Google for 
hosting the blog platform and failing to take down the libelous material quickly when 
notified.925 To determine whether Google was the publisher of the words complained of, 
Judge Richard Parkes of the High Court reviewed prior cases such as Godfrey, Bunt, and 
Metropolitan:  
It is necessary to see how relatively novel internet-bred concepts can be made to 
fit into the traditional legal framework. One tool is analogy. But it can be difficult 
to draw effective analogies between long established modes of publication like 
the newspaper and the television, and radically novel platforms like the enormous 
burgeoning Bagel which the fifth defendant [Google] hosts through Blogger.com. 
… Blogger.com, by contrast, is not simply a facilitator…. It might be seen as 
analogous to a gigantic notice board which is in the fifth defendant’s control in 
the sense that the fifth defendant provides the notice board for users to post their 
notices on, and it can take the notices down (like the club secretary in Byrne v 
Deane) if they are pointed out to it.926 
 
As a publisher of the “gigantic notice board,” the court found that Google, after receiving 
notification, should be regarded as having consented and participated in the publication 
by not taking it down.927  
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Although Judge Parkes sympathized with Google’s claim that it could not determine 
whether a complaint would be justified or not,928 he pointed out that after notified, 
Google knew or had reason to believe that its continued hosting of the material would 
cause or contribute to the publication of a defamatory statement. Therefore, Google was 
determined not to take reasonable care under Section 1.929 Even if Google was a mere 
provider of the notice board, according to Judge Parkes, Google should be liable for 
continued publication after notified.930 
As to the “hosting” defense under the EC Regulations, Judge Parkes addressed the 
issue of whether Google had “actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information,” 
which Regulation 19 required. Judge Parkes ruled that there was “no realistic prospect” to 
establish that Google had actual knowledge of unlawful information, when it confronted 
the conflicting arguments from Davison and from the journalist of the Palestine 
Telegraph.931 The Davison decision shows that Google as a website host would not avoid 
liability for defamation, contrasting with Google’s liability as a search engine in 
Metropolitan.  
Google’s role as a blog operator was questioned again in the following year. In Tamiz 
v. Google,932 Payam Tamiz appeared in the news relating to allegations that he had 
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resigned as a candidate for local elections after making inappropriate comments.933 A 
blog titled “London Mouslim,” which was operated by Google blog service, posted 
several comments that Tamiz insulted girls and involved drug dealing.934 Finding that 
those statements were made anonymously, Tamiz used the “Report Abuse” function on 
the blog website and sent a letter of claim to Google UK, which later passed the 
complaint to Google Inc.935 The “Blogger Team” within Google Inc. forwarded Tamiz’s 
complaint to the author of the blog, and the blogger himself eventually removed the 
comments 5 weeks later.936 Nonetheless, Tamiz sued Google for defamation, instead of 
suing the blogger. 
Justice David Eady of the High Court, examining whether Google would be a 
publisher under the common law, stated that none of the previous decisions have 
definitely established how ISPs would fit into the traditional framework of common law 
principles.937 Emphasizing that the ISP’s position would be “fact-sensitive,” Justice Eady 
held that ISP’s liability would rely on “the extent to which the ISP has knowledge of the 
words complained of” and “on the extent to which it has control over publication.”938  
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In this case, Google claimed that it could not exercise editorial control over the 
content of the blog that it was hosting with 250,000 new words added every minute.939 
Justice Eady agreed with Google, stating that Google cannot take responsibility for 
publication of material on any particular blog, regardless of whether Google received 
notification of a complaint or not. Comparing Google to the owner of a wall gratified, 
Justice Eady held that the owner of the wall should not be responsible for the contents of 
the graffiti.940 
Also, Justice Eady held that acceptance of the responsibility for notifying the blogger 
would not change Google’s status into a publisher.941 Irrespective of the notification of a 
complaint, the court concluded that Google was not liable as a “purely passive one” in the 
process of publication.942 Likewise, Google’s technical capability of taking down blogs 
or comments on its platform did not convert the ISP’s position into an author of 
publication.943 Justice Eady stated: 
It is no doubt often true that the owner of a wall which has been festooned, 
overnight, with defamatory graffiti could acquire scaffolding and have it all 
deleted with whitewash. That is not necessarily to say, however, that the 
unfortunate owner must, unless and until this has been accomplished, be classified 
as a publisher.944 
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Even if Google could be liable, Justice Eady said, Section 1 of the Defamation Act would 
apply to Google because it was not a commercial publisher and took reasonable care to 
take down the material once it received the complaint.945 Regulation 19 of the EC 
Regulations also would provide protection, according to Justice Eady, for Tamiz did not 
offer Google as to the detailed information about the allegedly unlawful information.  
Under Davison, however, Google should be treated as a publisher of the contents that 
were hosted on the Blogger.com, after it received notification. Nonetheless, Justice Eady 
held that Google should not be a publisher of the hosted contents even after it received 
notification. Eventually, Google was held in the same position of Bunt as a purely passive 
intermediary. As a consequence, Justice Eady’s decision was criticized in that it did not 
follow the precedent of Davison and allowed the ISP to ignore the plaintiff’s takedown 
request.946 
In February 2013, Judge Stephen Richards of the Court of Appeal reversed Justice 
Eady’s ruling on the Google’s role for blog publication.947 Tamiz claimed that Google 
must be liable both as a primary publisher and as a secondary publisher or distributor. But 
Judge Richards held that Google was not a primary publisher of the blogs because it did 
not create the blogs or had no effective control over blog contents.948 Also, Google was 
not a secondary publisher, according to the Court of Appeal, for it did not know of the 	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946 See e.g., Rhys Griffiths, New Immunity for Website Which Host Defamatory User Generated 
Content, 23(5) ENT. L.R. 145 (2012) (noting that Justice Eady’s Tamiz decision was “totally at 
odds with the law as it stood”). 
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existence of the defamatory comments prior to Tamiz’s notification.949 The Court of 
Appeal held, however, that Google’s position should be changed after receiving 
notification of the complaint.950 Relying on the 1937 decision of Byrne,951 Judge 
Richards used an analogy of a “gigantic notice board”: “Most importantly, it [Google] 
makes the notice board available to bloggers on terms of its own choice and it can readily 
remove or block access to any notice that does not comply with those terms.”952  
Then, Judge Richards considered Section 1 defense. After Google was notified, he 
held that Google knew or had reason to believe that hosting of the blog had caused or 
contributed to the publication of defamatory statement.953 Hence, Section 1 could not 
protect Google after notified. Nevertheless, Judge Richards sided with the high court and 
refused the overall appeal. The reason was that the publication was so trivial without 
“real and substantial tort” and lacked in evidence about how may people had read the 
offending material.954 It was improbable that significant number of readers would have 
accessed the blog comments after notification.955  
Although Tamiz could not win against Google, this case is significant because the 
Court of Appeal held that Google was liable as a blog publisher after being notified and 	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Google could not rely on Section 1 defense when the ISP did not take down harmful 
contents promptly.956 But it is not clear why the Court of Appeal concluded that there was 
no substantial and real harm: even though several users had read defamatory materials, 
they were likely to easily copy and spread such materials to other online space. The 
number of readers and duration of publication might not be so important in cyberspace 
where contents can be permanently reproduced.   
In McGrath v. Dawkins,957 author Chris McGrath, with intent to generate publicity for 
his book, posted a review of a book by the well-known scientist Stephen Hawking on 
Amazon.co.uk.958 McGrath’s book review, which gave the details of his own book, had 
sparked off a long thread of critical comments.959 McGrath sued both critical commenters 
and Amazon.co.uk.  
Judge Patrick Moloney of the High Court examined whether Section 1 and 
Regulation 19 could be applied to liability of Amazon. Judge Moloney held that Amazon 
was entitled for Section 1 as a non-commercial publisher within the definition of Section 
1(2), (3).960 Then the judge found that Amazon took reasonable care with its a moderation 
policy of limited pre-publication control by an automatic filter for forbidden words or 	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blacklisted users and had no reason to believe that it caused defamation.961 In addition, 
Amazon was entitled to rely on Regulation 19 because McGrath did not clearly specify 
the location of postings complained and did not disclose facts that the postings were 
unlawful.962 
Amazon could narrowly escape liability with its automatic filter system. As Judge 
Moloney noted, if Amazon relied on a manual review (human eyes), it might be liable 
due to lack of reasonable care as an editor.963 So the ISP is placed in the paradoxical 
situation: If the ISP hires people to watch and check harmful contents more diligently, it 
likely become an editor of the website and eventually take responsibility for defamation. 
Thus, courts should focus on whether an ISP engaged significantly in publishing 
defamatory contents. If the courts’ determination of the ISP’s liability hinges on the ISP’s 
own moderation policy, as shown in McGrath, such determination will make Internet 
defamation law more confusing. 
                                          C. Summary and Conclusions 
The UK defamation law enters a new phase with the Defamation Act 2013. ISPs are 
expected to benefit from a new defense under Section 5, but the ISP’s liability for 
defamation becomes more complicated while the new Act as well as the Defamation Act 
1996, EC Regulations, and common law are applied simultaneously. Although reform of 
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Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 has been viewed to protect more freedom of 
speech, it is open to question whether the new defense under the Defamation Act 2013 
will provide more speech on the Internet.  
Nonetheless, the new defense is novel in that it focuses on the identification of the 
original poster and it does not hinge on the ISP’s role as a host, a cache, and a mere 
conduit. Providing procedural guidance with the Defamation Regulations 2013, the 
Defamation Act 2013 will likely guarantee more practical solutions for ISPs in dealing 
with defamatory contents. If ISPs under Section 5 continue to opt for take-downs as they 
did under Section 1, however, the supposedly ISP-friendly Defamation Act of 2013 will 
unlikely accomplish its intended goal— that is, to protect ISPs more against liability for 
defamation.  
As the case law illustrates, the application of the defamation law to ISP liability 
shows that the law remains in a state of flux. A noticeable problem is how to draw a line 
between mere conduits and hosting publishers. While Google as search engine is treated 
as mere facilitator regardless of its ability to control search results, Google as blog 
operator is ruled as publishers at least after being notified about harmful contents. If 
simply focusing on Goolge’s potential ability to control its contents, such dichotomy 
might be less persuasive. The ISP’s position prior to notification also has yet to be settled 
and needs to be more speculated. 
 ISPs are rapidly evolving. New types of ISPs will be developing with more 
complicated and mixed functions. In this context, what is needed is the effective, 
simplified law that can be applied to this fast changing area of communication.  
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CHAPTER VII 
                                   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Internet is a network of networks. Since the browser system of the World Wide 
Web (WWW) was launched in 1990, the Internet has brought about a communication 
revolution. As a global medium of human communications, the Internet makes cyber 
speech available to anyone connected to the Net, enabling an ideal two-way 
communication. Moreover, the widespread use of smartphones and the advent of social 
network service (SNS) have changed the way human beings communicate. Currently, 
online speech exerts more tremendous impact on modern society than speech mediated 
by the traditional media does.  
In the early 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that technological differences 
between various media have affected media laws in that “[e]ach method of 
communication is ‘a law unto itself’ and that law must reflect the different natures, 
values, abuses, and dangers” of each medium.964 But it remains a never-ending issue 
whether cyber communication should be treated differently from non-cyber 
communication as a matter of law because of its different technical and intrinsic features.  
Regardless, the Internet has posed a number of challenges to online 
communication.965 The concept of the press and journalist, for example, has been affected 
by the rise of blogger journalists and websites dedicated to news reporting. The Internet’s 
uniquely versatile ability to copy and distribute contents makes the enforcement of 	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copyright law increasingly complicated. SNS and Google have forced people to 
reexamine the long-standing notion of privacy, precipitating legal disputes over the 
“digital Panopticon” and a “right to be forgotten.” Meanwhile, online pornography as a 
global phenomenon makes it harder to regulate obscene materials hosted through foreign 
servers. Hate speech is more prevalent globally with online hate sites to recruit new 
members and spread hatred of religion, race, nation, and languages. Further, Internet 
defamation is one of the most perplexing issues as the law of defamation is an 
extraterritorial concern through foreign lawsuits over online publications.  
To balance freedom of speech with reputational right in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, three classic free speech theories – “marketplace of ideas,” “democratic 
self-governance,” and “human dignity and self-fulfillment” – have played an important 
role in providing a theoretical framework.  
Especially, the marketplace of ideas has significantly informed American courts in 
addressing Internet-related issues. In American law, the Internet is viewed as the most 
accessible medium, and strong protection is allowed to online communication.966 By 
contrast, the marketplace of ideas has been less impactful to U.K. court decisions on 
online expression.  
In understanding what makes the United States distinguished from, as well as similar 
to, the United Kingdom in cyber law in general and in online defamation law particular, 
the concept of functional equivalence will help to contextualize various differences and 
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similarities.967 Meanwhile, Yale law professor James Q. Whitman notes the importance 
of comparative research in examining the “relative” differences: 
[I]t would be wrong to say that there is some absolute difference between 
American and continental European law. But the issue is not whether there is an 
absolute difference. Comparative law is the study of relative differences. Indeed, 
it is the great methodological advantage of comparative law that it can explore 
relative differences. No absolute generalization about any legal system is ever 
true.968 
 
Notwithstanding their relative differences, comparative research on American and 
English online defamation law would be valuable because these two countries share the 
same root of common law but have diverged sharply from each other since the Sullivan 
ruling. In addition, these countries enacted laws on ISP liability in the same year, 1996. 
Thus, this research shows how the United States and the United Kingdom, the two liberal 
democracies with similar sociopolitical and cultural traditions, have yielded distinctive 
legal perspectives on the law of defamation in cyberspace. 
                           A. The United States: Absolute Immunity for ISPs 
The common law requires that the plaintiff, in making a prima facie libel case, must 
establish a defamatory statement, of and concerning the plaintiff, and publication to a 
third party. When the plaintiff established three elements, the pre-Sullivan libel law 
burdened the defendant with strict liability. But the revolutionary change in American 
libel law since Sullivan has made libel litigation no longer a major threat to U.S. media. 
Although the Sullivan “actual malice” rule has been criticized for its over-protection of 
freedom of speech, the constitutional rule has made American libel law most media-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
967 For a discussion of functional equivalence, see supra Ch. I, p. 12. 
 
968 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1151, 1163 (2004). 
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friendly in the world.  
Media victories in America have continued to on the rise over the years. Yet triumph 
of the media in libel litigation does not necessarily mean that libel law is a non-issue for 
the media. American media still remain wary of libel law in their news reporting out of 
their desire to forgo the often prohibitively high cost of libel litigation. More directly 
relevant to the topic of this dissertation is the sharp increase in libel litigation against 
individuals -- especially bloggers and online publishers. Now defamation law has 
emerged as more of a threat in the Internet era, and it is far from passé in the Internet era. 
To address liability for online speech as a legal issue, Congress passed the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) in 1996. The CDA was originally designed to 
prohibit transmission of obscene and indecent materials via telecommunication devices. 
But Section 230, the “Good Samaritans” clause, was added to the CDA to overrule an 
anti-ISP court ruling and to protect ISPs that screen harmful contents. Protecting online 
communication from government coercion was another substantial purpose.969 
Judicial interpretations of Section 230 have rarely deviated from what Congress had 
intended. Since 1997, courts have almost always protected ISPs from both publisher and 
distributor liabilities as long as the ISPs were not authors or contributors to the libelous 
materials. Section 230 has been a perfect shield for ISPs: ISPs were immunized in 83 
cases out of a total of 85 cases. In only two cases, website operators were found liable 
because they were directly engaged in authoring defamatory contents.970 
Section 230, as interpreted by American courts over the past 17 years, has revealed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
969 For a discussion of the legislative history of CDA § 230, see supra Ch. V, pp. 139-42. 
 
970 See Table 1 for the list of CDA § 230 cases from 1997 to 2014. 
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several Internet law problems. The concept of the “interactive computer service” provider 
is so expansively interpreted that almost all types of service providers—individual 
bloggers, SNS, Google, and even traditional media—have been entitled to immunity so 
long as they are not original speakers. Also, what constitutes the ISP’s “creation or 
development” of information has been a core issue in Section 230 litigation. But courts 
are less than coherent in applying the “material contribution” test for deciding on the 
ISP’s liability in “creating or developing” the challenged information. Operators of a 
website or a blog could avoid liability even when they exercised “traditional editorial 
functions” such as selecting or editing materials written by others before posting. 
Although the cause of action most frequently associated with Section 230 is 
defamation, Section 230 preempts an array of non-defamation claims against ISPs, 
including anti-discrimination, negligence, invasion of privacy, spam filtering, negligent 
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Given the legislative 
intent of Section 230 was to protect an ISP that acted as a “computer Good Samaritan,” 
courts should have focused on protection for ISPs who attempt to block harmful contents 
rather than for those who more often aim to hurt others’ rights for one reason or another. 
Overall, the supposedly fair sense of balance in defamation law has been lost in the 
application of Section 230. American courts need to consider reading Section 230 more 
narrowly. For instance, they might apply the “material contribution” test, as established 
in Roomates, more broadly to find ISPs liable for operating “revenge porn” or bullying 
websites. If the operators invite or encourage other users to post defamatory contents, the 
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ISPs should be found to be “contributing or developing” illegal contents and so to be 
found liable under Section 230.  
More fundamentally, Congress made a policy choice in 1996 to provide the kind of 
cushion that ISPs might have needed to survive in the infantile period of the Internet. But 
now the Internet is not as fragile as it was in the mid-1990s as a medium of 
communication that might have warranted a special protection. Hence, the CDA is in 
need of being revised in order that the ISPs’ protection against liability for defamation 
and related lawsuits may be better balanced with individuals’ right to reputation.  
             B. The United Kingdom: Less-absolute Immunity for ISPs  
U.K libel law is less media-friendly than American law in that it still requires the 
media defendant to prove truth. It is easier for a plaintiff –particularly a public official or 
public figure—to win when suing the media in England than in America, for the plaintiff 
does not have to prove the Sullivan type of “actual malice” on the part of the defendant. 
In the late 1990s and in the mid-2000s, however, the U.K. House of Lords, then the 
highest court of England, moved to liberalize British libel law in Reynolds and Jameel by 
drawing from the broadened American concept of press freedom, as epitomized by 
Sullivan.971  
More recently, the U.K. Parliament, in response to the concerted efforts of media 
organizations and free speech groups, tipped the balance in favor of freedom of speech 
over reputation. In 2013, the Parliament reformed libel law sweepingly by passing the 
Defamation Act. The Defamation Act 2013 replaces the common law test developed in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
971 For a discussion of Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. of 1999 and Jameel v. Wall Street 
Journal Europe of 2006, see supra Ch. IV, pp. 120-26. 
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Reynolds by codifying the Reynolds “public interest” defense. If the media defendant 
shows that an allegedly false, defamatory statement was published in public interest or 
the defendant reasonably believed the existence of the public interest, the media 
defendant would not be held liable.  
Nevertheless, the ten factors listed in Reynolds will likely continue to be relevant, 
when courts consider “all the circumstances of the case” in determining whether the 
defendant has shown the publication to be relevant to a matter of public interest. But if 
the courts strictly stick to the Reynolds factors to scrutinize the journalist’s conduct, the 
new public interest defense will remain “ten hurdles” for the press. Hence, the courts 
should apply the Reynolds test, as refined by Jameel, more flexibly in ruling on the 
reporting-related circumstances, including the media’s editorial judgment.  
In addition, the new Defamation Act codifies “reportage” as part of Reynolds, 
allowing media defendants to report on issues of public interest.972 The defense is based 
on the “reasonable” belief of the existence of public interest. Such requirement of 
“reasonable belief” might restrict the application of the reportage defense, which was 
expected to be speech-protective. Yet the new Act is likely to protect more freedom of 
speech in libel lawsuit by requiring “serious harm” for defamation claims and replacing 
the “multiple publication” rule with the “single publication” rule.973  
While defamation lawsuits against the traditional media are on decline in the United 
Kingdom, online defamation litigation is rapidly increasing. But ISPs in England are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
972 Defamation Act 2013, § 4(3). 
 
973 For a discussion of “serious harm” and “single publication” under the Defamation Act 2013, 
see supra Ch. IV, pp. 109-12.   
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given limited immunity from online defamation liability. The Defamation Act 2013, the 
Defamation Act 1996, EC Regulations, and other traditional defenses have been applied 
to ISP liability.  
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, which codifies common law liability for libel, 
protects ISPs when they are not the author, editor, or publisher of the challenged 
statement, they “took reasonable care” regarding the publication, and they “did not know, 
and had no reason to believe” that they had caused or contributed to the publication. 
Section 1, however, has led ISPs to remove materials that may have been in the public 
interest, as well as materials that were true. Another problem with the Section 1 defense 
is illustrated when the ISP is held liable for the third party’s defamation simply because it 
was notified of the defamatory posting by the plaintiff. Moreover, a blogger, as a blog 
operator, was liable for libelous comment by others as exercising “editorial control” even 
when correcting grammar for or removing posts by other users. 
In addressing the criticism that Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 had been 
“unduly harsh on secondary publisher,”974 Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 allows 
broader immunity to ISPs through a new “notice and takedown” system. When enacting 
Section 5 in 2013, however, the UK government refused to adopt the CDA Section 230-
like immunity on the ground that American law gave little weight to the protection of 
reputation.  
An ISP will turn to Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 for defense when an ISP 
proves that it was “not the operator who posted the statement.” But the ISP defense will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
974 Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill- First Report, HL Paper 203/HC 930-I, Oct. 19, 
2011. 
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be defeated when the plaintiff shows that it was impossible to identify the person who 
posted the statement, that the plaintiff sent the operator a notice of complaint regarding 
the posting, and that the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint. The 
defense will be defeated when the ISP has acted with malice regarding the libelous 
contents as well.975 
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 provided defense only if the ISP did not know 
about the existence of such content. But Section 5 of the Defamation Act 2013 can be 
applied even when the ISP had knowledge of the defamatory content provided by the 
identifiable person. Consequently, Section 5 is likely to work positively for ISPs. 
Whether or not the author of the harmful content is identifiable, the ISP will not lose the 
defense simply because it was aware of the existence of defamatory material.  
Section 5 defense of the Defamation Act 2013 is novel in English libel law. It adopts 
neither blanket immunity nor strict liability for ISPs’ defamation. Instead of categorizing 
the degrees of protection based on the ISP’s role as hosting, caching, and mere conduits, 
the new defense focuses on whether the original speaker is identifiable and provides a 
procedural guideline for a notice and takedown system. This new type of defense is 
noteworthy, for categorizing the role of ISPs will become more difficult and complicated 
with technological advances.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
975 Defamation Act 2013, § 5(11). 
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C. The United States and the United Kingdom:   
Serving as Cyber Libel Law Laboratories?  
While American libel law places freedom of speech in a preferred position, U.K. law 
strikes the balance between speech and reputation in favor of reputation. Such differences 
between the two countries can be attributed to the comparative weight given to individual 
reputation vs. freedom of speech. 
Online defamation laws demonstrate the similar value assessment that the traditional 
defamation law has engaged in in the offline world. But the statutory approaches and case 
laws of the United States and the United Kingdom indicate more differences than 
similarities. In a way, the differences showcase an American society where the Internet is 
considered to play a positive role in a marketplace of ideas. But American defamation 
law does not necessarily disregard reputation or ignore the dangerous impact of the 
Internet. Rather, it reflects the speech-favored American tradition. 
American free speech law has inspired U.K. defamation law to be more liberal in 
recent years, and the CDA and the U.S. case law have influenced U.K. law on Internet 
defamation. The Defamation Act 2013 affirms an ongoing shift in English libel law and 
moves it closer to the American approach. Here, the U.S. has served as a free-speech 
laboratory for the evolving Internet libel law of the U.K.  
Is American defamation law so perfect that it does not need any change, whether 
procedural or substantive? The answer should be no. The seemingly valid rationale 
behind the CDA at the time of its enactment in the mid-1990s has outlived its relevance 
now. And the CDA might deserve a reexamination in view of its nearly 20-year 
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experience.  
One possible way of retooling the CDA Section 230 is to borrow from the notice and 
takedown procedure in Section 5 of the U.K. Defamation Act 2013. There is no 
compelling need to adopt the procedure immediately. For the U.K. law should take time 
for its impact — or lack thereof — to be felt by the ISPs and Internet speakers. 
Regardless, the U.K. experience will serve as a useful comparative framework for 
Americans in appreciating their relative differences from Britons. 
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APPENDIX A 
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, 47 U.S.C. SECTION 230  
(UNITED STATES) 
 
(a) Findings 
     The Congress finds the following: 
  (1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services 
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the 
availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens. 
  (2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they 
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology 
develops. 
  (3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and 
myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
  (4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit 
of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation. 
  (5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, 
educational, cultural, and entertainment services. 
(b) Policy 
      It is the policy of the United States-- 
  (1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media; 
  (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation; 
  (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over 
what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the 
Internet and other interactive computer services; 
  (4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable 
or inappropriate online material; and 
  (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish 
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material 
  (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
        No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
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provider. 
  (2) Civil liability 
        No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of-- 
     (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected; or 
     (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph  
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service 
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement 
with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in a manner deemed 
appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control protections (such 
as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that 
may assist the customer in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such 
notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access to information identifying, 
current providers of such protections. 
(e) Effect on other laws 
  (1) No effect on criminal law 
        Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 
or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual 
exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute. 
  (2) No effect on intellectual property law 
        Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to 
intellectual property. 
  (3) State law 
        Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any 
State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be brought and 
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section. 
  (4) No effect on Communications Privacy law 
        Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, 
or any similar State law. 
(f) Definitions 
     As used in this section: 
  (1) Internet 
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        The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both Federal and 
non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks. 
  (2) Interactive computer service 
       The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users 
to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access 
to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or 
educational institutions. 
  (3) Information content provider 
       The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service. 
  (4) Access software provider 
       The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including client 
or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the following: 
     (A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; 
     (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or 
     (C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or 
translate content. 
(June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 230, as added Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, Title I, § 
509, 110 Stat. 137; Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. 105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, § 1404(a), 112 
Stat. 2681-739.) 
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APPENDIX B 
DEFAMATION ACT, 1996, C. 31, SECTION 1 (UNITED KINGDOM) 
 
 S. 1 Responsibility for publication 
 (1) In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that-- 
      (a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of, 
      (b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and 
      (c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or 
contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement. 
 (2) For this purpose "author", "editor" and "publisher" have the following meanings, 
which are further explained in subsection (3)-- 
     "author" means the originator of the statement, but does not include a person who did 
not intend that his statement be published at all; 
     "editor" means a person having editorial or equivalent responsibility for the content of 
the statement or the decision to publish it; and 
     "publisher" means a commercial publisher, that is, a person whose business is issuing 
material to the public, or a section of the public, who issues material containing the 
statement in the course of that business. 
 (3) A person shall not be considered the author, editor or publisher of a statement if he is 
only involved-- 
      (a) in printing, producing, distributing or selling printed material containing the 
statement; 
      (b) in processing, making copies of, distributing, exhibiting or selling a film or sound 
recording (as defined in Part I of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988) 
containing the statement; 
      (c) in processing, making copies of, distributing or selling any electronic medium in 
or on which the statement is recorded, or in operating or providing any 
equipment, system or service by means of which the statement is retrieved, 
copied, distributed or made available in electronic form; 
      (d) as the broadcaster of a live programme containing the statement in circumstances 
in which he has no effective control over the maker of the statement; 
      (e) as the operator of or provider of access to a communications system by means of 
which the statement is transmitted, or made available, by a person over whom he 
has no effective control. 
In a case not within paragraphs (a) to (e) the court may have regard to those 
provisions by way of analogy in deciding whether a person is to be considered the 
author, editor or publisher of a statement. 
 (4) Employees or agents of an author, editor or publisher are in the same position as their 
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employer or principal to the extent that they are responsible for the content of the 
statement or the decision to publish it. 
 (5) In determining for the purposes of this section whether a person took reasonable care, 
or had reason to believe that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a 
defamatory statement, regard shall be had to-- 
      (a) the extent of his responsibility for the content of the statement or the decision to 
publish it, 
      (b) the nature or circumstances of the publication, and 
      (c) the previous conduct or character of the author, editor or publisher. 
 (6) This section does not apply to any cause of action which arose before the section 
came into force. 
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APPENDIX C 
DEFAMATION ACT, 2013, C. 26, SECTION 5 (UNITED KINGDOM) 
 
 S. 5 Operators of websites 
(1) This section applies where an action for defamation is brought against the operator of 
a website in respect of a statement posted on the website. 
(2) It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who posted the 
statement on the website. 
(3) The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that— 
    (a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the statement, 
    (b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement, 
and 
    (c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with any 
provision contained in regulations. 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(a), it is possible for a claimant to “identify” a 
person only if the claimant has sufficient information to bring proceedings against the 
person. 
(5) Regulations may— 
    (a) make provision as to the action required to be taken by an operator of a website in 
response to a notice of complaint (which may in particular include action relating to 
the identity or contact details of the person who posted the statement and action 
relating to its removal); 
    (b) make provision specifying a time limit for the taking of any such action; 
    (c) make provision conferring on the court a discretion to treat action taken after the 
expiry of a time limit as having been taken before the expiry; 
    (d) make any other provision for the purposes of this section. 
(6) Subject to any provision made by virtue of subsection (7), a notice of complaint is a 
notice which— 
    (a) specifies the complainant's name, 
    (b) sets out the statement concerned and explains why it is defamatory of the 
complainant, 
    (c) specifies where on the website the statement was posted, and 
    (d) contains such other information as may be specified in regulations. 
(7) Regulations may make provision about the circumstances in which a notice which is 
not a notice of complaint is to be treated as a notice of complaint for the purposes of 
this section or any provision made under it. 
(8) Regulations under this section— 
    (a) may make different provision for different circumstances; 
    (b) are to be made by statutory instrument. 
(9) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made 
unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, 
each House of Parliament. 
(10) In this section “regulations” means regulations made by the Secretary of State. 
(11) The defence under this section is defeated if the claimant shows that the operator of 
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the website has acted with malice in relation to the posting of the statement 
concerned. 
(12) The defence under this section is not defeated by reason only of the fact that the 
operator of the website moderates the statements posted on it by others. 
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APPENDIX D 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC DIRECTIVE) REULATIONS, 2002,  
S.I. 2000/2013 (UNITED KINGDOM) 
 
Mere conduit 17.  (1) Where an information society service is provided which consists 
of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of 
the service or the provision of access to a communication network, the service provider 
(if he otherwise would) shall not be liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy 
or for any criminal sanction as a result of that transmission where the service provider -   
   (a) did not initiate the transmission; 
   (b) did not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
   (c) did not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 
(2) The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in paragraph (1) 
include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information 
transmitted where:  
    (a) this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the 
communication network, and 
 (b) the information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary for 
the transmission. 
Caching 18. Where an information society service is provided which consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the 
service, the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not be liable for damages or for 
any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of that transmission 
where -   
   (a) the information is the subject of automatic, intermediate and temporary storage 
where that storage is for the sole purpose of making more efficient onward 
transmission of the information to other recipients of the service upon their request, 
and 
   (b) the service provider -  
       (i) does not modify the information; 
       (ii) complies with conditions on access to the information; 
       (iii) complies with any rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a 
manner widely recognised and used by industry; 
       (iv) does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used 
by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and 
       (v) acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information he has stored 
upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial 
source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has 
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been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such 
removal or disablement. 
Hosting 19. Where an information society service is provided which consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider (if he 
otherwise would) shall not be liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for 
any criminal sanction as a result of that storage where -  
   (a) the service provider -  
       (i) does not have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or information and, where a 
claim for damages is made, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which it 
would have been apparent to the service provider that the activity or information 
was unlawful; or 
       (ii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to 
disable access to the information, and 
   (b) the recipient of the service was not acting under the authority or the control of the 
service provider. 
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APPENDIX E 
TABLES 
      Table 1. U.S. Decisions about ISP Liability for Defamation under Section 230 
Decision 
  Year 
Immunity for 
ISP Liability  
                       Defamation Cases Relating to § 230 
  1997           I 
(Immunized) 
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
  1998           I Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). 
  1999           I Lunney v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999). 
  2000           I Ben Ezra Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, 206 F.3d 980 
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 824 (2000). 
  2000           I Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC. v. Black Ice Software, 
Inc., No. CV7888630, 2000 WL 34016435 (Cal. Oct. 
13, 2000). 
  2001           I Morrison v. America Online, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 930 
(N.D. Ind. 2001). 
  2001           I PatentWizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1069 
(D.S.D. 2001). 
  2002           I Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-
1964, 2002 WL 31844907 (Dec. 17, 2002). 
 
  2003           I Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
  2003           I Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). 
  2003           I Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003). 
  2004           I Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). cert. denied, 
541 U.S. 1085 (2004). 
  2004           I Grace v. eBay, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004). 
  2005           I Austin v. Crystaltech Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
  2005           I Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711 (N.J. 2005). 
  2005          N (Not 
Immunized) 
Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, 418 F. Supp. 2d 
1142 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
  2005          I Lackner v. Sanchez, No. Civ.A. B-05-264, 2005 WL 
3359356 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2005). 
  2005          I Roskcwski v. Corvallis Police Officer’s Ass’n, No. Civ.03-
474-AS, 2005 WL 555398 (D. Or. Mar. 9, 2005). 
  2006          I Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006). 
  2006          I D'Alonzo v. Truscello, 34 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2084 (Pa. 
Com. Pl. May 31, 2006). 
  2006          I Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
  2006          I Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Tex. 
2006). 
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  2007          I Eckert v. Microsoft Corp., No. 06-11888, 2007 WL 496692 
(D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2007). 
  2007          I DiMeo v. Max, 248 Fed. Appx. 280 (3d Cir. 2007). 
  2007          I Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
  2007          I Universal Commc’n Sys. Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 419 
(1st Cir. 2007). 
  2008          I Capital Corp. Merchant Banking, Inc. v. Corporate 
Colocation, Inc., No. 07-1626, 2008 WL 4058014 (D. 
Fla. Aug. 27, 2008). 
  2008          I Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc. 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 
(D.N.H. 2008).   
  2008          I Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, 544 F. Supp. 2d 
929 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
  2008          I Higher Balance, LLC v. Quantum Future Group, Inc., 37 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1181 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2008). 
  2008          I Kuersteiner v. Schrader, No. 100089/08, 2008 WL 8152695 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 14, 2008). 
  2008          I Mayhew v. Dunn, No 580-11-07, 2008 WL 4281984 (Vt. 
Mar. 18, 2008). 
  2008          I Steele v. Mengelkoch, No. A07-1375, 2008 WL 2966529 
(Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008). 
  2008          I Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentirc Ventures, LLC, No. 
2:04-cv-47-FtM-34SPC, 2008 WL 450095 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 
15, 2008). 
  2009          I Certain Approval Programs, I.L.C. v XCentric Ventures 
I.L.C., No. CV08-1608-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 596582 (D. 
Ariz., Mar. 9, 2009). 
  2009          I Finkel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 102578/09, 2009 WL 3240365 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 15, 2009).  
  2009          I Hechtman v. Connecticut Dept. of Public Health, No. 
CV094043516, 2009 WL 5303796 (Conn. Dec. 03, 
2009). 
  2009          I Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 996 A.2d 432 (Md. 
2009).  
  2009          I Joyner v. Lazzareschi, No. 05CC10627, 2009 WL 695539 
(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2009). 
  2009          I Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 
F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009).  
  2009          I Woodhull v. Meinel, 202 P.3d 126 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009), 
cert. denied, 203 P.3d 870 (N.M. 2009). 
  2010          I Collins v. Purdue Univ., 703 F. Supp. 2d 862 (N.D. Ind. 
2010).  
  2010          I Cornelius v. DeLuca, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Idaho 2010). 
  2010          I Johnson v, Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010). 
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  2010          I Miles v. Raycom Media, Inc., No. 1:09CV713-LG-RHW, 
2010 WL 3419438 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 2010). 
  2010          I Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App. 2010). 
  2010          I Novins v. Cannon, No. 09-5354, 2010 WL 1688695 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 27, 2010). 
  2010          I Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
  2010          I Supplementmarket.com, Inc.v. Google, Inc., No. 09-43056, 
2010 WL 6309991 (Pa. Co. Pl. July 16, 2010). 
  2010          I Two Plus Two Publishing LLC v. Jacknames.com, No. 
2:09-CV-002318-KJD-LRL, 2010 WL 4281791 (D. 
Nev. Sept. 30, 2010). 
  2011          I Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. CV 10-
01360 SVW PJWX, 2011 WL 2469822 (C.D. Cal. May 
04, 2011). 
  2011          I Deer Consumer Products, Inc. v. Little, 938 N.Y.S.2d 226 
(2011). 
  2011          I Delle v. Worcester Telegram & Gazette Corp., No. 110810, 
2011 WL 7090709 (Mass. Sept. 14, 2011). 
  2011          I Fox v. Albanese, No. 108169/20102011, 2011 WL 1130499 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2011). 
  2011          I Frontier Van Lines Moving and Storage, Inc. v. Valley 
Solutions, Inc., No. 11cv0526, 2011 WL 2110825 (W.D. 
Pa. May 24, 2011). 
  2011          I Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So.3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2011). 
  2011          I Hopkins v. Doe, No. 2:11-CV-100-RWS, 2011 WL 5921446 
(N.D. Ga, Nov. 28, 2011). 
  2011          I Kruska v. Perverted Justice Foundation Inc., No. CV 08-
0054-PHX-SMM, 2011 WL 1260224 (D. Ariz. Apr. 5, 
2011). 
 
  2011          I Mealer v. GMAC Mortg. LLC, No. 3:10-cv-08172 JWS, 
2011 WL 1103357 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2011). 
  2011          I Parisi v. Sinclair, 774 F.Supp.2d 310 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 
2011). 
  2011          I Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New York, Inc., 952 
N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 2011) 
  2012          I Courtney v. Vereb, No. 12-655, 2012 WL 2405313 (June 
25, 2012). 
  2012          I Directory Assistants, Inc. v. Supermedia, LLC, 884 F. Supp. 
2d 446 (E.D.Va. 2012). 
  2012          I Gaston v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-oo63-ST, 2012 WL 
610005 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2012). 
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  2012          I Hadley v. GateHouse Media Freeport Holdings, Inc., No. 12 
C 548, 2012 WL 2866463 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2012). 
  2012          I Price v. Gannett Co., No. 2:11-cv-00628, 2012 WL 1570972 
(S.D. W. Va. May 1, 2012). 
  2012          I S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 
3335284 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012). 
  2012          I Shrader v. Biddinger, No. 10-cv-01881-REB-MJW, 2012 
WL 976032 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2012). 
  2012          I Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Public Library, No. CV 11-64-M-
DWM-JCL, 2012 WL 734163 (D. Mont. Mar. 6, 2012). 
  2013         N Ascend Health Corp. v. Wells, No. 4:12-CV-00083-BR, 
2013 WL 1010589 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 14, 2013). 
  2013          I Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., No. 155629/12, 2013 WL 3335071 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2013). 
  2013          I Gavra v. Google Inc., No. 5:12-CV-06546-PSG, 2013 WL 
3788241 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2013). 
  2013          I Mmubango v. Google, Inc., No. 12-1300, 2013 WL 664231 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2013). 
  2013          I Russell v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries Inc., No. DKC 
08-2468, 2013 WL 5276557 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2013). 
  2014          I Dowbenko v. Google Inc., No. 14-10195, 2014 WL 
4378742 (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2014). 
  2014          I Internet Brands, Inc. v. Jape, 760 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2014). 
  2014          I Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 
F.3d. 398 (6th Cir. 2014). 
  2014          I Joseph v. Amazon.com, No. C13-1656-JCC, 2014 WL 
4269505 (W.D. Wash., Aug. 28, 2014). 
  2014          I Kimzye v. Yelp Inc., No. C13-1734RAJ, 2014 WL 1805551 
(W.D. Wash. May 7, 2014). 
  2014          I Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc., 152 So. 
3d 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
  2014                I Miller v. Federal Exp. Corp., 6 N.E.3d 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2014). 
  2014          I Obado v. Magedson, No. 13-2382 (JAP), 2014 WL 3778261 
(D.N.J. July 31, 2014). 
  2014          I O’Kroley v. Fastcase Inc., No. 3:13-0780, 2014 WL 
2197029 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2014). 
  2014          I  Seldon v. Magedson, No. CV-13-00072-PHX-DFC, 2014 
WL 1456316 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014). 
  2014          I Vanzquez v. Buhl, 90 A.3d 331 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). 
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Table 2. U.K. Decisions about ISP Liability for Defamation 
under Section 1 and EC Regulations 
 
Decision 
  Year 
Immunity 
for ISP 
Liability  
         Defamation Cases Relating to § 1 and EC Regulations 
  1999          N Godfrey v. Demon Internet Ltd [1999] EWHC 244 (QB).  
  2006          I Bunt v. Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB). 
  2009          I Karim v. Newsquest Media Group [2009] EWHC 3205 
(QB). 
 
  2009          I Metropolitan International Schools Ltd v. Designtechnica 
Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 (QB). 
  2010          I Budu v. BBC 2010 EWHC 616 (QB). 
  2010          N Kaschke v. Gray [2010] EWHC 690 (QB). 
  2011          N Davison v Habeeb [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB). 
  2012          I McGrath v. Dawkins [2012] EWHC B3 (QB). 
  2013          N Tamiz v. Google [2013] EWCA Civ 68. 
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